United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER
LEWIS
T. BABCOCK, JUDGE.
Plaintiff
Michael Johnson appeals Defendant's (the
“Commissioner”) final administrative decision
denying his claim for disability insurance benefits under
Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”)
and for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the
Act. Jurisdiction in this appeal is proper pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). Oral argument would not materially
assist in the determination of this appeal. After
consideration of the briefs and the record, I affirm the
Commissioner's decision.
I.
Statement of the Case
Following
a hearing, Plaintiff's disability claim was denied in a
decision dated December 28, 2016. The Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff's request for review thereby rendering the
ALJ's December 28, 2016 decision the Commissioner's
final decision for purposes of my review. Plaintiff timely
filed this appeal seeking review of the Commissioner's
final decision.
II.
Statement of Facts
A.
Plaintiff's Disability Hearing
At the
December 5, 2016 hearing on Plaintiff's disability claim,
Plaintiff testified that he was seeking disability benefits
because of his bipolar disorder which caused severe mood
swings, feelings of hopelessness and worthlessness, suicidal
ideations, frustration, anger, and paranoia. AR 55. Plaintiff
further testified that he suffered from abdominal pain that
limited his mobility, including his lifting capabilities. AR
59-61.
The VE
identified Plaintiff's past work as a clothing
salesperson and a coffee shop counter attendant. AR 63-4. The
ALJ asked the VE if a person with Plaintiff's work
history who could perform work at all exertional levels but
was limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks with
only occasional interaction with supervisors and coworkers
and only incidental interaction with the public could perform
Plaintiff's past work. AR 64. The VE responded no but
opined that such an individual could work as a hand packager,
store laborer, and industrial cleaner. If the individual was
further limited to work at the light exertional level, the VE
opined that the individual could work as a housekeeping
cleaner, routing clerk, and small products assembler. AR
65-6. If the individual could have no contact with the public
or coworkers, the VE opined that the individual would be
limited to working as a night cleaner. AR 66-7. The VE
further testified that employers generally do not tolerate
employees being off task more than 10-15% of the workday. AR
66.
B.
The ALJ's Decision
In his
December 28, 2016 decision, the ALJ applied the five-step
sequential process outlined in 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a). At the first step of the sequential process, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since his alleged disability onset date of
September 25, 2014. AR 34. At the second step, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff had impairments of status-post colosotmy and
reversal, bipolar disorder, and panic disorder. Id.
The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment
or a combination of impairments that met or medically equaled
one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 1. AR 298.
The ALJ
next concluded that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light
work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) but was
limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks; no more
than occasional interaction with supervisors and coworkers;
and no more than incidental interaction with the public. AR
37. Based on the VE's hearing testimony, the ALJ then
found that Plaintiff was capable of performing jobs existing
in significant numbers in the national economy and was
therefore was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. AR
42-3.
III.
Standard of Review
In
reviewing the Commissioner's decision, I must determine
whether substantial evidence in the record as a whole
supports the factual findings and whether the correct legal
standards were applied. Castellano v. Secretary of Health
& Human Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1992);
Hamilton v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs.,
961 F.2d 1495, 1497-98 (10th Cir. 1992). Substantial evidence
is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Hamilton, supra, 961 F.2d at 1498. I “may
neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute [my] discretion
for that of the Administrative Law Judge.” Kelley
v. Chater, 62 F.3d 335, 337 (10th Cir. 1995).
IV.
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