The People of the State of Colorado, Petitioner-Appellee, In the Interest of I.S., Juvenile-Appellant.
County District Court No. 14JD569 Honorable Thomas J.
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Patrick A. Withers,
Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for
Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Rachel
Milos, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for
1 This case addresses one of the five criteria under section
16-22-103(5)(a), C.R.S. 2017, that an offender involved in a
sex offense must satisfy to be eligible to petition for
exemption from sex offender registration. The criterion in
question requires that
[t]he offense, as charged in the first petition filed with
the court, is a first offense of either misdemeanor unlawful
sexual contact, as described in section 18-3-404, C.R.S., or
indecent exposure, as described in section 18-7-302, C.R.S.
2 I.S., a juvenile, was originally charged in a petition in
delinquency with three felony counts of sexual assault on a
child. Under a plea deal, the prosecution added a fourth
misdemeanor count of unlawful sexual contact to its petition,
to which I.S. pleaded guilty in return for the three felony
counts being dismissed. But because the first petition filed
with the court charged I.S. with the three felony counts of
sexual assault on a child - not the misdemeanor - the
district court ruled that I.S. did not satisfy section
16-22-103(5)(a)(III) and thus must register as a sex
3 I.S.'s argument presents an issue of first impression:
Does the meaning of "the first petition filed with the
court" in section 16-22-103(5)(a)(III) encompass later
amendments to that first petition? We answer this question no
in Part II and affirm. I. Judicial Notice and Mootness
4 At his first sentencing, the district court deferred
I.S.'s adjudication for two years contingent on I.S.
complying with the terms of his probation and ordered him to
register as a sex offender. While this appeal was still
pending, I.S. violated the terms of his probation. The court
revoked his probation in a second sentencing and resentenced
him after voiding the first sentence.
5 The People contend that I.S.'s appeal is moot because
his first sentence has been revoked and replaced by a new
sentence. To support their contention, they point to a
"register of actions" appended to their brief that
shows I.S.'s first sentence is now "void" and
has been replaced by a new sentence. Though this appendix is
not part of the record, the People contend that we may take
judicial notice of it.
6 We agree with the People that we may take judicial notice
of their appendix. But we disagree that the void status of
I.S.'s first sentence moots this appeal.
7 Under CRE 201(b), a court may judicially notice facts not
subject to reasonable dispute because they are "capable
of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." This
includes "the contents of court records in a related
proceeding." People v. Sa'ra, 117 P.3d 51,