United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Daniel David Egli, was a prisoner in the custody of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), incarcerated
at the Englewood Federal Correctional Institution in
Littleton, Colorado at the time he initiated this action on
January 4, 2018. On January 31, 2018, Mr. Egli filed, pro
se, an Amended Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 7), challenging a
prison disciplinary conviction. He has paid the $5.00 filing
The Amended Application
Amended Application, Mr. Egli seeking an expungement of an
incident report, a restoration of his 27 days of lost good
time credits, and access to the inmate email system for the
remainder of his incarceration. (ECF No. 7). According to
Applicant, he was denied due process at the disciplinary
hearing because the hearing officer had pre-judged him
guilty. (Id. at 2). He also alleges that BOP staff
improperly advised him that he could not proceed with his
administrative remedies. (Id. at 4).
February 1, 2018, Magistrate Judge Gordon P. Gallagher
directed the Respondent to file a preliminary response to the
application addressing the affirmative defense of exhaustion
of administrative remedies. (ECF No. 8). In the preliminary
response, Respondent argued that Applicant had failed to
exhaust administrative remedies. (ECF No. 12). Mr. Egli filed
a Response on March 9, 2018. (ECF No. 13). Respondent filed a
Reply to Applicant's Response on March 22, 2018. (ECF No.
14). The same day, Applicant filed a “Petition to
Submit Exhibit into Evidence, ” (ECF No. 15), which was
granted by the Court on July 10, 2018 (ECF No. 24). On April
4, 2018, Applicant filed a “Rebuttal to
Government's Statement.” (ECF No. 16).
April 25, 2018, the Court ordered Respondent to Show Cause
why Applicant's habeas application should not be granted.
(ECF No. 17). On May 16, 2018, Respondent filed a response to
the Order to Show Cause. (ECF No. 19). On May 29, 2018,
Applicant filed a Notice of Change of Address (ECF No. 20),
and a “Rebuttal to Respondent's Response, ”
(ECF No. 21). On June 27, 2018, Applicant filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 22), which was denied by the Court
on June 28, 2018 (ECF No. 23).
Court takes judicial notice that the Bureau of Prisons inmate
locator website indicates that Mr. Egli was released from BOP
custody on December 4, 2018. See
federal courts have an independent obligation to determine
whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. Ruhrgas AG v.
Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). A court
lacking jurisdiction “must dismiss the cause at any
stage of the proceedings in which it becomes apparent that
jurisdiction is lacking.” See Basso v. Utah Power
& Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir.
1974); see also McAlester v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
851 F.2d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 1988) (issue of subject matter
may be raised sua sponte by the court at any point
in the proceedings); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“Whenever
it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the
court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court
shall dismiss the action.”). A dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction is without prejudice.
Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213,
1218 (10th Cir. 2006).
is a threshold issue because the existence of a live case or
controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal court
jurisdiction.” McClendon v. City of
Albuquerque, 100 F.3d 863, 867 (10th Cir.1996); see
also Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 92 (2009). “To
invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, a litigant must
have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury
traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a
favorable judicial decision.” Lewis v. Cont'l
Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). At all stages of
the case, “‘[t]he parties must continue to have a
“personal stake in the outcome” of the
lawsuit.'” Spencer v. Kenma, 523 U.S. 1, 7
(1998) (quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477-78). Federal
courts have no authority to give an opinion upon a question
that is moot as a result of events that occur during the
pendency of the action. Church of Scientology v. United
States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992).
Mr. Egli was released from prison, he no longer had a
redressable injury arising from his prison disciplinary
conviction and the forfeiture of good time credits.
See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 18 (1998)
(stating that the federal courts "are not in the
business of pronouncing that past actions which have no
demonstrable continuing effect were right or wrong.").
Therefore, because Mr. Egli was released from BOP custody on
December 4, 2018, his request for relief, that his 27 days of
good time credit be restored and that he be allowed access to
the inmate Trulincs email system, is moot. In other words,
because Applicant has already been released from custody,
there is nothing for the Court to remedy. See Lucero v.
McKune, 340 Fed.Appx. 442, 444 (10th Cir. 2009)
(“Since [petitioner] has been released from custody, he
has already received his requested relief, and there is
simply ‘nothing for us to remedy.'”
(citing Spencer, 523 U.S. at 18)). As recognized by
the Tenth Circuit in Rhodes v. Judiscak, 676 F.3d
931 (10th Cir. 2012):
This court can no longer issue a judgment that has a
more-than-speculative chance of affecting [petitioner's]
rights. We cannot modify his sentence now that it has been
completed. And we are not allowed to give him a judicial
make-up call by shortening his supervised release term.
See [United States v.] Johnson,
529 U.S. [53, ] 59 [(2000)].
. . . . [T]he best this court could do for him would be to
declare that he spent longer in prison than he should have.
It is merely speculative, however, that such a declaration