United States District Court, D. Colorado
KLANCIE A. ROANE, Plaintiff,
v.
FRANKIE'S BAR & GRILL, a/k/a Frankie's Inc., n/k/a Frankie's Inc. dissolved May 27, 2016, FRANKIE D. PATTON, and KATHLEEN PATTON, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Before
the Court is Plaintiff Klancie A. Roane's Motion for
Attorney's Fees, wherein she requests an award of $108,
780.00 in fees. For the following reasons, the Court grants
in part and denies in part Plaintiff's motion and awards
$55, 219.50 in fees.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
initiated this case in late 2016, alleging Title VII claims
of discrimination and retaliation against Defendants
Frankie's Bar and Grill, Frankie Patton, and Kathleen
Patton. (Doc. # 4.) This Court dismissed Plaintiff's
retaliation claim on summary judgment in October 2017. (Doc.
# 36.) Claims of a hostile work environment and pregnancy
discrimination were then tried to a jury on April 16-18,
2018. (Doc. ## 53- 55.) The jury returned a verdict in favor
of Plaintiff on her pregnancy discrimination claim but not on
her claim of a hostile work environment. (Doc. # 58 at 1.)
The jury also awarded Plaintiff $500 in back pay, but reduced
the award by $499 based on Plaintiff's failure to
mitigate those damages, resulting in a net compensatory
damage award of $1. (Id. at 1-2.) The jury did not
award emotional distress or punitive damages. (Id.)
Pursuant
to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(k), Plaintiff now
requests $108, 780.00 in fees for the work of her attorney,
Andrew Brake, on her case. Defendants object to
Plaintiff's request, contending that (1) Plaintiff is not
entitled to recover fees because she is not the prevailing
party in this case and, (2) even if she is entitled to fees,
the amount requested should be reduced based on her limited
success. (Doc. # 69). Defendants also argue that the hours
Plaintiff's attorney expended and his billable rate are
unreasonable. The Court addresses each dispute in turn.
II.
PLAINTIFF'S DEGREE OF SUCCESS
A.
PREVAILING PARTY
1.
Law
“To
determine whether a prevailing party achieved enough success
to be entitled to an award of attorney's fees, ”
the district court must assess the “relevant indicia of
[plaintiff's] success.” Farrar v. Hobby,
506 U.S. 103, 122 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
see also Phelps v. Hamilton, 120 F.3d 1126, 1131
(10th Cir.1997) (adopting Justice O'Connor's
framework); Brandau v. State of Kansas, 168 F.3d
1179, 1181 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying the framework to an
employment discrimination case). To examine the indicia of
success, the court examines (1) the difference between the
judgment recovered and the judgment sought, i.e. whether the
recovery was “merely technical or de minimis”;
(2) “the significance of the legal issue on which the
plaintiff prevailed”; and (3) “the public purpose
served” by the litigation. Farrar, 506 U.S. at
117 (O'Conner, J., concurring); Gudenkauf v. Stauffer
Commc'ns, Inc., 158 F.3d 1074, 1078 (10th Cir.
1998).
“No
one factor is necessarily controlling; nor should all three
factors necessarily be given equal weight.” Barber
v. T.D. Williamson, Inc., 254 F.3d 1223, 1233 (10th Cir.
2001). The bottom line is that “all three factors
should be given due consideration but ultimately it is within
the discretion of . . . the district court to determine what
constitutes a reasonable fee given the particular
circumstances.” Id.
2.
Analysis
Evaluating
these factors and Tenth Circuit case law applying them, the
Court finds that Plaintiff has achieved enough success to
support an award of attorney fees as the prevailing party in
this litigation.
With
respect to the first Farrar factor, the Court
considers the nominal difference between the amount Plaintiff
sought and the damages she recovered in the context of the
entire litigation. In this case, Plaintiff requested just
over $10, 000.00 in back pay and an unspecified amount in
emotional distress and punitive damages. Her ultimate award
was $1. Although this difference could indicate that
“the “litigation accomplished little beyond
giving the [plaintiff] the moral satisfaction of knowing that
a federal court concluded that [her] rights had been violated
in some unspecified way, ” Farrar, 506 U.S. at
117 (O'Conner, J., concurring), the difference is
remarkably distinct from the corresponding difference in
Farrar. There, the Supreme Court declined to award
fees in part because the plaintiff sought $17 million and
recovered only $1 in nominal damages. Moreover, unlike in
Farrar, where the litigation which was drawn out
over ten years and two appeals, Plaintiff's litigation in
this case was not protracted. Koopman v. Water Dist. No.
