United States District Court, D. Colorado
A. BRIMMER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on Arctic Energy Services,
LLC's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's
Denial of its Motion for a Preliminary Injunction [Docket No.
96]. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 and 1367.
filed this lawsuit on January 12, 2018, asserting claims for
misappropriation of trade secrets under the Federal Defend
Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1831 et seq.,
and the Colorado Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 7-74-101 et seq.; civil theft; conversion;
breach of the duty of loyalty; aiding and abetting breaches
of fiduciary duties; violations of the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 et seq.;
intentional interference with prospective contractual
relations; conspiracy; and preliminary and permanent
injunctive relief. Docket No. 1. On January 19, 2018,
plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction based on its
misappropriation of trade secrets claims. Docket No. 11.
After a full day evidentiary hearing on February 20, 2018,
Docket No. 44, the Court granted plaintiff's request for
relief and preliminarily enjoined defendants from
“deleting, destroying, erasing, or otherwise making
unavailable . . . any business information of
plaintiff”; “using, disclosing, or otherwise
making publicly available for any purpose confidential
information . . . obtained as a result of Mr. Ailport's
and Mr. Neal's employment with plaintiff”; or
“soliciting any current client of plaintiff through the
use of [plaintiff's] confidential information.”
Docket No. 45 at 8-9.
March 14, 2018, plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding
claims for breach of contract against defendant Dustin
Ailport based on employment agreements introduced at the
February 20, 2018 preliminary injunction hearing. Docket No.
51. On March 28, 2018, plaintiff filed a second motion for a
preliminary injunction predicated on the newly-asserted
breach of contract claims. Docket No. 57. On June 28, 2018,
the Court denied plaintiff's motion, finding that
plaintiff had not shown good cause for failing to raise its
breach of contract claims at the earlier evidentiary hearing.
See Docket No. 90 at 6.
now moves for reconsideration of the Court's June 28
order denying its request for preliminary injunctive relief.
Docket No. 96. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
specifically provide for motions for reconsideration. See
Hatfield v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs for Converse Cty.,
52 F.3d 858, 861 (10th Cir. 1995). Instead, motions for
reconsideration fall within a court's plenary power to
revisit and amend interlocutory orders as justice requires.
See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Thompson Theatres,
Inc., 621 F.2d 1088, 1090 (10th Cir. 1980) (citing
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b)). In determining whether to grant a motion
for reconsideration, courts consider whether new evidence or
legal authority has emerged or whether the prior ruling was
clearly in error. Motions to reconsider are generally an
inappropriate vehicle to advance “new arguments, or
supporting facts which were available at the time of the
original motion.” Servants of the Paraclete v.
Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000).
asserts two arguments in support of reconsideration. First,
plaintiff contends that the Court overlooked controlling law
by denying its preliminary injunction motion “based
solely on a finding that Arctic lacked good cause for its
delay in bringing the motion.” Docket No. 96 at 8.
Plaintiff cites cases holding that delay in filing a
preliminary injunction motion is not dispositive of the
irreparable harm analysis. See, e.g., Fish v.
Kobach, 840 F.3d 710, 753 (10th Cir. 2016) (noting that,
although “delay in seeking preliminary relief cuts
against finding irreparable injury[, ] . . . . delay is only
one factor to be considered among others”); RoDa
Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1211 (10th Cir.
2009) (“[D]elay is but one factor in the irreparable
harm analysis . . . .”). The Court, however, did not
make any finding that plaintiff's delay in filing its
second preliminary injunction motion “defeat[ed] a
finding of irreparable harm as a matter of law.”
RoDa Drilling Co., 552 F.3d at 1211 n.4. The Court
based its denial of plaintiff's request for preliminary
injunctive relief not on an analysis of the preliminary
injunction factors, but on its inherent authority to manage
its docket and promote the “just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 1; see also Dietz v.
Bouldin, 136 S.Ct. 1885, 1888-89 (2016) (noting district
court's “inherent power” to “manage its
docket and courtroom with a view toward the efficient and
expedient resolution of cases”). Accordingly, the cases
cited by plaintiff are inapposite.
also argues that nothing required it to move to continue the
preliminary injunction hearing and amend its complaint based
on the newly-discovered employment agreements. Docket No. 96
at 10. However, plaintiff does not identify any new evidence
or legal authority demonstrating that the Court's
exercise of its inherent powers was clearly in error. In
fact, plaintiff concedes, consistent with the Court's
prior ruling, that “nothing prevented plaintiff from
moving to continue the preliminary injunction hearing.”
foregoing reasons, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that
reconsideration of the Court's June 28, 2018 denial of
plaintiff's request for preliminary injunctive relief is
warranted. It is therefore
that Arctic Energy Services, LLC's Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court's Denial of its Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction [Docket No. 96] is
Although the Court's order stated
that “plaintiff ha[d] not shown good cause for failing
to raise its breach of contract arguments at the February 20,
2018 preliminary injunction hearing, ” Docket No. 90 at
6, the Court clarifies that plaintiff could not have raised
its breach of contract arguments at the hearing without first
amending its complaint and preliminary injunction motion to
include the breach of contract claims. The real issue - and
the basis for the Court's denial of plaintiff's
second preliminary injunction motion - was that plaintiff
failed to seek a continuance of the hearing in order to
consolidate its requests for injunctive relief. See
Docket No. 90 at 6 (noting that “[n]othing prevented
plaintiff from moving to continue the preliminary injunction
hearing and to amend its complaint based on the
newly-discovered employment agreements”).
Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Kraft
Foods Global, Inc., 549 F.3d 842 (Fed. Cir. 2008), is
likewise inapplicable. Although the court held that the
district court had abused its discretion by denying a
preliminary injunction without considering the required
factors, see Id. at 847, the case did not involve
successive motions for injunctive relief.
Plaintiff notes that, at the February
20, 2018 evidentiary hearing, “the parties and the
Court correctly agreed that Arctic was not permitted to seek
preliminary injunctive relief based upon” its contract
claims. Docket No. 96 at 11. As explained in footnote 1,
however, the Court's denial of plaintiff's
preliminary injunction motion was not predicated on