United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
A. BRIMMER United States District Judge.
Court takes up this matter sua sponte on the notice
of removal [Docket No. 1] filed by “UF Specialty
Insurance Company.” Defendant states that the Court has
subject matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a). Docket No. 1 at 2.
every case and at every stage of the proceeding, a federal
court must satisfy itself as to its own jurisdiction, even if
doing so requires sua sponte action. Citizens
Concerned for Separation of Church & State v. City &
County of Denver, 628 F.2d 1289, 1297 (10th Cir. 1980).
Absent an assurance that jurisdiction exists, a court may not
proceed in a case. See Cunningham v. BHP Petroleum Great
Britain PLC, 427 F.3d 1238, 1245 (10th Cir. 2005).
Courts are well-advised to raise the issue of jurisdiction on
their own, regardless of parties' apparent acquiescence.
First, it is the Court's duty to do so. Tuck v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 859 F.2d 842, 844 (10th
Cir. 1988). Second, regarding subject matter jurisdiction,
“the consent of the parties is irrelevant, principles
of estoppel do not apply, and a party does not waive the
requirement by failing to challenge jurisdiction.”
Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (internal citations
omitted). Finally, delay in addressing the issue only
compounds the problem if it turns out that, despite much time
and expense having been dedicated to a case, a lack of
jurisdiction causes it to be dismissed or remanded regardless
of the stage it has reached. See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Pinkard Constr. Co., No. 09-cv-00491-PAB-MJW, 2009 WL
2338116, at *3 (D. Colo. July 28, 2009).
well established that “[t]he party invoking federal
jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing such
jurisdiction as a threshold matter.” Radil v.
Sanborn W. Camps, Inc., 384 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir.
2004). Defendant invokes 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) as the
basis for this Court's diversity jurisdiction. Docket No.
1 at 2. Section 1332(a)(1) states: “The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,
000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between 
citizens of different States.” The facts as presently
averred, however, do not provide sufficient information
regarding the citizenship of plaintiff and defendant.
notice of removal states that plaintiff is a “resident
of the City of Northglenn and State of Colorado.”
Docket No. 1 at 2. However, domicile, not residency, is
determinative of citizenship. Whitelock v.
Leatherman, 460 F.2d 507, 514 (10th Cir. 1972)
(“[A]llegations of mere ‘residence' may not
be equated with ‘citizenship' for the purposes of
establishing diversity.”); see also Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48
(1989) (“‘Domicile' is not necessarily
synonymous with ‘residence, ' and one can reside in
one place but be domiciled in another.” (citations
defendant's allegations regarding its own citizenship are
deficient.Defendant states that it is a
“corporate resident of the city of Cedar Rapids, State
of Iowa, with a corporate address at 118 2nd Ave SE, Cedar
Rapids, IA 52401.” Docket No. 1 at 2 (citing Docket No.
1-3). For diversity purposes, “a corporation shall be
deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by
which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign
state where it has its principal place of business.” 28
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); see Carden v. Arkoma
Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 196 (1990). A
corporation's “principal place of business”
is “the place where a corporation's officers
direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's
activities.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S.
77, 92-93 (2010). A corporation's principal place of
business is not necessarily the same as its corporate address
or even its headquarters. Id. at 93. Defendant fails
to identify its form of business organization, its state of
incorporation, and its principal place of business. Docket
No. 1 at 2.
defendant has not sufficiently alleged the citizenship of the
parties, the Court is unable to determine whether it has
subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim.
See United States ex rel. General Rock & Sand Corp.
v. Chuska Dev. Corp., 55 F.3d 1491, 1495 (10th Cir.
1995) (“The party seeking the exercise of jurisdiction
in his favor must allege in his pleading the facts essential
to show jurisdiction.”) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Therefore, it is
that, on or before 5:00 p.m. on February 19,
2018, defendant UFG Specialty Insurance Company
shall show cause why this case should not be dismissed due to
the Court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
 UF Specialty Insurance Company claims
that it is incorrectly named in the complaint as UFG
Specialty Insurance Company. Docket No. 1 at 1. For
simplicity, the Court refers to the party seeking removal as
 Defendant claims that plaintiff's
policy was issued by United Fire & Casualty. Docket No.
1-3 at 1, ¶ 3. United Fire & Casualty is not a named
party. Moreover, to the extent that defendant claims that
United Fire & Casualty is a proper party, defendant's
allegations of United Fire & Casualty's citizenship
are similarly deficient.
 These considerations do not apply if
defendant was not formed as a corporation. See
Carden, 494 U.S. at 195 (“[W]e reject the
contention that to determine, for diversity purposes, the
citizenship of an artificial entity, the court may consult