United States District Court, D. Colorado
MICHAEL C. TRIMARCO, Plaintiff,
v.
CHARLES E. ERGEN, III, Defendant.
ORDER
PHILIP
A. BRIMMER United States District Judge
This
matter comes before the Court on the parties' Joint
Stipulated Motions for Leave to Restrict [Docket Nos. 37, 41]
and defendant's Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 [Docket No. 43].
Although plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed this case, the
Court "retains the inherent authority to issue orders on
matters collateral to the merits." Lundahl v.
Halabi, 600 Fed.Appx. 596, 605 (10th Cir. 2014)
(unpublished); see also Cooter&Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396 (1990) (stating that the
determination of whether to impose sanctions under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 "may be made after the principal suit
has been terminated").
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
filed this lawsuit on January 22, 2018 seeking to collect on
a $60 million loan that allegedly "matured and came due
on May 1, 2017." Docket No. 1 at 1-2, ¶3. Plaintiff
asserted that the Court had diversity jurisdiction because
plaintiff "is an individual and resident of the State of
New York" and defendant is, "upon information and
belief, a resident of the State of Colorado."
Id. at 1, ¶¶ 1-2. On April 16, 2018, the
Court ordered plaintiff to show cause why the case should not
be dismissed based on plaintiff's failure to establish
the parties' domiciles for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction. Docket No. 24 at 2-3. On April 20, 2018,
plaintiff filed a response to the show cause order claiming
that he "is a United States citizen and a citizen of New
York" and that defendant renounced his United States
citizenship in 2011 and became a citizen of the Federation of
Saint Christopher and Nevis. Docket No. 25 at 2. Before the
Court ruled on the sufficiency of these new allegations,
plaintiff filed two supplemental responses to the Court's
show cause order asserting that (1) defendant's United
States citizenship was restored in 2016 and given retroactive
effect to September 14, 2011, Docket No. 30 at 2, and (2)
defendant has been residing at 5225 Bow Mar Drive, Littleton,
Colorado, for the past several months with his
"one-time" fiancee who recently gave birth to
defendant's second child. Docket No. 33 at 2. Plaintiff
argued that these facts demonstrated defendant's intent
to remain domiciled in Colorado, his childhood home. Docket
No. 30 at 3, Docket No. 33 at 3.
On May
17, 2018, the Court entered a second order to show cause
noting that plaintiff's new jurisdictional allegations
were rebutted by evidence in the record and therefore
insufficient to establish the Court's subject matter
jurisdiction. See Docket No. 35 at 5.[1] The Court
directed plaintiff to file a response addressing the impact
of certain evidence on the Court's determination of
domicile. Docket No. 35 at 1. Plaintiff filed his response to
the Court's second show cause order on May 30, 2018.
Docket No. 38.
On May
30, 3018 and June 5, 2018, the parties filed joint stipulated
motions to restrict access to documents bearing on
defendant's domicile, specifically, the State Department
letter of August 26, 2016 [Docket Nos. 38-5, 39] and certain
exhibits filed by plaintiff in response to the Court's
May 17, 2018 show cause order [Docket Nos. 38-3, 38-4, 38-6,
38-7, 38-8, 38-9, 38-10, 38-11, 38-12, 38-13]. See
Docket Nos. 37, 41. On June 19, 2018, defendant also moved
for sanctions pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927, arguing that plaintiff and his attorney had
provided the Court with false information concerning
defendant's domicile. See Docket No. 43 at 4,
6-7. On August 22, 2018, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the
case pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1), explaining that
"in order to preserve certain claims under applicable
statutes of limitations, and in light of the challenges
asserted to this Court's jurisdiction, plaintiff [had]
commenced an action in New York State Court Supreme Court,
New York County." Docket No. 46 at 1. The parties'
joint motions for leave to restrict and defendant's
motion for sanctions are still pending.
II.
MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO RESTRICT
The
parties request a court order restricting public access to
certain documents filed in this case. See generally
Docket Nos. 37, 41. Those documents include a letter from the
U.S. State Department [Docket Nos. 38-5, 39], a declaration
by plaintiff's private investigator, James Albee [Docket
No. 38-6], the exhibits attached to Mr. Albee's
declaration [Docket Nos. 38-7, 38-8, 38-9, 38-10, 38-11,
38-12, 38-13], and Exhibits B and C to plaintiff's May
30, 2018 declaration [Docket Nos. 38-2, 38-3]. The parties
state that the State Department letter contains
"personal medical information" of defendant, Docket
No. 37 at 2, ¶ 5, and that the Albee declaration and
exhibits "contain certain sensitive information
including social security numbers, bank account numbers, and
birthdates." Docket No. 41 at 2, ¶ 4.
"Courts
have long recognized a common-law right of access to judicial
records." Mann v. Boathght, 477 F.3d 1140, 1149
(10th Cir. 2007) (citing Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns,
Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978)). However, that
presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted "if the
public's right of access is outweighed by competing
interests." JetAway Aviation, LLC v. Bd. of Cty.
Comm'rs of Cty. of Montrose, Colo., 754 F.3d 824,
826 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Helm v. Kansas, 656
F.3d 1277, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011)). To overcome the
presumption in favor of public access, "the party
seeking to seal records must articulate a real and
substantial interest that justifies depriving the public of
access to the records that inform our decision-making
process." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). It is within the district court's discretion to
determine whether a particular court document should be
sealed. See Mann, 477 F.3d at 1149 ("Whether
judicial records and other case-related information should be
sealed or otherwise withheld from the public is a matter left
to the sound discretion of the district court.").
In
furtherance of the common law right of access to court
records, this District promulgated D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2(c),
which requires a party seeking to restrict public access to:
(1) identify the document or the proceeding for which
restriction is sought;
(2) address the interest to be protected and why such
interest outweighs the presumption of public access
(stipulations between the parties or stipulated protective
orders with regard to discovery, alone, are insufficient to
justify restriction);
(3) identify a clearly defined and serious injury that would
result if access is not restricted;
(4) explain why no alternative to restriction is practicable
or why only restriction will adequately protect the interest
in question (e.g., redaction, summarization, restricted
...