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Tso v. Murray
United States District Court, D. Colorado
September 30, 2018
GILBERT T. TSO, a natural person and an American, Plaintiff,
REBECCA MURRAY, a/k/a Tso, individually, TANYA AKINS, individually, SHERR PUTTMANN AKINS LAMB PC, law firm, JEANNIE RIDINGS, individually, KILILIS RIDINGS & VANAU PC, a law firm, RUSSELL MURRAY, individually, DENA MURRAY, individually, JOANNE JENSEN, individually, RICHARD F. SPIEGLE, PSY.D., individually, ELIZABETH A. STARRS, individually, DAVID P. BRODSKY, individually, CHARLES D. JOHNSON, individually, ROSS B.H. BUCHANAN, individually, DAVID H. GOLDBERG, individually, MONICA JACKSON, individual and official capacity, LARA DELKA, individual and official capacity, CHRISTIAN MADDY, individual and official capacity, JENNIFER ADELMANN, individual and official capacity, DON MARES, official capacity, BARRY PARDUS, official capacity, MICHAEL DIXON, official capacity, CYNTHIA COFFMAN, official capacity, 19th JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT, LAKE CO., IL, 2nd DISTRICT COURT, DENVER COUNTY, CO, DENVER DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES, COLORADO DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES, COLORADO DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, and CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, Defendants.
A. BRIMMER JUDGE
matter is before the Court on plaintiff's Memorandum of
Law in Support of (2nd) Order to Show Cause for Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order [Docket No. 62].
In light of plaintiff's pro se status, the Court
construes his filings liberally. See Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1991).
plaintiff's second motion for injunctive relief in this
case. See Docket No.61 at 2-3. On February 22, 2018,
the Court denied plaintiff's first motion because he did
not address the problems identified by Judge William J.
Martínez in denying an almost identical motion that
plaintiff filed in a case before Judge Martínez.
Id. at 3-4. The Court stated that it would
deny plaintiff's motion because plaintiff has not made
the necessary showing to warrant injunctive relief.
Plaintiff's present motion does not cure the two
infirmities identified by Judge Martínez. First,
“‘simple economic loss'” of the type
claimed by plaintiff “‘usually does not, in and
of itself, constitute irreparable harm.'” [Tso
v. Murray et al., No. 16-cv-2480-WJM-STV, 2017 WL
3116338, at *2 (“Tso II”)] (quoting
Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1189
(10th Cir. 2003)). Plaintiff again makes only conclusory
allegations regarding potential insolvency and lost
opportunities that cannot be compensated. Docket No. 49 at
6-7, ¶¶ c.i, c.ii. Second, plaintiff has not shown
likelihood of success on the merits because he does not
address whether the Court will be required to abstain from
granting plaintiff the relief he seeks as a “collateral
attack on the lawfulness of final state court judgments and
orders.” Tso II, 2017 WL 3116338, at *2;
see also Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006)
(The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “prevents the
lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases
brought by state-court losers challenging state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced.”); Docket Nos. 49, 57.
Docket No. 61 at 4-5.
February 23, 2018, plaintiff filed the present motion, again
seeking an injunction. Docket No. 62. Compared to his prior
motion, plaintiff's new motion adds arguments that the
loss of his driver's license has had other effects on him
and his family; that his civil Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961 et seq., claims provide a basis for injunctive
relief and can be asserted against government actors,
including courts; and that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine is not automatic and requires a fact-specific
inquiry with respect to each claim. Compare Docket
No. 49 with Docket No. 62.
respect to the additional harms that plaintiff argues are
caused by the loss of his driver's license, plaintiff
again alleges economic harm, e.g. that losing his license
“significantly reduced my ability to earn a living,
” and alleges potentially non-economic harms only in
conclusory fashion. Docket No. 62 at 10, ¶
c.ii. Therefore, the Court finds plaintiff has
not shown irreparable harm. See Heideman, 348 F.3d
respect to his RICO claim and the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, plaintiff is correct insofar as he argues that
government officers and organizations can be subject to RICO
liability and that the applicability of
Rooker-Feldman is not automatic and requires a
fact-specific inquiry with respect to each claim. Docket No.
62 at 8, ¶ b.x (citing United States v.
LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977, 984-85 (7th Cir. 1986)), and at
9, ¶ b.xii (citing Iqbal v. Patel, 780 F.3d
728, 730 (7th Cir. 2015)). The problem with plaintiff's
new arguments is that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
applies with equal force to plaintiff's RICO claim as it
does to his other claims, and the relevant inquiry is whether
each claim “‘consists of a review of the
proceedings already conducted by the “lower”
tribunal to determine whether it reached its result in
accordance with law.'” PJ ex rel. Jensen v.
Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182, 1193 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129, 1143 (10th
Cir. 2006)). Like his other claims, plaintiff seeks to use
his RICO claim to attack the correctness of state court
judgments based on a claim that those judgments were not made
in accordance with law. See Docket No. 62 at 11-12,
¶ d.ii; Thompson v. Romeo, 728 Fed.Appx. 796,
799 (10th Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (holding that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred jurisdiction where,
“for [plaintiff] to prevail, [the federal court] would
have to review, and ultimately reject, the state
determinations.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiff has not shown a
likelihood of success on the merits because he has not shown
that he is likely to establish that the Court has
jurisdiction to hear his claims.
plaintiff has not shown that he can establish each of the
four elements necessary to warrant injunctive relief, the
Court will deny his motion. See RoDa Drilling Co. v.
Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). Accordingly, it is
that plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of (2nd)
Order to Show Cause for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order [Docket No. 62] is DENIED.
 Plaintiff argues that the
“suspension of my driver's license since July 2017
has had (1) a chilling and inconvenient effect on me and my
family's wellbeing, (2) significantly reduced my ability
to earn a living, (3) exposes me and my child to unnecessary
risks and endangerment from emergencies and other negative
elements by having to rely on public transportation, (4) my
ability to support to my child's educational, social
development and extracurricular activities, and (5) to
generally care for my family.” Docket No. 62 at 10,
¶ c.ii (citing Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,
539 (1971)). Bell addresses whether due process
rights apply to revocation ...