United States District Court, D. Colorado
ESTATE OF TYLER TABOR; RAY TABOR, as personal representative of the estate of Tyler Tabor, deceased; MICHELLE MCLEAN, as legal guardian for minor child D.T.; D.T., a minor child by and through his legal guardians; and BRIDGET TABOR, Plaintiffs,
v.
CORIZON HEALTH, INC., Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RESTRICT, DENYING
MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT, AND CLOSING CASE
MARCIA
S. KRIEGER CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
THIS
MATTER comes before the Court pursuant to the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement
(# 135) and the Plaintiffs' unopposed
Motion to Restrict Access (# 134).
The
Court assumes the reader's familiarity with the
proceedings to date. In summary, the Plaintiffs, the
representatives and heirs of Tyler Tabor, a detainee who died
in the custody of the Adams County jail, allege claims
sounding in various constitutional deprivations under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and state law statutory and tort claims
against Defendant Corizon Health, Inc., who managed the
jail's medical staff. In April 2017, the parties notified
the Court that they had reached a settlement (#
116) and were preparing dismissal papers. After a
series of extensions, the deadline for submitting dismissal
papers was set (# 127) at November 19, 2018.
On
November 16, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed the instant motions.
They explain that the terms of the parties' settlement
agreement involved Corizon making a lump sum payment to the
Plaintiffs in exchange for the Plaintiffs giving a release of
all claims. Although the Plaintiffs gave such a release in
August 2018, see Docket # 133-2, Corizon apparently
did not fulfill its obligations. Rather, the Plaintiffs
explain, Corizon made roughly a quarter of the promised
payment on November 2, 2018, and announced “cash
flow” problems that required it to make the remaining
payments in installments through February 2019. The
Plaintiffs rejected Corizon's request to complete the
settlement via installment payments and filed the instant
Motion to Enforce (# 135), requesting
“that this Court use its equitable powers to convert
the Settlement into a Final Judgment.” Separately, the
Plaintiffs requested that their motion and supporting
exhibits be filed under restriction to prevent public access,
owing to an agreement between the parties that the terms of
the settlement would be kept confidential.
The
Court denies the request to enforce the settlement. In
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375
(1994), [1] the Supreme Court held that federal courts
ordinarily lack jurisdiction to enforce settlement agreements
that arise from and resolve prior federal litigation, unless
the court has incorporated the terms of the settlement into
its order of dismissal or there is an independent basis for
federal jurisdiction. Here, neither party asked the Court to
embody the terms of their settlement as part of any order
dismissing the claims against Corizon. But see
infra.
Arguably,
the Court observes, sua sponte, that there is a
basis for independent federal jurisdiction over a claim by
which the Plaintiffs seek to enforce their contract with
Corizon - the Complaint makes clear that Corizon is a citizen
of the State of Tennessee, the Plaintiffs are all citizens of
Colorado, and the amount in controversy clearly exceeds $75,
000, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332. But even if this
Court could, consistent with Kokkonen,
proceed to adjudicate whether there has been any breach of
the parties' settlement agreement, it would exercise its
discretion not to. The lawsuit before this Court concerns
questions of Corizon's constitutional liability for
failure to deliver adequate medical care to Mr. Tabor, not
Corizon's contractual obligations towards the Plaintiffs.
Although it may be convenient to the parties to use the
framework of the existing lawsuit to resolve the new dispute
that has arisen between them, this Court does not treat civil
actions as a mere shell whose substantive contents can be
swapped out freely as the parties' needs change. The
Court's statistical records reflect that this case is a
civil rights action, not a contract action. Those records
reflect that the parties' dispute arose in 2016, not on
or about November 2, 2018. The Scheduling Order in this case
is focused upon discovery relating to constitutional claims,
not contractual breaches. All this is to say that, to the
extent the Plaintiffs wish to litigate the issue of whether
Corizon is in breach of the settlement agreement (instead of
litigating the constitutional issues initially presented),
they must do so by commencing a new action sounding in
contract and paying a new filing fee, not by asking this
Court to resolve a dispute that is entirely collateral to the
existing action. Accordingly, the Court denies the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce.
