United States District Court, D. Colorado
DAVID H. HANSON, Plaintiff,
BOSLEY AND BRATCH, INC., doing business as Bosley and Bratch, BOSLEY AND BRATCH, P.C., doing business as Bosley and Bratch, RALPH JUDSON BRATCH, in his individual capacity and as an Attorney at Law, Registered Agent doing business as Bosley and Bratch, THEODORE JARVI, in his individual capacity and as an Attorney at Law, Jarvi and Bratch, Inc., P.C. and Bosley and Bratch, Inc., and Bosley and Bratch Trade Name, and RICHARD PALMATIER, JR., Attorney at Law, Arizona Registered Agent and Plaintiff Representative, Defendants.
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
A. BRIMMER United States District Judge
Court takes up this matter sua sponte on the amended
complaint [Docket No. 27] filed by plaintiff David H. Hanson.
Plaintiff states that the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over this lawsuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2671-80 and 1332. Docket No. 27 at 1-2,
¶¶ 1, 9.
every case and at every stage of the proceeding, a federal
court must satisfy itself as to its own jurisdiction, even if
doing so requires sua sponte action. Citizens
Concerned for Separation of Church & State v. City &
County of Denver, 628 F.2d 1289, 1297 (10th Cir. 1980).
Absent an assurance that jurisdiction exists, a court may not
proceed in a case. See Cunningham v. BHP Petroleum Great
Britain PLC, 427 F.3d 1238, 1245 (10th Cir. 2005).
Courts are well-advised to raise the issue of jurisdiction on
their own, regardless of parties' apparent acquiescence.
First, it is the Court's duty to do so. Tuck v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 859 F.2d 842, 844 (10th
Cir. 1988). Second, regarding subject matter jurisdiction,
“the consent of the parties is irrelevant, principles
of estoppel do not apply, and a party does not waive the
requirement by failing to challenge jurisdiction.”
Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (internal citations
omitted). Finally, delay in addressing the issue only
compounds the problem if it turns out that, despite much time
and expense having been dedicated to a case, a lack of
jurisdiction causes it to be dismissed or remanded regardless
of the stage it has reached. See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Pinkard Constr. Co., No. 09-cv-00491-PAB-MJW, 2009 WL
2338116, at *3 (D. Colo. July 28, 2009).
well established that “[t]he party invoking federal
jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing such
jurisdiction as a threshold matter.” Radil v.
Sanborn W. Camps, Inc., 384 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir.
2004). Plaintiff first invokes a portion of the Federal Tort
Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§
2671-80, as a basis for jurisdiction. Docket No. 27 at 1-2,
¶ 1. None of the cited statutory sections provides a
basis for jurisdiction over plaintiff's professional
negligence claim against private parties. Under the FTCA, a
plaintiff can sue the United States for torts, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2674, and this Court has original jurisdiction over
such claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a), but neither the United
States nor any of its agencies is a defendant in this
lawsuit. See Docket No. 27 at 1.
also invokes 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) as the basis for this
Court's diversity jurisdiction. Docket No. 27 at 2,
¶ 9. Section 1332(a)(1) states: “The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $75, 000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is
between  citizens of different States.” The facts as
presently averred, however, do not provide sufficient
information regarding the citizenship of plaintiff or
defendants or regarding the amount in controversy.
amended complaint states that plaintiff is a “resident
in the state of Colorado.” Docket No. 27 at 2, ¶
3. However, domicile, not residency, is determinative of
citizenship. Whitelock v. Leatherman, 460 F.2d 507,
514 (10th Cir. 1972) (“[A]llegations of mere
‘residence' may not be equated with
‘citizenship' for the purposes of establishing
diversity.”); see also Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989)
(“‘Domicile' is not necessarily synonymous
with ‘residence, ' and one can reside in one place
but be domiciled in another.” (citations omitted)).
Moreover, plaintiff's amended complaint contains no
allegations regarding the citizenship of defendants.
See Docket No. 27 at 2, ¶¶ 3-7. Nor does
the complaint contain any allegations from which the Court
could infer that the amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000.
Id. at 4. Therefore, the Court is unable to
determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over
plaintiff's claim. See United States ex rel. General
Rock & Sand Corp. v. Chuska Dev. Corp., 55 F.3d
1491, 1495 (10th Cir. 1995) (“The party seeking the
exercise of jurisdiction in his favor must allege in his
pleading the facts essential to show jurisdiction.”)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
foregoing reasons, it is
that, on or before 5:00 p.m. on December 7,
2017, plaintiff David H. Hanson shall show cause why
this case should not be dismissed due to the Court's lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.
 Plaintiff also cites 28 U.S.C. §
1332(b), but it is a cost-shifting provision that does not
provide a basis for jurisdiction. See Docket No. ...