Larimer County District Court No. 00CR185 Honorable Daniel J.
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Kevin E. McReynolds,
Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for
Reppucci Law Firm, P.C., Jonathan D. Reppucci, Denver,
Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
1 Section 16-22-113(3)(c), C.R.S. 2017, of the Colorado Sex
Offender Registration Act (SORA) provides that "[a]ny
adult who has more than one conviction . . . for unlawful
sexual behavior" is not eligible to petition for removal
from the sex offender registry. This case presents an issue
of first impression: Does the term "conviction" as
used in subsection 113(3)(c) of SORA include a successfully
completed deferred judgment? Because we answer this question
"yes," we affirm the trial court's order
denying the petition to deregister.
2 In 2000, the People charged the defendant, Brian Keith
McCulley, with two counts of felony sexual assault, both of
which were crimes involving unlawful sexual behavior. Months
later, McCulley entered into a split plea agreement whereby
he pleaded guilty to one count of second degree sexual
assault, a class 4 felony, and one count of third degree
sexual assault, a class 1 misdemeanor.
3 Pursuant to the plea agreement, which the trial court
approved, McCulley received a four-year deferred judgment on
the felony charge and a probation sentence on the misdemeanor
charge. The only condition of his probation sentence was that
he comply with the terms of the deferred judgment. Under the
terms of McCulley's plea agreement, the trial court would
dismiss the felony charge once McCulley complied with his
deferred judgment, but he would stand convicted of the
misdemeanor after having successfully completed his probation
sentence. That is exactly what occurred. In 2004, McCulley
completed his deferred judgment, the felony charge was
dismissed, and at the same time he completed probation on the
4 As a condition of his deferred judgment, McCulley was
required to register as a sex offender. See §
16-22-103(2)(a), C.R.S. 2017. In 2016, McCulley filed a
petition to discontinue the requirement that he register as a
sex offender. The trial court denied McCulley's petition
despite the fact that he had successfully completed his
deferred judgment. The trial court reasoned that the statute
defines the term "conviction" to include having a
deferred judgment, McCulley had two convictions, and an
individual who has more than one conviction for unlawful
sexual behavior is ineligible for an order discontinuing the
5 McCulley's sole argument on appeal is that the trial
court erred by construing the term "conviction"
under SORA to include a successfully completed deferred
judgment. We disagree because we conclude that the plain
language of SORA dictates that a deferred judgment is a
"conviction" as used in section 16-22-113(3)(c).
Standard of Review
6 Our goal when interpreting a statute is to effectuate the
General Assembly's intent. Martin v. People, 27
P.3d 846, 851 (Colo. 2001). To do that, we first look to the
statute's language, giving words and phrases their plain
and ordinary meaning. Peoplev.
Padilla-Lopez, 2012 CO 49, ¶ 7. If the
statute's plain language unambiguously indicates the
legislature's intent, we apply the statute as written.
Martin, 27 P.3d at 851. When the statute is
ambiguous, however, we may "rely on other factors, such
as legislative history, prior law, the ...