United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER
Scott
T. Varholak, United States Magistrate Judge
This
matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's request for
construction of the terms “a” and
“the” used with the term “controller”
in claims 1, 3, and 8-11 in United States Patent No. 9, 346,
662 (the “‘662 Patent”). The parties have
consented to proceed before the undersigned United States
Magistrate Judge for all proceedings, including entry of a
final judgment. [##20, 34] The matter is now ripe for
consideration. [See ##100, 115-17] This Court has
carefully considered the briefing and the applicable case
law. The Court construes the terms “a” and
“the” used with the term “controller”
in claims 1, 3, and 8-11 as set forth below.
I.
BACKGROUND
According
to the Amended Complaint, Frac Shack, Inc. (“Frac
Shack”) “provides modular solutions for fuel
delivery that reduce significantly the health, safety and
environmental risks associated with fueling operations during
hydraulic fracturing.” [#30 at ¶ 10] Frac Shack is
the owner of the ‘662 Patent, which was issued on May
24, 2016. [Id. at ¶ 9] The Preamble describes
the ‘662 Patent as “[a] fuel delivery system for
fuel delivery to multiple pieces of equipment at a work
site.” [#1-1 at 10] The Summary of the ‘662
Patent states that “[a] fuel delivery system and method
is presented for reducing the likelihood that a fuel tank of
equipment at a well site during fracturing of a well will run
out of fuel.” [Id. at 7]
Frac
Shack alleges that Defendant Atlas Oil Company
(“Atlas”) has been using modular solutions for
refueling during hydraulic fracturing operations in the
United States. [#30 at ¶ 12] Frac Shack alleges that one
of these solutions, the Atlas Fuel Automation Station,
infringes Claims 1-4 and 7-12 of the ‘662 Patent.
[Id. at ¶¶ 12-13] Defendant Fuel
Automation Station, LLC (“Fuel Automation”)
allegedly leases the Atlas Fuel Automation Station to Atlas.
[Id. at ¶ 12]
On
March 9, 2018, this Court issued its Order construing each of
the claims that the parties had designated for construction
(the “Claim Construction Order”). [#92] On March
27, 2018, Defendants filed a “Motion for Clarification
of the [Claim Construction] Order” (the
“Clarification Motion”), asking the Court to
reconsider certain aspects of its Claim Construction Order.
[#93] On May 17, 2018, this Court: (1) denied the
Clarification Motion to the extent it asked the Court to
reconsider the preamble, (2) granted the Motion to the extent
it asked the Court to reconsider whether Claim Seven was
indefinite, and (3) concluded that Claim Seven was not
indefinite. [#99]
On May
23, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave for Limited
Claim Construction Briefing and to Reopen Claim Construction
(the “Reopen Motion”). [#100] Through the Reopen
Motion, Plaintiff asked the Court to reopen claim
construction and construe the articles “a” and
“the” used with “controller” in
claims 1, 3, and 8-11. [Id.] On August 2, 2018, this
Court granted the Reopen Motion and ordered the parties to
file supplemental briefs on the construction of
“a” and “the” used with
“controller” in claims 1, 3, and 8-11. [#115] The
parties each filed supplemental briefs. [##116, 117]
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In
construing patent claims, courts are guided by the precedent
of the Federal Circuit. See Sun Tiger, Inc. v. Sci.
Research Funding Grp., 189 F.3d 1327, 1333 (Fed. Cir.
1999). A patent infringement claim involves a two-step
analysis. First, the Court “must determine as a matter
of law the correct scope and meaning of a disputed claim
term.” CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,
288 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Second, the properly
construed patent claims must be compared to the accused
device to determine whether the accused device contains all
the limitations of the claimed invention. Id.
The
first step, claim construction, is a matter of law for the
Court. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517
U.S. 370, 391 (1996). “It is a ‘bedrock
principle' of patent law that ‘the claims of a
patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled
the right to exclude.'” Phillips v. AWH
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting
Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys.,
Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). “When
construing claim terms, [courts] first look to, and primarily
rely on, the intrinsic evidence, including the claims
themselves, the specification, and the prosecution history of
the patent, which is usually dispositive.” Sunovion
Pharm., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 731 F.3d 1271,
1276 (Fed. Cir. 2013). “[T]he words of a claim
‘are generally given their ordinary and customary
meaning.'” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312
(quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90
F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). “[T]he ordinary and
customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the
term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in
question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the
effective filing date of the patent application.”
Id. at 1313.
“The
inquiry into how a person of ordinary skill in the art
understands a claim term provides an objective baseline from
which to begin claim interpretation.” Id.
“Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art
is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of
the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but
in the context of the entire patent, including the
specification.” Id. While “the claims
themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of
particular claim terms, ” the claims do not stand
alone. Id. at 1314-15. “Rather, they are part
of a fully integrated written instrument, consisting
principally of a specification that concludes with the
claims.” Id. at 1315 (quotation omitted). As a
result, “the specification ‘is always highly
relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is
dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a
disputed term.'” Id. (quoting
Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582). Nevertheless, “there
is a fine line between reading a claim in light of
the written description and reading a limitation into the
claim from the written description.” Howmedica
Osteonics Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 822 F.3d 1312, 1321
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
In
addition to the claims and the specification, courts should
also consider the patent's prosecution history, if it is
in evidence. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. The
prosecution history is part of the “intrinsic evidence,
” and it “consists of the complete record of the
proceedings before the [Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO”)] and includes the prior art cited during
the examination of the patent.” Id.
“Like the specification, the prosecution history
provides evidence of how the PTO and the inventor understood
the patent.” Id. Nonetheless, the prosecution
history “often lacks the clarity of the specification
and thus is less useful for claim construction
purposes.” Id.
In
addition to this intrinsic evidence, courts may also rely on
“extrinsic evidence, ” consisting “of all
evidence external to the patent and prosecution history,
including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and
learned treatises.” Id. (quoting
Markman, 52 F.3d at 980). But, “while
extrinsic evidence can shed useful light on the relevant art,
. . . it is less significant than the intrinsic record in
determining the legally operative meaning of claim
language.” Id. (quotations omitted). As a
result, “extrinsic evidence may be useful to the court,
but it is unlikely to result in a reliable interpretation of
patent claim scope unless considered in the context of the
intrinsic evidence.” Id. at 1319.
III.
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