United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER
R.
BROOKE JACKSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Emiliano
Archuleta was 16 years old in July 2016 when three
Westminster police officers and two social workers arrived at
his mother's apartment to execute a state court order to
remove him and two younger siblings from his mother's
custody. Apparently not wishing to leave the apartment,
Emiliano went into the kitchen, stood by a counter with his
head down, and was verbally non-responsive. Officer Heather
Wood began to forcibly remove him. In the process Officers
Louis Engleberg and Reed Giles allegedly took him to the
ground, and then assaulted and injured him. He was then
handcuffed, removed, and charged with obstructing a police
officer - a charge that was later dismissed. Based on these
alleged facts, he asserts an excessive force claim against
all three officers and malicious prosecution against Officer
Wood. Amended Complaint, ECF No. 15.
Defendant
Wood moves to dismiss the malicious prosecution claim
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), contending that it fails
to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.
ECF No. 19. She cites Margheim v. Buljko, 855 F.3d
1077, 1084 (10th Cir. 2017) for the proposition that a
malicious prosecution claim requires “legal process,
” specifically in this case an arrest warrant before
the arrest was made. I agree that some form of legal process
is required, i.e. in the form of an arrest, confinement, or
prosecution, but I do not agree that “legal
process” must be an arrest pursuant to a warrant. Colo.
Rev. Stat. §16-5-101 lists many of the ways in which
legal process is imposed in Colorado, and section (1)(d)(i)
specifies “the issuance of a summons and
complaint.” This is the legal process that serves the
basis for malicious prosecution in the present case.
In my
view, defendant took language from Margheim out of
context. There the Tenth Circuit was differentiating between
situations where it was appropriate to bring a malicious
prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment's right to
be free from unreasonable seizures as opposed to where it was
appropriate to bring a false imprisonment claim. In essence,
the Tenth Circuit was saying that a malicious prosecution
claim for a seizure can be brought if the plaintiff was
arrested with legal process, such as a warrant, but if they
weren't, then a false imprisonment claim should be
brought instead. 855 F.3d at 1085.
Notably,
the case lists the standard five elements for a Fourth
Amendment malicious prosecution claim under §1983 as the
following:
(1) the defendant caused the plaintiff's continued
confinement or prosecution;
(2) the original action terminated in favor of the plaintiff;
(3) no probable cause supported the original arrest,
continued confinement, or prosecution;
(4) the defendant acted with malice; and
(5) the plaintiff sustained damages.
Id. at 1085 (citing Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528
F.3d 790, 799 (10th Cir. 2013)). It then elaborates that
“legal process” usually comes in at step three:
“In a case like this one where the arrest was based on
a warrant, the third element concerns the probable cause
determination at the time the warrant was issued and thus
supplies the link to legal process . . . The plaintiff's
challenge to the process (not merely the confinement) is the
mark of a malicious prosecution claim.” Id.
But the use of a warrant for the arrest was just one example
of how legal process came into step three. The court
favorably cites Wilkins v. DeReyes, the case on
which defendant relies, which says that an arrest made
pursuant to a warrant is the “classic example” of
what constitutes the imposition of legal process giving rise
to a claim of malicious prosecution. The cases are not in
conflict.
In the
present case the arrest was not made pursuant to a warrant,
but legal process is involved when Defendant Wood served Mr.
Archuleta with a criminal summons. The distinction described
in Margheim is relevant in cases where a plaintiff
is only seeking a remedy for wrongful detention they suffered
before the imposition of any legal process. There, the
warrant would be the only involvement of “legal
process” because there was no subsequent summons or
prosecution. Mr. Archuleta is not only challenging his
seizure but is also challenging the imposition of legal
processes against him in being served with a criminal summons
after his detention.
Finally,
I find that the Amended Complaint asserts facts that, if
construed in plaintiff's favor as is required at this
stage of the case, sufficiently alleges a claim that could
satisfy the five elements of a malicious ...