United States District Court, D. Colorado
RAYMOND P. MOORE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on Defendants David Lee Smith and
M. Julia Hook's (collectively, “Defendants”)
“Motion to Vacate and Set Aside November 20, 2017
Order; Request for Stay of Case Pending Resolution of
Motion” (the “Motion to Vacate”) (ECF No.
333). Upon consideration of the Motion to Vacate, the court
file, and the applicable rules and case law, and being
otherwise fully advised, the Court finds no response is
necessary to the Motion to Vacate before a ruling.
See D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(d). And, further, upon such
consideration, for the reasons stated herein, the Motion to
Vacate is DENIED.
parties are well versed in the facts, allegations, and
history of this case; therefore, it will not be repeated
here. As relevant to the Motion to Vacate, upon Motion to
Reactive (ECF No. 328) filed by Plaintiff, and after
consideration of the case file, including the orders of the
Bankruptcy Court, this Court found good cause to reopen this
case which had been administratively closed due to
Defendants' bankruptcy filing. Defendants now challenge
this Court's Order to reopen this case, asserting: (1)
the Bankruptcy Court's order (“Lift Order”)
granting Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Automatic
Stay is void under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4) as the
“judgment” is allegedly premised on two
jurisdictional errors and violations of Defendants' due
process rights; and (2) because the Bankruptcy Court's
Lift Order is void, this Court's Order is also void and
also violates the automatic stay in Defendants'
are correct in that, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4), a
court may “relieve a party from a final judgment if the
judgment is void.” United Student Aid Funds, Inc.
v. Espinoza, 559 U.S. 260, 270 (2010) (citation and
quotation marks omitted). But, that is the only thing they
have shown is correct.
although Defendants assert the Bankruptcy Court's Lift
Order is a “judgment” to which Rule 60(b)(4) may
apply, they have not shown it is so. Their bare statement is
insufficient. See, e.g., Robey-Harcourt v. BenCorp Fin.
Co., 326 F.3d 1140, 1143 (10th Cir. 2003)
(“Parties must support their arguments with legal
authority.”); Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d
1099, 1105 (10th Cir. 2007) (cursory arguments, without
supporting analysis and case law, are waived); Birch v.
Polaris Indus., Inc., 812 F.3d 1238, 1249 (10th Cir.
2015) (court may decline to consider argument which is
unsupported and inadequately briefed).
even assuming, arguendo, the Lift Order is a
“judgment, ” “[a] judgment is not void
merely because it is erroneous. It is void only if the court
that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter,
or of the parties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent
with due process of law.” 11 Charles Alan Wright et
al., Federal Practice and Procedure Civil § 2862
(3rd ed. 2012 & Supp. 2017); see also Espinoza,
559 U.S. at 271 (“Rule 60(b)(4) applies only in the
rare instance where a judgment is premised either on a
certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due
process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to
be heard.”). Here, Defendants' position that the
Lift Order is void consists of nothing more than conclusory
assertions; it is bereft of supporting facts, legal
authority, or analysis. As such, Defendants fail to show it
is void.And, as Defendants have not shown the Lift
Order is a void judgment, it follows Defendants have not
shown this Court's Order in reliance on the Lift Order is
either void or violative of any automatic stay. Or, that any
stay is warranted. Accordingly, it is
that Defendants' “Motion to Vacate and Set Aside
November 20, 2017 Order; Request for Stay of Case Pending
Resolution of Motion” (ECF No. 333) is
 Further, the record shows
Defendants' “jurisdictional errors” and other
allegations were raised before and rejected by the Bankruptcy
Court. (See ECF Nos. 329-1, 331-1.) As the
Bankruptcy Court found, and with which this Court agrees,
Defendants' complaint about the Bankruptcy Court is not
that it lacked jurisdiction, but, rather, is that it
allegedly refused to hear matters within its jurisdiction.
Moreover, even assuming Defendants' complaint was a
jurisdictional challenge, a court's determination that it
has subject matter jurisdiction is generally not subject to
collateral attack where the issue has already been litigated
and decided. See Stoll v. Gottlieb,305 U.S. 165,
172 (193 8) (“We see no reason why a court[, ] in the
absence of an allegation of fraud in obtaining the judgment,
should examine again the question whether the court making
the earlier determination on an actual contest over
jurisdiction between the parties, did have jurisdiction of
the subject matter of the litigation.”); 11 Charles
Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 2862 (3d ed. 2012 & 2017 Supp.) ...