United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER
PHILIP
A. BRIMMER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This
matter comes before the Court on the Complaint [Docket No. 1]
filed by plaintiff Renee Lisa Castillo on December 27, 2016.
Plaintiff seeks review of the final decision of defendant
Nancy A. Berryhill (the “Commissioner”) denying
her claim for a period of disability and disability insurance
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (the
“Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33, and
supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq. The Court has jurisdiction
to review the Commissioner's final decision under 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).[1]
I.
BACKGROUND
On
March 31, 2015, plaintiff applied for a period of disability
and disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Act
and supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Act.
R. at 17. Plaintiff alleged that she had been disabled since
June 1, 2013. Id. After an initial administrative
denial of her claim, plaintiff received a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on March 30,
2016. Id. On June 10, 2016, the ALJ issued a
decision denying plaintiff's claim. R. at 20. The ALJ
found that plaintiff had the following severe impairments:
“fibromyalgia, lumbar degenerative disc disease with
post laminectomy syndrome and evidence of radiculopathy, mild
cervical degenerative disc disease, mild degenerative joint
disease of the left AC joint, depression, bipolar disorder,
anxiety, impulse control disorder, generalized anxiety
disorder, panic disorder with agoraphobia, and posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD).” R. at 19-20. The ALJ concluded
that these impairments, alone or in combination, did not meet
one of the regulations' listed impairments, R. at 21, and
found that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to
perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and
416.967(a), meaning the claimant would be limited to
occasional lifting and carrying of 10 pounds, frequently
lifting and carrying less than 10 pounds, standing and/or
walking for no more than 2 hours in an 8-hour workday, and
sitting for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. However, she can
never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She can
occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps and
stairs. She can occasionally reach overhead bilaterally and
can only frequently reach in all other directions with the
non-dominant left upper extremity. She should avoid all
exposure to hazards. She can understand, remember, and carry
out no more than simple tasks and instructions. She should
not be subject to a production rate pace, such as assembly
line work, and she cannot perform team or tandem work.
R. at 23. Plaintiff has past relevant work as a receptionist.
R. at 34. Based upon the RFC and in reliance on the testimony
of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ concluded
that plaintiff is not capable of performing her past relevant
work but is capable of performing jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy, including
callout operator, document preparer, and hand
painter/stainer. R. at 34-35.
On
October 31, 2016, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's
request for review of the ALJ's denial of her claim. R.
at 1. Given the Appeals Council's denial, the ALJ's
decision is the final decision of the Commissioner.
II.
ANALYSIS
A.
Standard of Review
Review
of the Commissioner's finding that a claimant is not
disabled is limited to determining whether the Commissioner
applied the correct legal standards and whether the decision
is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a
whole. See Angel v. Barnhart, 329 F.3d 1208, 1209
(10th Cir. 2003). The district court may not reverse an ALJ
simply because the court may have reached a different result
based on the record; the question instead is whether there is
substantial evidence showing that the ALJ was justified in
her decision. See Ellison v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 534,
536 (10th Cir. 1990). “Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Flaherty v. Astrue, 515 F.3d
1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2007). Moreover, “[e]vidence is
not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the
record or constitutes mere conclusion.” Musgrave v.
Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir. 1992). The
district court will not “reweigh the evidence or retry
the case, ” but must “meticulously examine the
record as a whole, including anything that may undercut or
detract from the ALJ's findings in order to determine if
the substantiality test has been met.”
Flaherty, 515 F.3d at 1070. Nevertheless,
“if the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal test,
there is a ground for reversal apart from a lack of
substantial evidence.” Thompson v. Sullivan,
987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993).
B.
The Five-Step Evaluation Process
To
qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must have a
medically determinable physical or mental impairment expected
to result in death or last for a continuous period of twelve
months that prevents the claimant from performing any
substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)-(2). Furthermore,
[a]n individual shall be determined to be under a disability
only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are
of such severity that he is not only unable to do his
previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and
work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless
of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he
lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or
whether he would be hired if he applied for work.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (2006). The Commissioner has
established a five-step sequential evaluation process to
determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520; Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750 ...