United States District Court, D. Colorado
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
Marcia
S. Krieger, Chief United States District Judge
THIS
MATTER comes before the Court pursuant to the
Plaintiffs' (“the Sadlers”) pro
se[1] Motion for Preliminary Injunction
(# 27), and the Defendants' response
(# 29); and the Sadlers' Motion for
Expedited Consideration (# 30), which the
Court now denies as moot.
FACTS
Because
the Plaintiffs' Complaint (# 6) is
somewhat unclear, the Court turns to the Scheduling Order
(# 22) for a recitation of the pertinent
facts. The Sadlers reside in a home in Castle Rock, Colorado.
The home is encumbered[2] by a mortgage note in the principal amount
of $295, 000 and Deed of Trust, originally issued in favor of
America's Wholesale Lender. At some point between 2007
and 2014, the note and Deed of Trust were assigned to
Defendant Bank of New York Mellon (“BNY”) and
serviced by Defendant Shell Point Mortgage Servicing
(“Shell”). The note fell into default in or about
2007. BNY commenced a foreclosure action at that time, but
according to the Sadlers, because BNY presented “three
separate versions” of the promissory note, the Colorado
District Court for Douglas County dismissed the foreclosure
action. BNY and Shell commenced several more foreclosure
proceedings, but dismissed them for various reasons. In 2017,
BNY commenced a new foreclosure proceeding. The Sadlers
contend that BNY presented a fourth version of the note in
this proceeding, and that the note “is not the
original.” Nevertheless, the Douglas County court was
apparently persuaded: it authorized a foreclosure sale, BNY
was the high bidder for the property with a bid of $408, 000,
and the Douglas County Public Trustee eventually issued a
certificate of purchase to BNY, transferring title to the
property.
The
Sadlers' claims are not well-articulated in either the
Complaint or Scheduling Order, They consist largely of an
assertion that the Defendants committed “deception
[and] fraud” and violated an array of statutes the
Sadlers identify only by their initials -- the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C.
§ 2601 et seq.; the Home Affordable
Modification Prograrm (“HAMP”), an uncodified
Treasury Department program created pursuant to the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5201; the
Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”), 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a); the Truth In Lending Act (“TILA”),
15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.; the Consumer
Financial Protection Act (“CFPA”), 12 U.S.C.
§ 5531 and 5536 - along with “various Colorado
statutes” (apparently including the Colorado Consumer
Protection Act, C.R.S. § 6-1-101 et seq.)
“and other illegal practices.”[3]
On
March 2, 2018, the Sadlers filed the instant Motion for
Preliminary Injunction (# 27). That motion
explains that the Defendants “posted a demand for
possession” on the Sadlers' home in February 2018 -
that is, BNY commenced a Forcible Entry and Detainer
(“FED” action) in the Colorado District Court for
Douglas County, seeking the Sadlers' eviction from the
home. The Sadlers state that they “should be subject to
the rulings of only one court, not two” and request
that the Court “grant relief from any eviction process
by the Defendants until the Complaint [in this case] is
resolved.” They explain that they are “both in
their mid-70s and experiencing the infirmities that come with
aging, ” as well as caring for a grandchild with
special needs.
The FED
action is set for trial on April 2.
ANALYSIS
A.
Standard of review
The
Sadlers seek a preliminary injunction restraining the
Defendants from prosecuting the FED action. A party seeking a
preliminary injunction is required to show: (i) the party
will suffer an imminent and irreparable injury if the
injunction is denied; (ii) a likelihood of success on the
merits of the claims in the action; (iii) a balancing of the
equities tipping in favor of the party seeking the
injunction; and (iv) that the requested injunction is not
injurious to the public interest. McDonnell v. City and
County of Denver, 878 F.3d 1247, 1252 (10th
Cir. 2018). In addition, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(c), the
Court must require the movant to “give[ ] security in
an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs
and damages sustained by any party found to have been
wrongfully enjoined or restrained.”
B.
Threshold issues
There
are several obstacles that prevent the Court for reaching the
Sadlers' request for an injunction on the merits. The
Defendants have argued that the Anti-Injunction Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2283, prevents the Court from enjoining the FED
action. That statute provides that the Court “many not
grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State
Court” unless: (i) a federal statute provides for such
injunction, (ii) the Court must enjoin the state proceeding
in order to preserve its jurisdiction over the case, or (iii)
the Court has issued a judgment that requires such an
injunction. Although it is not entirely clear whether the
Sadlers request that this Court enjoin the state
court from hearing the FED action, or whether they
simply request that this Court enjoin BNY from
prosecuting that case, the difference is not material. The
Anti-Injunction Act also prohibits injunctions directed at
private parties where the injunction would prohibit the party
from using the results of a state court proceeding. U.S.
v. Billingsley, 615 F.3d 404, 409 (5th Cir.
2010). Federal courts have routinely concluded that the
Anti-Injunction Act prevents them from enjoining state
eviction proceedings. Bond v. JP Morgan Chase Bank,
526 Fed.Appx. 698, 701-02 (2d Cir. 2013) (dicta);
Powers v. Bank of America, 63 F.Supp.3d 747, 752
(E.D.Mi. 2014). As set forth below, the Court finds that none
of the statutes that the Sadlers invoke provide for
injunctive relief to halt an eviction, and the Court finds
that none of the Sadlers' putative claims depend on their
presence in the home to secure this Court's jurisdiction.
To the contrary, the Sadlers' claims are in
personam claims that the Sadlers can assert regardless
of whether they are living in the home, an apartment, or on a
yacht. Thus, the Court declines the Sadlers' request
solely on the strength of the Anti-Injunction Act.
The
Court also has concerns that the Sadlers' request would
be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. That
doctrine prohibits a party who lost in a concluded state
court proceeding from invoking federal jurisdiction in an
effort to upset the state court's judgment. Dillard
v. Bank of New York, 476 Fed.Appx. 690, 691-92
(10th Cir. 2012). The Sadlers appear to be
asserting that, although the state court has approved
BNY's foreclosure on the home and issued a confirmation
deed, they contend that the note BNY presented during that
proceeding was fraudulent or otherwise inauthentic. By
requesting that BNY be precluded from evicting them from the
home, the Sadlers appear to be suggesting that this Court
should somehow find fault with the state court's
conclusive determination on the foreclosure action, which has
been completed. To do so would violate the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The
Court also agrees with the Defendants that the doctrine of
Younger abstention would also counsel against this
Court interfering in the FED action. See e.g. Flemming v.
Sims, 2017 WL 8314665 (D.Colo. Aug. 1, 2017); Davis
v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 2016 WL 8670507
(D.Colo. Dec. ...