United States District Court, D. Colorado
TRUMAN H. WEAVER, and PATTY FUNK, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.
Michael E. Hegarty, United States Magistrate Judge.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
(“Defendant”) has moved to dismiss all six claims
brought by Plaintiffs Truman H. Weaver and Patty Funk
(“Plaintiffs”) on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated. The Court finds that Plaintiffs'
claims are all based on the same legal theory-fraudulent
nondisclosure-and Plaintiffs' allegations are
insufficient to state any plausible claim for relief on this
basis. Therefore, the Court will grant Defendant's
Statement of Facts
following are factual allegations from the operative
Complaint, which are taken as true for analysis under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) pursuant to Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
are Colorado residents who, in December 2014, sought to
purchase automobile liability insurance from Defendant for
three vehicles: a 2012 Chevrolet Impala, a 1991 Chevrolet
pickup truck, and a 1996 Suzuki motorcycle. Compl.
¶¶ 1, 10-11, ECF No. 1. Colorado law requires that
an automobile liability insurance policy issued in the state
provide uninsured motorist (“UM” or
“UIM”) coverage for the protection of the insured
for injuries incurred in an accident caused by an uninsured
or underinsured motorist, unless the insured rejects that
coverage in writing. Id. ¶ 7 (citing Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 10-4-609(1)(a)). In conjunction with these
policies, Defendant sent Plaintiffs two identical forms
separately pertaining to the 1991 pickup truck and the 1996
motorcycle titled “Colorado Uninsured Motor Vehicle
Coverage (Acknowledgment of Coverage Selection or
Rejection)” (“UM Rejection Form”).
Id. ¶ 11; see Id. Attach. 1, at 2;
id. Attach. 2, at 2. The two forms had the following
identical language in the second paragraph (the “Second
Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage for bodily injury, sickness,
or disease, including death, selected on one policy insuring
a motor vehicle owned and insured by you or any family member
who resides in your household will apply to any accident for
which the selected Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage is
payable for that bodily injury, sickness, or disease,
including death. The described vehicle on that one policy
need not be involved in the accident for Uninsured Motor
Vehicle Coverage to apply.
Id. Attach. 1, at 2; id. Attach. 2, at 2.
Plaintiffs allege Colorado law does not require an insurer to
provide this, or any other, information regarding the
rejection of UM insurance. Id. ¶¶ 25, 28.
On these forms, Plaintiffs rejected the UM coverage for both
vehicles. Id. ¶ 15; see Id. Attach. 1,
at 2; id. Attach. 2, at 2. Defendant then issued
Plaintiffs policies on the three vehicles. Id.
¶¶ 16-18. The policies provided for liability and
UM insurance on the 2012 Impala and only liability insurance
on the 1991 pickup truck and 1996 motorcycle. Id.
policies were in effect on February 17, 2016, when Mr. Weaver
sustained serious injuries in a two-vehicle accident caused
by the other driver's negligence. Id. ¶ 19.
Mr. Weaver's medical expenses from this accident exceeded
$300, 000. Id. ¶ 20. The other driver's
liability insurance was insufficient to cover Mr.
Weaver's medical expenses, so Defendant paid Mr. Weaver
$100, 000, the maximum available under the policy in which he
accepted UM coverage. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. Had
Plaintiffs not rejected UM insurance on the other two
policies, Mr. Weaver would have been able to
“stack” that coverage, meaning that he would have
been entitled to coverage on all three policies, resulting in
an additional $125, 000 in coverage. Id.
¶¶ 9, 24.
bring the present suit and assert six claims for relief
alleging Defendant's disclosures in the UM Rejection Form
fraudulently induced them to reject the UM coverage.
Id. ¶¶ 48-80. The first five claims ask
for equitable and declaratory relief and are founded on the
alleged fraudulent nondisclosure. Id. ¶¶
48-71. The sixth claim is brought by Mr. Weaver individually
under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act. Id.
¶¶ 72-80. However, Defendant argues, and Plaintiffs
effectively concede, this claim also is founded in a
fraudulent nondisclosure theory. See Resp. 18
(“Plaintiffs' Consumer Protection Act [c]laim
pleads a plausible claim for relief. Plaintiffs plead that
failure to disclose was misleading.”). Therefore, all
of Plaintiffs claims necessarily rely on the same legal
theory. The present motion asks the Court to dismiss all
claims, because Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for
fraudulent nondisclosure. Mot., ECF No. 21.
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). Plausibility, in the context of a motion to dismiss,
means that the plaintiff pled facts which allow “the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
Twombly requires a two-prong analysis. First, a court
must identify “the allegations in the complaint that
are not entitled to the assumption of truth, ” that is,
those allegations which are legal conclusions, bare
assertions, or merely conclusory. Id. at 678-80.
Second, the Court must consider the factual allegations
“to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement
to relief.” Id. at 681. If the allegations
state a plausible claim for relief, such claim survives the
motion to dismiss. Id. at 680.
refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint:
if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of
conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs ‘have
not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.'” Khalik v. United Air Lines,
671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Robbins v.
Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008)).
“The nature and specificity of the allegations required
to state a plausible claim will vary based on context.”
Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210,
1215 (10th Cir. 2011). Thus, while the Rule 12(b)(6) standard
does not require that a plaintiff establish ...