United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER DENYING BOTH DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
FRUITS OF SEARCH WARRANT AND MOTION TO SUPPRESS FRUITS OF
UNLAWFUL DETENTION AND SEARCH AND VACATING SUPPRESSION
HEARING
CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This
matter comes before the Court on Defendant Arlene
Pereda's Motion to Suppress Fruits of Search Warrant
(Doc. # 37) and Motion to Suppress Fruits of Unlawful
Detention and Search (Doc. # 38). For the following reasons,
the Court denies both motions.
I.
BACKGROUND
In
March 2018, Detective Christopher A. Shotts received
information from a confidential informant (CI) that Ms.
Pereda was distributing about 10 pounds of methamphetamine
weekly out of her home - the carriage house at 1575 Gaylord
Street. (Doc. # 37-1 at 2-3.) The CI also disclosed that he
had previously purchased methamphetamine from Ms. Pereda and
positively identified her from a DMV photograph.
(Id. at 4.) The CI further informed law enforcement
about a robbery at Ms. Pereda's home, where large
quantities of methamphetamine and currency were stolen.
(Id. at 3.)
Based
on this information, Detective Shotts began to investigate
Ms. Pereda, in part by having surveillance cameras installed
around her house. (Id. at 4.) Over the course of
several weeks, Detective Shotts observed “numerous
individuals at various hours respond to 1575 Gaylord Street
‘Carriage' house.” (Id. at 3.)
Several of these individuals stayed for only short periods of
time; “arriv[ing] with nothing and then le[aving] with
backpacks and or bags.” (Id.) Based on his
training and experience, Detective Shotts believed these
activities were consistent with narcotics distribution.
(Id.)
On
April 26, 2018, Detective Shotts observed Tina Lucero enter
and exit Ms. Pereda's residence and drive away in a
silver Nissan. (Id. at 5.) Two officers conducted a
traffic stop on Ms. Lucero, and after she consented to a
search of her belongings, officers found several small bags
of methamphetamine and cocaine. (Id.) Ms. Lucero
admitted she “just purchased the meth[amphetamine] from
Arlene Pereda.” (Id. at 6.)
Based
on these facts, law enforcement obtained a warrant to search
Ms. Pereda's residence. (Doc. # 37-1 at 1.) Ms. Pereda
now objects to the issuance of this warrant and requests the
suppression of any evidence uncovered in her home. (Doc. #
37.)
II.
DISCUSSION
Ms.
Pereda raises two primary arguments in her motion to
suppress. First, she contends that the search warrant
insufficiently describes the reliability of the CI and the
source of his information. Second, Ms. Pereda argues that the
warrant did not describe the place or things to be searched
with enough particularity. The Court addresses and rejects
each argument in turn.
A.
RELIABILITY OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT
The
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
“unreasonable searches and seizures” and requires
that “no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
“Probable cause for a search warrant exists when the
affidavit in support of the warrant alleges sufficient facts
to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that
contraband or other evidence of criminal activity is located
at the place to be searched.” People v. Pate,
878 P.2d 685, 689 (Colo. 1994).
As
pertinent here, “a search warrant ‘can be
predicated upon . . . hearsay from a reliable . . .
informant.'” United States v. Harris, 735
F.3d 1187, 1192 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States
v. Monaco, 700 F.2d 577, 580 (10th Cir. 1983)). Courts
consider the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether the search warrant sufficiently establishes the
reliability of a confidential informant. Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). “Under the
totality-of-the-circumstances test, ‘an informant's
account of criminal activities need not establish the
informant's basis of knowledge, so long as the
informant's statement is sufficiently detailed to allow a
judge to reasonably conclude that the informant had access to
reliable information about the illegal activities reported to
the police.'” Pate, 878 P.2d at 689
(quoting People v. Abeyta, 795 P.2d 1324, 1327- 28
(Colo. 1990)). Moreover, “police corroboration of some
of the information provided by the informant may be
sufficient to support a finding of probable cause, even where
all of the corroborated details relate to noncriminal
activity.” Id. at 689-90.
Considering
the totality of circumstances in this case, the Court finds
that the warrant and accompanying affidavit contain
sufficient facts to establish the reliability of the CI and
that the warrant is supported by probable cause. The
affidavit reflects that Detective Shotts had worked with this
CI in the past and they had successfully orchestrated two
purchases of methamphetamines. (Doc. # 37-1 at 3.) The CI
also provided “pertinent and specific information on
individuals involved in the distribution and manufacturing of
methamphetamine in the Denver Metro area, ” on numerous
other occasions. (Id.) Even more telling, the CI had
purchased methamphetamine from Ms. Pereda. (Id.)
According to Detective Shotts, the CI “ha[d] never
provided information to [him] or any other Detective of the
Denver Police Department that ha[d] proven to be
false.” (Id.) Moreover, law enforcement
verified the CI's information in other ways: as
mentioned, Detective Shotts placed surveillance cameras
outside Ms. Pereda's home, observing what he believed to
be several drug exchanges, and officers obtained a concession
by Ms. Lucero that Ms. Pereda had sold methamphetamine to
her.[1]
Having
thoroughly considered the issue and the applicable law, the
Court finds the warrant and affidavit sufficiently detailed
the reliability of the CI to support a finding of probable
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