United States District Court, D. Colorado
FRANKY L. SESSION, Plaintiff,
DEPUTY SHERIFF CAPTAIN ROMERO, in his individual capacity, and DEPUTY SHERIFF SERGEANT JORDAN, in his individual capacity, Defendants.
A. BRIMMER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on plaintiff's Motion
Requesting Court to Reopen Discovery or Compel Defendants to
Surrender Both Inmate Trustee Names [Docket No. 328]. The
Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
case arises out of plaintiff's pretrial detention at the
Denver Detention Center (“DDC”) in March 2013.
Plaintiff filed a pro se prisoner complaint on
August 28, 2014 alleging that various members of the Denver
Sheriff's Department had violated his due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment by placing him in Cell Pod 4D,
a 23-hour segregation unit at DDC. See generally
Docket No. 1. On March 29, 2018, the Court accepted the
recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge and
denied in part defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Docket No. 295. A four-day jury trial on plaintiff's
remaining claims is set to begin August 27, 2018. Docket No.
303. Although plaintiff's request for pro bono counsel
has been granted, Docket No. 308, counsel has not yet been
appointed on his behalf.
filed his present motion on July 31, 2018 requesting that the
Court reopen discovery or compel defendants to disclose the
names of two inmates who allegedly complained to Deputy
Sheriff Clements about plaintiff's hygiene issues. Docket
No. 328 at 3, ¶ 14. Although plaintiff's motion does
not explain the significance of this information, defendants
argued on summary judgment that the complaints of these
inmates prompted plaintiff's transfer to the segregation
unit. See Docket No. 278 at 6 (discussing
defendants' evidence “that the Classification
division made the decision to transfer Plaintiff to
segregation in order to avoid potential conflicts with other
inmates following complaints from three inmates to Defendant
Clements regarding Plaintiff's hygiene” (quoting
Docket No. 249-2 at 2, ¶¶ 4, 7-8)).
to extend or reopen discovery is committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court . . . .” Smith v.
United States, 834 F.2d 166, 169 (10th Cir. 1987). In
exercising that discretion, courts consider the following
factors: (1) “whether trial is imminent”; (2)
“whether the request is opposed”; (3)
“whether the non-moving party would be
prejudiced”; (4) “whether the moving party was
diligent in obtaining discovery within the guidelines
established by the court”; (5) “the
foreseeability of the need for additional discovery in light
of the time allowed for discovery by the district
court”; and (6) “the likelihood that the
discovery will lead to relevant evidence.” Id.
With regard to the fourth factor, the Tenth Circuit has
stated that “demonstrating good cause under [Fed. R.
Civ. P.] 16(b)(4) requires the moving party to show that it
has been diligent in attempting to meet the deadlines, which
means it must provide an adequate explanation for any
delay.” Arkansas River Power Auth. v. Babcock &
Wilcox Power Co., No. 14-cv-00638-CMA-NYW, 2016 WL
9734683, at *2 (D. Colo. Oct. 19, 2016) (internal brackets
omitted) (quoting Strope v. Collins, 315 Fed.Appx.
57, 61 (10th Cir. 2009)).
Court finds that these factors weigh against granting
plaintiff's motion. This case has been pending for nearly
four years and is scheduled to go to trial in less than four
weeks. The discovery deadline was June 20, 2017. Docket No.
263. Although plaintiff suggests that he had difficulty
obtaining the names of two inmates through the discovery
process, see Docket No. 328 at 2, ¶¶ 2-4,
he does not explain why he could not have resolved these
issues before the discovery deadline. Moreover, to the extent that
plaintiff requested the inmates' identities after the
discovery deadline, defendants were under no obligation to
respond. See Id. at 3, ¶¶ 6-9 (describing
various requests made after June 20, 2017). Plaintiff does
not argue that his need for additional discovery was
unforeseeable. Nor could he, given that defendants' July
25, 2017 summary judgment motion discussed the inmates'
complaints about plaintiff's hygiene. See Docket
No. 249 at 12. Finally, plaintiff does not explain how
knowing the identities of the two inmates would lead to the
discovery of information relevant to his claims against
defendants Romero and Jordan.
the imminence of trial and the likelihood that defendants
would suffer prejudice were discovery to be reopened at this
juncture, the Court declines to grant plaintiff's
requested relief. It is therefore
that plaintiff's Motion Requesting Court to Reopen
Discovery or Compel Defendants to Surrender Both Inmate
Trustee Names [Docket No. 328] is DENIED.
Because plaintiff is proceeding pro
se, the Court will construe his filings liberally.
See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.
Because defendants have not yet
responded to plaintiff's motion, the Court will assume
that the second factor is neutral.
Although not entirely clear from
plaintiff's motion or the record, it appears that he may
have been unable to obtain the information regarding the two
inmates because he exceeded the number of requests for
production allowed by the magistrate judge. See
Docket No. 328 at 2, ¶ 3 (noting that, “[d]ue to
multiple discovery issues and discovery misunderstandings of
numeric discovery request, the Plaintiff requested a hearing
to resolve these issues”); Docket No. 197 at 1
(requesting hearing to address defendants' refusal to
respond to requests for production on ground that plaintiff
had exceeded the number of requests permitted by the court);
Docket No. 206 at 1 (denying plaintiff's request for a
discovery hearing and finding that “Defendants were
permitted to refuse to respond to any requests for production
over the number of fifteen”). To the extent that
plaintiff disagrees with the discovery limits imposed by the
magistrate judge, his time to object has long passed.
On summary judgment, the inmates'
complaints were discussed only in relation to plaintiff's
claim against defendant Clements and the initial decision to
transfer plaintiff to the segregation unit. See
Docket No. 249 at 3-4, 11-12; Docket No. 278 at 5-6. It does
not appear that plaintiff's claims against defendants
Romero and Jordan are based on that initial transfer
decision. See Docket No. 278 at 9 (discussing
plaintiff's claim that defendants Romero and ...