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People ex rel. I.S.

Court of Appeals of Colorado, Second Division

December 14, 2017

The People of the State of Colorado, Petitioner-Appellee, In the Interest of I.S., Juvenile-Appellant.

         Weld County District Court No. 14JD569 Honorable Thomas J. Quammen, Judge

          Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Patrick A. Withers, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

          Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Rachel Milos, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile-Appellant

          OPINION

          HAWTHORNE JUDGE

         ¶ 1 This case addresses one of the five criteria under section 16-22-103(5)(a), C.R.S. 2017, that an offender involved in a sex offense must satisfy to be eligible to petition for exemption from sex offender registration. The criterion in question requires that

[t]he offense, as charged in the first petition filed with the court, is a first offense of either misdemeanor unlawful sexual contact, as described in section 18-3-404, C.R.S., or indecent exposure, as described in section 18-7-302, C.R.S.

§ 16-22-103(5)(a)(III).

         ¶ 2 I.S., a juvenile, was originally charged in a petition in delinquency with three felony counts of sexual assault on a child. Under a plea deal, the prosecution added a fourth misdemeanor count of unlawful sexual contact to its petition, to which I.S. pleaded guilty in return for the three felony counts being dismissed. But because the first petition filed with the court charged I.S. with the three felony counts of sexual assault on a child - not the misdemeanor - the district court ruled that I.S. did not satisfy section 16-22-103(5)(a)(III) and thus must register as a sex offender.

         ¶ 3 I.S.'s argument presents an issue of first impression: Does the meaning of "the first petition filed with the court" in section 16-22-103(5)(a)(III) encompass later amendments to that first petition? We answer this question no in Part II and affirm. I. Judicial Notice and Mootness

         ¶ 4 At his first sentencing, the district court deferred I.S.'s adjudication for two years contingent on I.S. complying with the terms of his probation and ordered him to register as a sex offender. While this appeal was still pending, I.S. violated the terms of his probation. The court revoked his probation in a second sentencing and resentenced him after voiding the first sentence.

         ¶ 5 The People contend that I.S.'s appeal is moot because his first sentence has been revoked and replaced by a new sentence. To support their contention, they point to a "register of actions" appended to their brief that shows I.S.'s first sentence is now "void" and has been replaced by a new sentence. Though this appendix is not part of the record, the People contend that we may take judicial notice of it.

         ¶ 6 We agree with the People that we may take judicial notice of their appendix. But we disagree that the void status of I.S.'s first sentence moots this appeal.

         A. Judicial Notice

          ¶ 7 Under CRE 201(b), a court may judicially notice facts not subject to reasonable dispute because they are "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." This includes "the contents of court records in a related proceeding." People v. Sa'ra, 117 P.3d 51, ...


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