Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Case No. 13CA1215
Attorneys for Petitioner: Megan Ring, Public Defender Jud
Lohnes, Deputy Public Defender Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent: Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney
General Brock J. Swanson, Assistant Attorney General Denver,
Colorado
OPINION
BOATRIGHT JUSTICE.
¶1
Christopher Mountjoy was convicted of reckless manslaughter,
illegal discharge of a firearm, and tampering with physical
evidence after he shot and killed V.M. outside of a
motorcycle clubhouse. During sentencing, the trial court
found that each crime involved extraordinary aggravating
circumstances. In doing so, the trial court relied on factual
findings that were made by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt
on the related charges as aggravating factors for the offense
for which he was being sentenced. As a result, the trial
court doubled the statutory presumptive maximum of each
sentence.
¶2
Mountjoy appealed his sentences, arguing that aggravating his
sentences in this fashion violated his constitutional rights
to due process and trial by jury under Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). The court of appeals
avoided the question of whether Apprendi and
Blakely had been satisfied and concluded that, even
assuming they were not satisfied, any error was harmless. We
granted certiorari[1] and now affirm on other grounds. We hold
that the trial court did not deny Mountjoy his rights to due
process and trial by jury when it relied on facts found by
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt on charges related to the
offenses for which the aggravated sentences were imposed.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals on
different grounds.
I.
Facts and Procedural History
¶3
This case arises from a shooting outside of a Sin City
Disciples motorcycle clubhouse. On the night of the shooting,
Mountjoy was working as the club's security. The victim
of the shooting, V.M., participated in a fight and, as a
result, was forced to leave the clubhouse. V.M. drove off
with a friend, but they returned to the clubhouse shortly
thereafter to reportedly retrieve a wallet he lost during the
fight. In returning, the friend parked the car outside the
clubhouse with the engine idling. Mountjoy testified that he
was concerned that the victim had returned to retaliate. At
that point Mountjoy fired eight shots in the direction of the
car. As the shots were fired, the car drove away from
Mountjoy. One of the fired shots struck and killed V.M.
Following the shooting, Mountjoy directed other members of
the club to clean up the area, and he deleted text messages
from his phone that mentioned the shooting. Subsequently, the
People charged Mountjoy with first-degree murder after
deliberation, first-degree extreme indifference murder,
robbery, illegal discharge of a weapon, and tampering with
physical evidence.
¶4
At trial, Mountjoy was found guilty of (1) reckless
manslaughter (the lesser included offense to first-degree
murder after deliberation and first-degree extreme
indifference murder), (2) illegal discharge of a firearm, and
(3) tampering with physical evidence. In sentencing Mountjoy,
the trial court determined that there were extraordinary
aggravating circumstances that warranted doubling the maximum
presumptive range sentence for each of Mountjoy's three
convictions under section 18-1.3-401(6), C.R.S. (2018).
Specifically, the court found that the reckless manslaughter
conviction was extraordinarily aggravated because Mountjoy
used a weapon, tampered with evidence, admitted to firing
eight shots, fired into a car with two occupants, and fired
while the car was driving away. Furthermore, the court found
that the illegal discharge conviction was extraordinarily
aggravated because somebody died and Mountjoy tampered with
evidence. Finally, the court found that the tampering count
was extraordinarily aggravated because somebody died. By
aggravating the sentences, the trial court sentenced Mountjoy
to twelve years in prison for the reckless manslaughter
charge, six years in prison for the illegal discharge of the
firearm charge, and three years in prison for the tampering
with physical evidence charge, each to be served
consecutively, for a total of twenty-one years in prison.
¶5
Mountjoy appealed the aggravated sentences, arguing, among
other things, that his constitutional rights to due process
and a jury trial under Blakely and Apprendi
had been violated because the trial court had issued
aggravated sentences for each count based on facts that the
jury had not specifically found in connection with those
particular counts.
¶6
The court of appeals upheld the enhanced sentences.
People v. Mountjoy, 2016 COA 86, ¶ 55, ___ P.3d
___. The majority held that even if the trial court's
actions violated Blakely and Apprendi, the
error was harmless because the jury would have found the
facts necessary to aggravate each count specifically in
connection with each count had it been asked to do so.
Id. at ¶ 1. In a special concurrence, Judge
Jones argued that no Blakely/Apprendi error
had occurred. Id. at ¶¶ 57-68. We granted
certiorari and now affirm the court of appeals' judgment
on different grounds.
II.
Standard of Review
¶7
We review legal questions and constitutional challenges to
sentencing schemes de novo. Misenhelter v. People,
234 P.3d 657, 660 (Colo. 2010); Lopez v. People, 113
P.3d 713, 720 (Colo. 2005).
III.
Analysis
¶8
We begin by examining Mountjoy's sentencing and
Colorado's aggravated sentencing scheme. Next, we discuss
the constitutionality of aggravated sentencing schemes under
Blakely and Apprendi, and how
Colorado's scheme has been implemented to satisfy
constitutional requirements. Finally, we conclude that each
of Mountjoy's aggravated sentences are
Blakely-compliant and therefore did not deny him his
rights to due process and trial by jury.
A. Colorado's Aggravating Circumstances
Scheme
¶9
Colorado's felony sentencing statute, section 18-1.3-401,
provides sentencing ranges for a trial court, and such ranges
are premised on the specific class of felony for which a
defendant is convicted. In this case, Mountjoy was convicted
of three offenses:
(1) Reckless manslaughter, a class four felony with a
presumptive range of two to six years imprisonment;
(2) Illegal discharge of a firearm, a class five felony with
a presumptive range of one to three years imprisonment; and
(3) Tampering with physical evidence, a class six felony with
a presumptive range of one year to eighteen months
imprisonment.
¶10
A trial court, however, may sentence a defendant in excess of
the presumptive range if the court concludes that
extraordinary aggravating circumstances are present. In that
instance, the trial court can impose a sentence greater than
the maximum in the presumptive range; except that in no case
shall the term of the sentence exceed twice the maximum
authorized in the presumptive range. See §
18-1.3-401(6). Thus, the trial court here was authorized
under section 18-1.3-401(6) to sentence Mountjoy to twelve
years for reckless manslaughter, six years for illegal
discharge of a firearm, and three years for tampering with
physical evidence. The trial court's implementation of
section 18-1.3-401(6), however, must have comported with the
Sixth Amendment, which guarantees, among other rights, the
right to a trial by an impartial jury.
B.
The Constitutionality of Colorado's Aggravating
Circumstances Scheme
¶11
In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Apprendi,
which held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
prohibits courts from enhancing criminal sentences beyond the
statutory maximum based on facts other than those found by a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at 490. The
Apprendi Court noted a narrow exception to the
jury-finding requirement-the fact of a prior conviction.
Id.
¶12
Four years later, the Court applied Apprendi in the
context of an aggravated sentencing guideline analogous to
our section 18-1.3-401(6) in Blakely. 542 U.S. at
299, 301. Although the statute in Blakely did not
specifically use the term "aggravating
circumstances," it was functionally equivalent,
providing that "[a] judge may impose a sentence above
the standard range if he finds 'substantial and
compelling reasons justifying an exceptional
sentence.'" 542 U.S. at 299 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code
§ 9.94A.120(2) (2000)). In Blakely, the
defendant pleaded guilty to the crime charged, and the judge,
believing that the crime had been committed with
"deliberate ...