United States District Court, D. Colorado
STEVEN G. SISNEROS, Plaintiff,
v.
MANHEIM DENVER, Defendant.
ORDER
Scott
T. Varholak United States Magistrate Judge.
This
matter comes before the Court on the Renewed Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (the “Motion”)
[#21], filed by Defendant Manheim Remarketing, Inc., d/b/a
Manheim Denver. [#21] Both parties have consented to proceed
before this Court for all proceedings, including the entry of
final judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and
D.C.COLO.LCivR 72.2. [##10, 15, 16] This Court has carefully
considered the Motion and related briefing, the case file and
the applicable case law, and has determined that oral
argument would not materially assist the Court. For the
following reasons, the Court GRANTS the
Motion to the extent it seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint, but DENIES the Motion to
the extent it seeks dismissal with prejudice.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In
January 2005, after serving 25 years with the United States
Navy, Plaintiff was hired by Defendant as a vehicle
inspector.[1] [#20 at ¶¶ 1, 3] ¶ 2007,
Plaintiff was promoted to Vehicle Entry Manager.
[Id. at ¶ 4] As a result of the promotion,
Defendant promised Plaintiff that his pay would be increased,
but did not provide documents detailing the increase.
[Id. at ¶¶ 4, 6] To the best of
Plaintiff's knowledge, he was the only Hispanic manager
while he worked for Defendant. [Id. at ¶ 5]
Plaintiff's
responsibilities grew and it became normal for him to work
12-14 hours per day, including holidays. [Id. at
¶ 7] ¶ 2016, because Plaintiff was required to work
on Thanksgiving, he contacted his supervisor and told him
that his salary did not justify the long hours and holidays,
and that he no longer wanted to work such hours.
[Id. at ¶¶ 8-9] Plaintiff's supervisor
responded that Plaintiff should not be upset because he had a
Navy pension and did not need the money. [Id. at
¶ 10]
Following
that conversation, Plaintiff spoke with another supervisor,
who informed Plaintiff that his compensation was below the
company minimum for his position. [Id. at ¶ 11]
Plaintiff spoke to the human resources department, which
confirmed that Plaintiff was being paid below the position
minimum, and raised Plaintiff's pay. [Id. at
¶ 12] Plaintiff claims that the new pay amount still
fell below the company minimum for his position.
[Id.]
On
March 1, 2018, Plaintiff filed an Employment Discrimination
Complaint alleging that he was discriminated against based on
race and age.[2] [#1] That Complaint did not contain any
factual content supporting Plaintiff's claims.
[Id.] On May 9, 2018, Defendant moved to dismiss the
Complaint. [#13] At a status conference held on May 23, 2018,
this Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint and
denied the original Motion to Dismiss. [#19] The Court
specifically instructed Plaintiff to attach to an amended
complaint all of the materials that he had filed with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).
[May 23, 2018 hearing, 11:02:21-11:02:55]
Plaintiff
filed his Amended Complaint on June 15, 2018. [#20] On July
2, 2018, Defendant filed the instant Motion. [#21] Plaintiff
did not timely respond, yet this Court sua sponte
granted Plaintiff an extension. [#22] Eventually, Plaintiff
filed a Response, which simply copied an earlier stricken
amendment to the Amended Complaint. [#29; see also
#26] Defendant replied to this Response. [#31]
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendant
seeks to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). [See
generally #21] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
empowers a court to dismiss a complaint for “lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction.” Dismissal under Rule
12(b)(1) is not a judgment on the merits of a plaintiff's
case, but only a determination that the court lacks authority
to adjudicate the matter. See Castaneda v. INS, 23
F.3d 1576, 1580 (10th Cir. 1994) (recognizing federal courts
are courts of limited jurisdiction and may only exercise
jurisdiction when specifically authorized to do so). A court
lacking jurisdiction “must dismiss the cause at any
stage of the proceeding in which it becomes apparent that
jurisdiction is lacking.” Basso v. Utah Power &
Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974).
Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss
a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” In deciding a motion under Rule
12(b)(6), a court must “accept as true all well-pleaded
factual allegations . . . and view these allegations in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Casanova v.
Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th
Cir. 2009)). Nonetheless, a plaintiff may not rely on mere
labels or conclusions, “and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007).
“To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility refers
“to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if
they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of
conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs ‘have
not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.'” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d
1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570). “The burden is on the plaintiff to frame
a ‘complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true)
to suggest' that he or she is entitled to relief.”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The
ultimate duty of the court is to “determine whether the
complaint sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the
elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief
under the legal theory proposed.” Forest Guardians
v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 2007).
“A
pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally
and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d
1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)). “The
Haines rule applies to all proceedings involving a
pro se litigant.” Id. at 1110 n.3. The court,
however, cannot be a pro se litigant's advocate. See
Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir.
2008).
III.
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