1 of Johnson Cty., Kan., 41 F.3d 1417, 1421 (10th Cir.
1994) (finding a small recovery insignificant where
litigation was not protracted nor the claims for damages
extravagant). Further, in mixed motive cases, like this one,
the Tenth Circuit has repeatedly held that attorney fee
statutes support an award of fees to the prevailing party
“notwithstanding the lack of a damages award.”
Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Commc'ns, Inc., 158 F.3d
1074, 1081 (10th Cir. 1998). Thus, the Tenth Circuit often
deems a plaintiff prevailing despite an award of only nominal
damages, as occurred Brandau, 168 F.3d at 1182,
where the Plaintiff sought 21 months of back pay and $50, 000
in non-economic damages but achieved only a nominal recovery
of $1. Thus, despite Plaintiff's limited financial
success, the Court does not find that her victory was
“merely technical or de minimis.”
Farrar, 506 U.S. at 122 (O'Conner, J.,
concurring).
The
second factor-i.e., “the significance of the legal
issue on which the plaintiff claims to have prevailed,
” id. at 121-“goes beyond the actual
relief awarded [which is the focus of the first factor] to
examine the extent to which the plaintiff[ ] succeeded on
[her] theory of liability.” Barber v. T.D.
Williamson, Inc., 254 F.3d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. 2001).
Even where a plaintiff loses on more claims than she wins,
courts have found her to prevail where she succeeds on her
primary theory of liability. E.g., Brandau,
168 F.3d at 1182 (affirming the district court's decision
that the plaintiff succeeded on a significant legal issue
because, although she lost her retaliation and constructive
discharge claims, she prevailed on her primary claim of
sexual harassment); Phelps, 120 F.3d at 1132
(“That the plaintiffs prevailed on only one of their
four underlying claims itself does not diminish the
reasonableness of awarding some attorney's fees.”).
That is precisely what occurred in this case: Plaintiff lost
on her retaliation and hostile work environment claims, but
she succeeded on her primary theory of liability-pregnancy
discrimination. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff
“succeeded on a ‘significant issue in litigation
which achieves some of the benefit [she] sought in bringing
suit.'” Brandau, 168 F.3d at 1182 (quoting
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).
With
respect to the third and final Farrar factor-the
public purpose served by the litigation-the Tenth Circuit has
explained, “a public goal is accomplished if the
plaintiff's victory encourages attorneys to represent
civil rights litigants, affirms an important right, puts the
defendant on notice that it needs to improve, and/or provokes
a change in the defendant's conduct.”
Barber, 254 F.3d at 1232. Because the jury, after
weighing all the evidence presented at trial, found that
Defendants had discriminated against Plaintiff based on her
pregnancy, the Court cannot conclude that no public purpose
was served. The jury instead affirmed an important civil
right and put Defendants and others on notice of pregnancy
discrimination in the workplace. In so concluding, the Court
rejects Defendants argument that, because Defendant
Frankie's Bar & Grill no longer exists, no public
purpose was served by the jury's discrimination finding.
To begin, Defendant Frankie's Bar & Grill does exist,
albeit under new management, and Defendant Frankie Patton
continues to operate another restaurant. Deterring future
discrimination by these Defendants therefore remains an issue
for this Court to consider. Moreover, the Tenth Circuit has
adopted a broad approach to the third factor, noting that
consideration of the “public goal” accomplished
extends beyond just the plaintiff and defendant in the case
to a consideration of the “basic rights for [other]
employees” in similar circumstances. Koopman,
41 F.3d at 1421. “[W]hat is controlling is
plaintiff's vindication of her civil rights and of
important rights of her co-workers.” Brandau,
168 F.3d at 1183.
Having
given all three Farrar factors due consideration,
the Court, in its discretion, finds that Plaintiff has
achieved enough success to be entitled to an award of
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