from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Oklahoma (D.C. No. 4:16-CR-00080-GKF-1)
William P. Widell, Jr., Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Tulsa, Oklahoma (Barry L. Derryberry, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Tulsa, Oklahoma; Julia L. O' Connell,
Federal Public Defender, Tulsa, Oklahoma, with him on the
briefs), for Defendant-Appellant.
Timothy L. Faerber, Office of the United States Attorney,
Tulsa, Oklahoma (Neal C. Hong, Office of the United States
Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma; Loretta F. Radford, Acting United
States Attorney, with him on the brief), for
LUCERO, HOLMES, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
LUCERO, Circuit Judge.
Leaverton was convicted of three counts of bank robbery. At
sentencing, the district court concluded that 18 U.S.C.
§ 3559(c) applied because Leaverton had been previously
convicted of two serious violent felonies, enhancing his
sentence from a maximum of twenty years to a mandatory term
of life imprisonment. Leaverton now appeals, arguing that his
prior conviction for Oklahoma manslaughter does not qualify
under § 3559(c). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742, we reverse
Leaverton's sentence and remand to the district court for
was convicted of three counts of bank robbery in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). His Presentence Investigation
Report ("PSR") calculated a total offense level of
27 and a criminal history category of III, resulting in an
advisory Guidelines range of 87 to 108 months. However, the
government contended that Leaverton was subject to a
mandatory life sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1).
That statute requires that anyone convicted of "a
serious violent felony" who has two or more prior
convictions for serious violent felonies be sentenced to life
imprisonment. § 3559(c)(1). A serious violent felony is
one that falls within a list of enumerated offenses or is
punishable by a term of imprisonment of at least ten years
and meets certain other criteria. § 3559(c)(2)(F).
sole point of contention was whether Leaverton's prior
conviction for Oklahoma Manslaughter I qualified as a serious
violent felony. That statute contains three subsections.
See Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 711. The government
argued that Leaverton was convicted under a subsection that
applies when a killing is "perpetrated without a design
to effect death, and in a heat of passion, but in a cruel and
unusual manner, or by means of a dangerous weapon; unless it
is committed under such circumstances as constitute excusable
or justifiable homicide." Okla. Stat. tit. 21, §
711(2). In support of its argument, the government attached a
docket sheet that described Leaverton as pleading guilty to
"MANSLAUGHTER I, SECTION #2, TITLE 711."
sentencing, the district court found that Leaverton had been
convicted under subsection two. It held that this conviction
qualified as a serious violent felony and thus Leaverton met
the requirements of § 3559(c). The court imposed a
sentence of life imprisonment. Leaverton timely appealed.
review de novo whether a prior conviction qualifies as a
serious violent felony under § 3559(c). United
States v. Cooper, 375 F.3d 1041, 1053 (10th Cir. 2004).
determining whether a previous crime meets a statutory
definition, there are two potential approaches, "the
categorical approach and the circumstance-specific
approach." United States v. White, 782 F.3d
1118, 1130 (10th Cir. 2015). Under the former, we look only
to "the elements of the statute forming the basis of the
defendant's conviction," and if a statute is
divisible, to "a limited class of documents,"
rather than the particular facts of a defendant's
conduct. Id. at 1130-31. Under the latter, we
"consider the facts and circumstances underlying an
offender's conviction." Id. at 1131
(quotation omitted). Both ...