Second,
the Court also denies the Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to
Restrict. D.C. Colo. L. Civ. R. 7.2 sets forth the specific
elements that a party must demonstrate to overcome the strong
public interest in having access to records presented to the
Court for adjudication. Among the key requirements are: (i) a
showing of the particular harm that will befall the parties
if the material in question is made publicly-available, and
(ii) a showing that all possible means short of restricted
access would be insufficient to meet the parties' needs.
D.C. Colo. L. Civ. R. 7.2(c)(3)-(4). The Plaintiffs'
Motion to Restrict fails to establish either element. The
sole basis articulated by the Plaintiffs for the necessity of
restriction is that the parties have agreed to keep their
settlement terms confidential; Local Rule 7.2(c)(2) expressly
provides that “stipulations between the parties”
for confidentiality “are insufficient to justify
restriction” in and of themselves. And although the
Plaintiffs make a perfunctory assertion that “a less
restrictive alternative” to filing the entire
settlement agreement “is not available to Plaintiff,
” that contention belies a lack of even a modicum of
effort devoted to the problem. The Court assumes - the
Plaintiffs have certainly not specifically alleged, despite
the requirements of Local Rule 7.2. (c)(2) - that the
particular information that the parties wish to keep
confidential is largely limited to the amount of the monetary
payment agreed upon.[2] A simple redaction of that sum in the
exhibits to the Motion to Enforce could have accomplished the
Plaintiffs' goals without requiring any restrictions on
public access to the filings. Accordingly, because the
Plaintiffs have not made a sufficient showing under Local
Rule 7.2(c), the Court denies the Motion to Restrict Access
and directs that the filing at Docket # 133 be unrestricted.
Finally,
the Court turns to the question of what, if anything, remains
to be done with this case. All Defendants other than Corizon
have now been dismissed. The parties' Settlement
Agreement, Exhibit B to Docket # 133, makes clear that the
Plaintiffs agreed to Stipulate to the Dismissal of this
action “[c]oncurrently with the execution of [the]
Agreement.” The Agreement was executed on August 9,
2018, at which time the Plaintiffs released their claims
against Corizon. That release was not conditioned upon
Corizon simultaneously making the full amount of the
settlement payment: the parties agreed that payment from
Corizon was not due until approval of the state court in a
related probate matter was completed and that approval was
not obtained until October 30, 2018, several weeks after the
Plaintiffs had signed the release of their claims. Thus, it
does not appear that the Plaintiffs have any remaining claims
that they can pursue in this action, Corizon's alleged
subsequent breach of the agreement notwithstanding. Their
sole remedy is, as discussed above, the commencement of a new
lawsuit sounding in breach of their settlement agreement.
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the remaining civil
rights claims against Corizon and close this case.
For the
foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Restrict (# 134)
and directs the Clerk of the Court to lift all restrictions
on Docket # 133. The Court DENIES the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce (# 135).
The Plaintiffs' claims against Corizon as set forth in
the Amended Complaint (# 23) are
DISMISSED based on the parties'
settlement. It appearing to the Court that there are no
remaining claims, the Clerk of the Court shall close this
case.
---------
Notes:
[1] The Court notes that literally all of
the pertinent authority the Plaintiffs invoke in their Motion
to Enforce predates the Supreme Court's decision in
Kokkonen. Indeed, the Plaintiffs cite to the
9th Circuit's decision in
Kokkonen for the proposition that “a district
court has the inherent power summarily to enforce a
settlement agreement with respect to an action pending before
it, ” without acknowledging that the Supreme Court
expressly reversed the 9th Circuit and rejected
that contention: “both [trial and appellate] courts in
the present case appear to have relied upon . . .
‘inherent power' [to enforce an agreement]. We
think, however, that the power asked for here is quite remote
from what courts require in order to perform their
functions.” 511 U.S. at 380. Whether the
Plaintiffs' counsel negligently copied authority from an
outdated research memo without bothering to check its
continuing applicability or is actively trying to mislead the
Court as to the current state of the law need not be
resolved, but either situation is troubling.
[2] To the extent that there are other
provisions in one or more of the exhibits that would also
justify the parties seeking restricted access, the same
analysis applies. Indeed, it is unclear to the Court why it
was necessary for the Plaintiffs to file any
exhibits in conjunction with their motion beyond an affidavit
of counsel explaining the pertinent facts that: (i) a
settlement was reached and agreed to by both sides; (ii) the
Plaintiffs have complied with their obligations under that
agreement; and ...