County District Court Nos. 09CR1694 & 13CR1449 Honorable
Richard T. Gurley, Judge
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Marissa R. Miller,
Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for
Matthew Joslin, Pro Se
1 In two separate cases, Matthew Joslin, defendant, accepted
the benefit of a plea bargain. In 2009, he was charged with
six sex offenses but pleaded guilty to only two. He was
sentenced to probation and ordered to pay over $8000 in fees.
He was not ordered to pay restitution. In 2013, Joslin faced
thirty new charges, twenty-one of which were class 3
felonies, but he pleaded guilty to only four. He was
sentenced to ninety-two years to life in the custody of the
Department of Corrections and ordered to pay over $14, 000 in
fees and $1520 in restitution.
2 When Joslin did not pay the restitution within a year, he
was charged interest on that unpaid restitution pursuant to
section 18-1.3-603(4)(b), C.R.S. 2014. He then filed two
nearly identical Crim. P. 35(c) motions, alleging that in
each case he was never told that he would be charged interest
on unpaid restitution. He claimed that he would never have
pleaded guilty if he had known he would have to pay interest.
The district court denied the motions without a hearing.
3 On appeal, Joslin essentially contends that he is entitled
to postconviction relief because either the district court or
his counsel (or both) was required to tell him that he would
be required to pay interest on unpaid restitution - and
neither did. Central to addressing Joslin's contentions
is the premise that defendants must be advised of the direct,
but not collateral, consequences of a plea. People v.
Campbell, 174 P.3d 860, 864 (Colo.App. 2007); see
also Crim. P. 11(b)(4); People v. Birdsong, 958
P.2d 1124, 1128 (Colo. 1998). We conclude that interest on
unpaid restitution is a collateral consequence of a plea and
that neither the district court nor Joslin's counsel had
a duty to advise Joslin of this possibility. Thus, we affirm
the district court's order denying Joslin's
postconviction motion without a hearing.
Denial of Crim. P. 35(c) Motions
4 A district court may deny a Crim. P. 35(c) motion without a
hearing if the allegations are bare and conclusory; the
allegations, even if true, do not warrant relief; or the
record refutes the claims. People v. Duran, 2015 COA
141, ¶ 9; see also Ardolino v. People, 69 P.3d
73, 77 (Colo. 2003). In other words, to warrant a hearing on
a Crim. P. 35(c) motion, a defendant must allege facts that,
if true, entitle the defendant to postconviction relief.
Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(IV); see also White v. Denver Dist.
Court, 766 P.2d 632, 635 (Colo. 1988).
5 We review the district court's summary denial of a
Crim. P. 35(c) motion de novo. People v. Lopez, 2015
COA 45, ¶ 68.
6 In his Crim. P. 35(c) motions, Joslin alleged that neither
the district court nor his counsel told him that he would be
required to pay interest on unpaid restitution. Taking these
facts as true, if either the district court or Joslin's
counsel had a duty to advise him of the interest provision,
Joslin would be entitled to a hearing on his motions. We
first address the district court's duty, then defense
District Court's Duty
7 A district court has a duty to ensure that a defendant is
advised of the direct, but not collateral, consequences of
the plea. Campbell, 174 P.3d at 864; see
also Crim. P. 11(b). Direct consequences are those that
have a definite, immediate, and largely automatic effect on
the range of possible punishment. Campbell, 174 P.3d
at 864. In contrast, collateral consequences are contingent
on a future event or action taken by some individual other
than the sentencing court. Id.
8 Joslin contends that being charged interest on unpaid
restitution is a direct consequence of his plea. We disagree.
It is true that interest on unpaid restitution is largely
automatic. Section 18-1.3-603(4)(b), C.R.S. 2014, states that
"[a]ny order for restitution . . . shall also be deemed
to order that: (I) The defendant owes interest ...