United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE
William J. Martinez, United States District Judge
Plaintiff
Cynthia Carosella (“Carosella”) was a human
resources director at Defendant One World Translation &
Associates, Inc. (“One World”) for approximately
six months in 2013. She claims that, during her tenure, she
discovered and also personally experienced sex discrimination
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (“Title
VII”); and also pay discrimination in violation of the
Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). She further alleges
that she reported at least the discrimination others
experienced to her superiors and suffered retaliation as a
consequence. She now brings claims against One World for sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII, retaliation in
violation of Title VII, sex discrimination in violation of
the Equal Pay Act, retaliation in violation of the Equal Pay
Act, libel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The matter is set for trial beginning October 9, 2018.
Currently
before the Court is Carosella's Motion in Limine
on Various Issues (ECF No. 107) and One World's Motion
in Limine (ECF No. 108). As to each of these
motions, the Court grants in part, denies in part, and denies
in part without prejudice to re-raising the matter at trial.
I.
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION (ECF No. 107)
A.
Item 1: “Certain Emails.”
Before
her alleged constructive discharge, Carosella forwarded
e-mails from her One World e-mail box to her personal e-mail
address. She marked up some of these forwarded e-mails. After
her discharge, she returned all of these forwarded e-mails,
with markups (if any), to One World via a thumb drive. She
now wishes to use these e-mails at trial as evidence of the
content of the original e-mails (i.e., the e-mails
as they existed in her One World inbox) because One World can
no longer locate the originals. (ECF No. 107 at 2-3.)
One
World agrees not to challenge the authenticity of the thumb
drive e-mails but “reserves the right to ask limited
questions about the underlying [originals] for the purpose of
informing the jury regarding the unique formatting and
content of [the thumb drive versions].” (ECF No. 116 at
2.) One World also reserves “all other objections . . .
including but not limited to relevance, hearsay, and unfair
prejudice.” (Id.)
The
Court grants Carosella's motion to the extent of One
World's authenticity concession. The motion is denied
without prejudice to the extent Carosella argues that the
e-mails, or any one of them, are fully admissible. Such a
ruling must await trial and will turn on their content and
the context in which they are presented.
B.
Item 2: After-Acquired Evidence
The
thumb drive e-mails are part of a larger collection of One
World documents that Carosella collected before her alleged
constructive discharge and then kept for herself after that
event. She argues that these documents' only possible
relevance is to One World's after-acquired evidence
defense, i.e., that it would have terminated
Carosella for collecting One World documents on her personal
computer. She further argues that the after-acquired evidence
defense is only relevant to her damages, if any. Before that,
she says, the evidence would not only be irrelevant but also
excludable as unduly prejudicial and as impermissible
character evidence. She therefore requests “separate
hearings to bifurcate the issues of liability and damages to
avoid potential prejudice.” (ECF No. 107 at 5-6.)
One
World responds that this evidence is relevant to rebut
Carosella's claim of constructive discharge and it
“substantiates the truth of certain allegedly
defamatory statements.” (ECF No. 116 at 2.) In other
words, it is not relevant solely to the after-acquired
evidence defense.
The
Court does not have enough context to make a blanket ruling
about the alleged after-acquired evidence. Moreover, it is
far too late to suggest a bifurcated trial. Accordingly, the
request for bifurcation is denied and the request to exclude
the after-acquired evidence is denied without prejudice to
renewal at trial in the context of a specific exhibit or line
of questioning.
C.
Item 3(a): Child Support Payments & Unemployment
Benefits
Carosella
receives monthly child support payments. In 2013 (the year of
her alleged constructive discharge) and 2014, she received
unemployment benefits. She requests that all of these amounts
be excluded from evidence so that One World cannot use them
to argue for an offset against any back pay award. (ECF No.
107 at 6-7.)
Defendant
agrees not to introduce evidence of child support payments.
As to unemployment benefits, however, One World points to
EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 624-26 (10th
Cir. 1980), and Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co.,
836 F.2d 1544, 1555 (10th Cir. 1988), both of which arguably
stand for the proposition that a district court has
discretion whether to deduct unemployment benefits from a
back pay award, although seemingly with a preference for not
deducting such benefits. (See ECF No. 116 at 3.)
The
Court need not resolve this question in this posture. If
unemployment benefits are deductible from a back pay award,
that is a question the Court should address through a
postjudgment motion. It is not something for the jury to
decide. Carosella's request is therefore granted-One
World may not introduce evidence at trial of either child
support benefits or unemployment benefits.
D.
Item 3(b): Loans from Friends
Carosella
has also relied on loans from friends since her alleged
constructive discharge. She argues that evidence of these
loans is irrelevant and that “any reference to those
monies should be redacted from [her] 2015 tax return, if such
exhibit is submitted into evidence.” (ECF No. 107 at
7.)
One
World responds that “[t]hese loans-and the reasons for
obtaining [them]- are unquestionably relevant to
[Carosella's] motivation in filing suit; and [Carosella]
put these facts at issue when she listed attempted
foreclosures on her home and the personal loans she took to
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