United States District Court, D. Colorado
OPINION AND ORDER
N.
REID NEUREITER UNITED STATE MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
An
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) determined that
Plaintiff Cynthia Martinez is not disabled for purposes of
the Social Security Act (the “Act”).
(AR[1]
26.) Ms. Martinez has asked this Court to review that
decision. The Court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §
405(g), and both parties have agreed to have this case
decided by a U.S. Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. §
636(c). (Dkt. #14.)
Standard
of Review
In
Social Security appeals, the Court reviews the ALJ decision
to determine whether the factual findings are supported by
substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards
were applied. See Pisciotta v. Astrue, 500 F.3d
1074, 1075 (10th Cir. 2007). “Substantial evidence is
such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. It requires more than a scintilla,
but less than a preponderance.” Raymond v.
Astrue, 621 F.3d 1269, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Court “should,
indeed must, exercise common sense” and “cannot
insist on technical perfection.” Keyes-Zachary v.
Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012). The Court
cannot reweigh the evidence or its credibility. Lax v.
Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007).
Background
At the
second step of the Commissioner's five-step sequential
evaluation process for making determinations, [2] the ALJ found
that Ms. Martinez “had the following severe
impairments: lumbar and cervical degenerative disc disease;
right shoulder AC separation; diabetes mellitus; bipolar
disorder; and anxiety disorder.” (AR 17.) The ALJ then
determined, at step three, that through the current date last
insured, Ms. Martinez “did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the
severity of one of the listed impairments” in the
regulations. (AR 18.) Because she concluded that Ms. Martinez
did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets the severity of the listed impairments, the ALJ found
that through the date last insured, Ms. Martinez had the
following residual functional capacity (“RFC”):
. . . [Ms. Martinez] had the residual functional capacity to
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) with the
following abilities and limitations: [Ms. Martinez] could
have occasionally climbed ramps and stairs but was unable to
climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; [Ms. Martinez] was
occasionally able to balance, stop, kneel, crouch, and crawl;
[Ms. Martinez] needed to avoid hazards such as unprotected
heights and dangerous moving machinery; [Ms. Martinez] was
unable to reach over head with her right (dominant) upper
extremity; [Ms. Martinez] could have no more than
occasionally reached overhead with the left upper extremity;
[Ms. Martinez] could have frequently reached in all other
directions bilaterally, and was limited to frequent handling
and fingering bilaterally; [Ms. Martinez] was limited to low
stress work, which is defined as occasional decision making
and occasional adapting to workplace change; [Ms. Martinez]
was limited to occasional public contact; and [Ms. Martinez]
was unable to perform work that would require travel to
unfamiliar places.
(AR 20-21.) At step five, the ALJ determined that
“[t]hrough the current date last insured, considering
[Ms. Martinez'] age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity, there were jobs that existed in
significant numbers in the national economy that [Ms.
Martinez] could have performed . . . .” (AR 25.)
As a
result, the ALJ concluded Ms. Martinez was not disabled and
was not entitled to benefits. (AR 26-27.)
Ms.
Martinez asserts two reversible errors: first, that the ALJ
erred when she denied Ms. Martinez' motion to reopen her
prior claim; and second, that the ALJ erred by concluding
there were jobs in the national economy that Ms. Martinez
could perform, and therefore she is not disabled within the
meaning of the Act. (Dkt. #15 at 4-8.)[3]
I
conclude the ALJ did not err in denying Ms. Martinez'
motion to reopen her prior claim, but that she did err by
concluding the Commissioner had met her burden of proving
available jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff could
perform. Although the ALJ, in her RFC findings and analysis,
referenced two limitations that the Vocational Expert
testified would make Ms. Martinez unable to perform the three
jobs identified by the Vocational Expert, the ALJ failed to
make any specific factual findings in relation to these two
limitations, necessitating the reversal and remand of the
ALJ's decision for further development of the record with
respect to these two limitations.
Analysis
1.
Motion to Reopen
Ms.
Martinez first argues the ALJ erred when she denied
counsel's request to reopen Ms. Martinez' prior claim
for Social Security disability insurance benefits
(“DIB”). Ms. Martinez's prior application for
DIB was dated October 29, 2013. (AR 37.) As Ms. Martinez
admits, she did not appeal that decision. (Dkt. #15 at 4;
Dkt. #26 at 1.) Ms. Martinez filed the claim at dispute in
this case on March 17, 2014 (AR ...