Interlocutory Appeal from the District Court El Paso County
District Court Case No. 18CR950 Honorable Gregory R. Werner,
Judge Honorable Gilbert A. Martinez, Senior Judge
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant: Daniel H. May, District
Attorney, Fourth Judicial District Andrew Lower, Deputy
District Attorney Doyle Baker, Senior Deputy District
Attorney Colorado Springs, Colorado
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee: Megan A. Ring, Public
Defender Max E. Shapiro, Deputy Public Defender Colorado
Springs, Colorado
HOOD
JUSTICE
¶1
While driving down a highway, a Colorado State Patrol (CSP)
trooper observed another driver flash her turn signal twice
over a distance of less than 200 feet and then change lanes.
Apparently believing he'd just witnessed an illegal lane
change, the trooper stopped the car in which there was a
passenger-the defendant, Devon Burnett.
¶2
A subsequent search of the car revealed a handgun, drug
paraphernalia, and suspected methamphetamine. As a result,
Burnett was charged with multiple offenses, including
possession with intent to manufacture or distribute a
controlled substance and possession of a weapon by a previous
offender.
¶3
Burnett filed a motion to suppress the evidence found during
the search that flowed from the stop for the allegedly
illegal lane change. He argued that the statute governing
turning movements and required signals, section 42-4-903(2),
C.R.S. (2018), doesn't require a person to signal for a
minimum distance before changing lanes; therefore, the
trooper did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the car.
The trial court agreed and suppressed the fruits of the
search.
¶4
The People filed this interlocutory appeal, contending in
part that the trooper at worst made an objectively reasonable
mistake of law when he concluded that changing lanes on the
highway without signaling for 200 feet violated section
42-4-903(2). Consequently, the People argue that the trooper
had reasonable suspicion to stop the car.
¶5
We conclude that the trooper's construction of section
42-4-903(2) was objectively unreasonable. The plain language
of the statute clearly distinguishes between turns and lane
changes, and the statute does not require a driver to signal
continuously for any set distance before changing lanes on a
highway-it only requires that a driver use a signal before
changing lanes. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's
suppression order.
I.
Facts and Procedural History [1]
¶6
Burnett was a passenger in a black sedan traveling along
Highway 21 in El Paso County. Trooper Stephen Wall watched as
the driver engaged the sedan's turn signal, allowed it to
flash twice for less than 200 feet, and then changed lanes.
Trooper Wall stopped the sedan.
¶7
As the sedan pulled over, Trooper Wall noticed the passenger
moving around in a manner that suggested he could be
"attempt[ing] to conceal contraband or produce a
weapon." Concerned for his safety, Trooper Wall radioed
for cover. When Trooper Wall approached the car, he noticed
that Burnett looked unusually nervous. This seemed strange to
Trooper Wall, considering Burnett was only the passenger and
not the subject of the stop. In addition to asking for the
driver's identification, Trooper Wall asked Burnett to
show the trooper his identification. Burnett complied.
¶8
After dispatch advised Trooper Wall that Burnett was subject
to a restraining order that prohibited Burnett from
possessing weapons, another trooper observed a handgun
magazine on the passenger side of the car. Law enforcement
personnel then searched the entire passenger compartment. The
troopers found a handgun underneath Burnett's seat, along
with a substance believed to be methamphetamine, drug
paraphernalia, baggies, and a scale. CSP arrested Burnett,
who was later charged with multiple offenses, including
possession with intent to manufacture or distribute a
controlled substance and possession of a weapon by a previous
offender.
¶9
Burnett moved to suppress all evidence resulting from the
stop, claiming Trooper Wall had no reasonable suspicion to
believe a traffic violation had occurred under section
42-4-903(2). The trial court granted the motion to suppress,
concluding that section 42-4-903(2) does not require a car to
signal continuously for 200 feet before changing lanes on a
highway-"that only applies to turning right or
left."
¶10
The People filed a motion to reconsider the suppression
order, arguing that the trooper made a reasonable mistake of
law because section 42-4-903(2) can be read as applying to
lane changes. They contended that under Heien v. North
Carolina, 135 S.Ct. 530 (2014), this objectively
reasonable mistake of law provided reasonable suspicion for
the traffic stop. The trial court denied the motion to
reconsider, without explicitly addressing the reasonable
mistake of law argument under Heien.[2]
¶11
The People filed this interlocutory appeal.
II.
Analysis
¶12
We first review relevant Fourth Amendment principles,
including precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court stating that
an objectively reasonable mistake of law can support a
finding that there was reasonable suspicion to justify an
investigatory stop. We then address section 42-4-903 and
determine that its plain language only requires that a driver
signal before changing lanes-it does not require a driver to
signal continuously for any set distance before changing
lanes. Because the text of the statute is clear, we conclude
that the trooper's construction of section 42-4-903 was
not objectively reasonable.
A.
Standard of Review
¶13
A trial court's order suppressing evidence presents a
mixed question of law and fact. People v.
Chavez-Barragan, 2016 CO 16, ¶ 9, 365 P.3d 981,
983. "We accept the trial court's findings of
historic fact if those findings are supported by competent
evidence, but we assess the legal significance of the facts
de novo." Id. We also review "[r]elated
issues of statutory construction . . . de novo."
Id.
B. The
Fourth Amendment and Mistakes of Law
¶14
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects
individuals against unreasonable searches and
seizures.[3] U.S. Const. amend. IV. "A traffic
stop for a suspected violation of law is a 'seizure'
of the occupants of the vehicle and therefore must be
conducted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment."
Heien, 135 S.Ct. at 536. As relevant here, a brief,
investigatory traffic stop is constitutional "when the
officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal
activity 'has occurred, is taking place, or is about to
take place.'" Chavez-Barragan, ¶ 10,
365 P.3d at 983 (quoting People v. Ingram, 984 P.2d
597, 603 (Colo. 1999)). An officer may thus stop a vehicle if
the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the driver has
committed a traffic violation.
¶15
Reasonable suspicion may exist even if an officer is mistaken
about a critical fact or about the proper interpretation of a
statute. However, "[t]he Fourth Amendment tolerates only
reasonable mistakes, and those mistakes-whether of
fact or of law-must be objectively reasonable."
Heien, 135 S.Ct. at 539.
¶16
In Heien, the Supreme Court held that an
officer's mistaken interpretation of a traffic law was
reasonable and, thus, could still justify a stop under the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 534. At issue was a North
Carolina statute that required drivers to have at least one
working brake light. Id. at 535. The officer pulled
a vehicle over for failing to have two working brake lights
because he incorrectly believed that was what the statute
required. Id. at 534. Because the language of the
statute was unclear and had not been previously interpreted
by North Carolina's appellate courts, the U.S. Supreme
Court determined that the officer's mistaken
interpretation was reasonable and could provide reasonable
suspicion to justify the stop under the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 540. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
noted "[t]o be reasonable is not to be perfect, and so
the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part of
government officials, giving them 'fair leeway for
enforcing the law in the community's
protection.'" Id. at 536 (quoting
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176
(1949)); see also Casillas v. People, 2018 CO 78M,
¶¶ 44-45, 427 P.3d 804, 815 (Samour, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the rationale behind the
Heien majority's holding). Heien thus
held that a mistaken interpretation of the law can still
support a finding of reasonable suspicion if the mistake is
objectively reasonable. Heien, 135 S.Ct. at
539. As a corollary of this holding, courts should not
consider the "subjective understanding of the particular
officer involved."[4] Id.
¶17
With these Fourth Amendment principles in mind, we now
examine ...