Arapahoe County District Court No. 05CR1909, Honorable
Charles M. Pratt, Judge
H. Coffman, Attorney General, John T. Lee, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Polansky Attorney at Law, LLC, Lisa A. Polansky, Boulder,
Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
1] This case is about two bites at the proverbial
apple. Defendant, Christopher Joseph Taylor, appeals the
postconviction courts order denying his second Crim. P.
35(c) motion. We affirm because the motion was successive.
Answering an undecided question, we hold that Crim. P.
35(c)(3)(VII) supersedes the rule stated in People v.
Naranjo, 738 P.2d 407, 409 (Colo.App. 1987), that a
defendant can file a second Crim. P. 35(c) motion raising new
postconviction claims if the defendant filed an initial Crim.
P. 35(c) motion pro se.
2] A jury found defendant guilty of first degree
murder, attempted first degree murder, and assault. On direct
appeal, a division of this court affirmed the judgment of
conviction. See People v. Taylor, 2010 WL
3504825 (Colo.App. No. 06CA2614, Sept. 9, 2010) (not
published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f) ) (Taylor I ).
3] Defendant moved for transcripts at state expense
to prepare a Crim. P. 35(c) motion. The postconviction court
denied the motion.
4] A few months later, defendant filed a pro se
Crim. P. 35(c) motion raising seven claims, most of them
asserting that his trial counsel had provided ineffective
assistance. He also requested the appointment of
5] The postconviction court summarily denied
defendants Crim. P. 35(c) motion and his request for the
appointment of postconviction counsel. A division of this
court affirmed. See People v. Taylor, 2014
WL 171833 (Colo.App. No. 12CA1984, Jan. 16, 2014) (not
published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f) ) (Taylor II ).
The opinion does not indicate that defendant appealed the
denial of his motion for transcripts at state expense.
6] Defendant then filed a second pro se Crim. P.
35(c) motion, which he amended. He renewed some of the claims
from his first Crim. P. 35(c) motion and raised new claims.
This time, the postconviction court appointed counsel, who
filed a supplemental motion. The prosecution responded,
arguing in part that the new claims in the second motion were
barred as successive.
7] The postconviction court issued a written order
denying the second Crim. P. 35(c) motion without a hearing.
The court first held that the claims from defendants first
Crim. P. 35(c) motion were barred as successive under Crim.
P. 35(c)(3)(VI). But the court did not bar defendants new
claims as successive. Instead, the court explained that it
was "not convinced" that Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII)
supersedes prior case law holding that a defendant can raise
new postconviction claims in a ...