United States District Court, D. Colorado
DWAN R. PETTI, Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
ORDER
PHILIP
A. BRIMMER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
This
matter comes before the Court on the Complaint [Docket No. 1]
filed by plaintiff Dwan R. Petti on March 13, 2017. Plaintiff
seeks review of the final decision of defendant Nancy A.
Berryhill (the “Commissioner”) denying her claim
for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the
Social Security Act (the “Act”), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 401-33. The Court has jurisdiction to review the
Commissioner's final decision under 42 U.S.C. §
405(g).[1]
I.
BACKGROUND
On
January 17, 2012, plaintiff applied for a period of
disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II
of the Act. R. at 22. Plaintiff alleged that she had been
disabled since December 20, 2011, id., but she has
amended her claim to allege disability beginning January 1,
2012. R. at 530. Plaintiff's disability insurance
benefits ended on March 31, 2013. Id. Thus, the
relevant period for plaintiff's claim is January 1, 2012
through March 31, 2013. After an initial administrative
denial of her claim, Plaintiff received a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on April 9,
2013. R. at 22. On May 10, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision
denying plaintiff's claim. R. at 32. Plaintiff appealed
the decision to the district court, and, on January 20, 2016,
District Judge William J. Martinez vacated the ALJ's
decision and remanded the case. R. at 601; Petti v.
Colvin, No. 15-cv-0256-WJM, 2016 WL 232775, at *6 (D.
Colo. Jan. 20, 2016). Judge Martinez found that the ALJ
“did not follow the correct legal standards in
considering the opinion of Plaintiff's treating
psychiatrist and treating psychologist, ” which he
noted were “uncontradicted by other medical
professionals.” R. at 596-97. Judge Martinez also found
that he could not “determine, from the ALJ's
decision, whether the ALJ's RFC accounted for
Plaintiff's moderate limitations in concentration,
persistence, and pace.” R. at 599. Following remand, on
September 22, 2016, the ALJ held a second hearing. R. at 530.
On January 11, 2017, the ALJ issued a decision again denying
plaintiff's claim. R. at 541. The ALJ found that
plaintiff had the following severe impairments: bipolar
disorder, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder
(“PTSD”), and liver disease. R. at 532. The ALJ
concluded that these impairments, alone or in combination,
did not meet one of the regulations' listed impairments,
id. at 533, and ruled that plaintiff had the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to
perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, but
with the following nonexertional limitations: [Plaintiff]
required nonproduction oriented work which is unskilled, with
a SVP skill level of one or two, not in close proximity to
co-workers or supervisors (meaning that she could not
function as a member of a team), and minimal to no direct
contact with the public.
R. at 534. Based upon this RFC and in reliance on the
testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ
concluded that plaintiff is capable of performing jobs that
exist in significant numbers in the national economy. R. at
540. Specifically, the ALJ identified three positions that
plaintiff could perform: dry cleaner, flagger, and microfilm
document preparer. Id. Each of these positions is
performed at a light or sedentary exertional level and is
classified as unskilled, with a specific vocational
preparation (“SVP”) level of two. R. at 540.
The
Appeals Council did not review the ALJ's denial of her
claim. Accordingly, the ALJ's decision is the final
decision of the Commissioner.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Review
of the Commissioner's finding that a claimant is not
disabled is limited to determining whether the Commissioner
applied the correct legal standards and whether the decision
is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a
whole. See Angel v. Barnhart, 329 F.3d 1208, 1209
(10th Cir. 2003). The district court may not reverse an ALJ
simply because the court may have reached a different result
based on the record; the question instead is whether there is
substantial evidence showing that the ALJ was justified in
her decision. See Ellison v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 534,
536 (10th Cir. 1990). “Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Flaherty v. Astrue, 515 F.3d
1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2007). Moreover, “[e]vidence is
not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the
record or constitutes mere conclusion.” Musgrave v.
Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir. 1992). The
district court will not “reweigh the evidence or retry
the case, ” but must “meticulously examine the
record as a whole, including anything that may undercut or
detract from the ALJ's findings in order to determine if
the substantiality test has been met.”
Flaherty, 515 F.3d at 1070. Nevertheless,
“if the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal test,
there is a ground for reversal apart from a lack of
substantial evidence.” Thompson v. Sullivan,
987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993).
III.
THE FIVE-STEP EVALUATION PROCESS
To
qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must have a
medically determinable physical or mental impairment expected
to result in death or last for a continuous period of twelve
months that prevents the claimant from performing any
substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)-(2). Furthermore,
[a]n individual shall be determined to be under a disability
only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are
of such severity that he is not only unable to do his
previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and
work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless
of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he
lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or
whether he would be hired if he applied for work.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (2006). The Commissioner has
established a five-step sequential evaluation process to
determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520; Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750 (10th
Cir. 1988). The steps of the evaluation are:
(1) whether the claimant is currently working; (2) whether
the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the
claimant's impairment meets an impairment listed in
appendix 1 of the relevant regulation; (4) whether the
impairment precludes the claimant from doing his past
relevant work; ...