Harris v. Davita Healthcare Partners, Inc.
United States District Court, D. Colorado
June 22, 2018
MYRNA HARRIS, Plaintiff,
v.
DAVITA HEALTHCARE PARTNERS, INC., and TOTAL RENAL CARE, Defendants. MARK TURNER, and DAISY VENTURA, Plaintiffs,
v.
DAVITA HEALTHCARE PARTNERS, INC., and TOTAL RENAL CARE, Defendants. LILYBETH COPE, Plaintiff,
v.
DAVITA HEALTHCARE PARTNERS, INC., and TOTAL RENAL CARE, Defendants. PAT SULLIVAN, JAMES WORSHAM, and STARR DAVIS, Plaintiffs,
v.
DAVITA HEALTHCARE PARTNERS, INC., and TOTAL RENAL CARE, Defendants. LACEY WILSON, and LAURA BARRY, Plaintiffs,
v.
DAVITA HEALTHCARE PARTNERS, INC., and TOTAL RENAL CARE, Defendants. LORI CLARK, LESLIE TAYLOR, SARA CREIGHTON, LAURA LAMADLINE, JACOB REEDER, FERNANDO FUSTERO, and IDA DANDRIDGE, Plaintiffs,
v.
DAVITA HEALTHCARE PARTNERS, INC., and TOTAL RENAL CARE, Defendants. and BARBARA COLEMAN, LAURA STEWART, LIAN TANG, DONNA WEATHERBY, GALE LEE, and KAREN JUDD, Plaintiffs,
v.
DAVITA HEALTHCARE PARTNERS, INC., and TOTAL RENAL CARE, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Marcia
S. Krieger, Chief United States District Judge.
THESE
MATTERS come before the Court pursuant to the
Defendants' (“DaVita”) Motions to Dismiss
(#36 in -2741; # 30 in
-2742; # 35 in -2744; # 33
in -2745; # 27 in -2747; #
36 in -2748; and # 33 in
-2749), the Plaintiffs' responses, and
DaVita's replies. Because the operative Amended
Complaints and DaVita's motions in each case are largely
identical, the Court finds that a single order is best suited
to address the motions in each case.
FACTS
The
allegations in each of these cases are substantially
identical. The Plaintiffs are employees of DaVita in various
capacities. They generally allege that they were not
compensated with premium overtime pay for hours that they
worked in excess of 40 per week, in violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §
201 et seq. Although the various Amended Complaints
contain conclusory recitations, the pertinent factual
averments follow:
• DaVita “allocate[s] a certain number of hours
per employee shift, but employees are unable to complete
their work within the pre-established time budgeted.”
See e.g. Docket # 24 in -2742, ¶ 8. Employees
are then “required to perform their work regardless of
how much time it takes.” Id., ¶ 7.
• DaVita has “centralized pay policies” used
throughout its United States operations. Id., ¶
9. The Plaintiffs list a variety of these policies -
“Patient to Staff Ratios, Anaplan tracking of labor
performance, Direct Patient Care budges, [etc.]” - but
do not elaborate on what any of these policies do or how they
bear on the claims at issue.
• “As an example, over the past three years while
employed by the Defendants, during most workweeks the
Plaintiffs would work an average of 7[1] hours of overtime for which
they were not paid.” Id., ¶ 10. No.
further explanation of this calculation is offered.
• “During the time period applicable to these
claims, Plaintiffs and those similarly situated routinely
worked in excess of forty hours per workweek without being
paid overtime premium[s].” Id., ¶ 46.
The
Amended Complaints assert two causes of action: (i) a claim
bringing a collective action, on behalf of the named
Plaintiff(s) and “others similarly situated” for
violation of the FLSA's overtime provisions pursuant to
29 U.S.C. § 216(b); and (ii) a claim for violation of
the FLSA's overtime provisions on behalf of the named
Plaintiffs, individually.
DaVita
moves to dismiss the Amended Complaints for failure to state
a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). DaVita argues that: (i)
the Plaintiffs fail to identify “what purported policy
or practice” by DaVita resulted in the Plaintiffs
working overtime hours without compensation; (ii) the
Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently “approximate the number
of regular and overtime hours allegedly worked”; and
(iii) the Plaintiffs fail to identify who is “similarly
situated” to them for purposes of bringing a collective
action.
ANALYSIS
A.
Standard of review
In
reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the
Court must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the Amended
Complaint as true and view those allegations in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Stidham v. Peace
Officer Standards & Training, 265 F.3d 1144, 1149
(10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for
the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir.
1999)). The Court must limit its consideration to the four
corners of the Amended Complaint, any documents attached
thereto, and any external documents that are referenced in
the Amended Complaint and whose accuracy is not in dispute.
Oxendine v. Kaplan, 241 F.3d 1272, 1275 (10th Cir.
2001); Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936,
941 (10th Cir. 2002); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Howsam, 261 F.3d 956, 961 (10th Cir. 2001).
A claim
is subject to dismissal if it fails to state a claim for
relief that is “plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To make
such an assessment, the Court first discards those averments
in the Complaint that are merely legal conclusions or
“threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements.”
Id. at 678-79. The Court takes the remaining,
well-pleaded factual contentions, treats them as true, and
ascertains whether those facts (coupled, of course, with the
law establishing the requisite elements of the claim) support
a claim that is “plausible” or whether the claim
being asserted is merely “conceivable” or
“possible” under the facts alleged. Id.
What is required to reach the level of
“plausibility” varies from context ...