United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER GRANTING ENDS OF JUSTICE CONTINUANCE
A. Brimmer, United States District Judge
matter comes before me on Defendant's Unopposed Motion to
Exclude 30 Days From the Speedy Trial Act [Docket No. 15],
wherein defendant Ulysses Adam Griner requests that the Court
exclude 30 days from the Speedy Trial period. The motion
indicates that the United States does not oppose this
request. Id. at 4.
trial is set for October 30, 2017 and motions are due on
September 26, 2017. Based upon Mr. Griner's initial
appearance on August 24, 2017, I find that there are 48 days
left in the Speedy Trial Act period.
defendant's motion is based on three grounds. First, the
need for defense counsel to review a videotape of the car
stop of Mr. Griner and research whether such videotape may
provide grounds for a motion to suppress. Id. at 3.
Second, the need to review the Fountain Police Department
Policy and Procedure Manual regarding the impoundment of
vehicles, which defendant has requested but not received.
Id. And third, defense counsel's workload, which
includes travel to Durango in mid-September. Id. at
indictment charges the defendant with three counts related to
possession with the intent to distribute methamphetamine and
the possession of firearms. Docket No. 1.
defendant's motion implicates the Speedy Trial Act of
1974, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174.
Specifically, the motion implicates 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h),
which provides in relevant part:
The following periods of delay shall be excluded . . . in
computing the time within which the trial of any such offense
. . . .
(7)(A) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance
granted by any judge . . . at the request of the defendant or
his counsel or at the request of the attorney for the
Government, if the judge granted such continuance on the
basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by
taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public
and the defendant in a speedy trial.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
Speedy Trial Act serves two distinct interests: first, to
protect a defendant's right to a speedy indictment and
trial, and second, to serve the public interest in ensuring
prompt criminal prosecutions. United States v.
Williams, 511 F.3d 1044, 1047 (10th Cir. 2007). The Act
requires that a defendant's trial commence within 70 days
after his indictment or initial appearance, whichever is
later. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1); Zedner
v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 497 (2006). Certain
periods of delay are excluded and do not count toward the
70-day limit. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)-(8).
Specifically, “the Act excludes any period of delay
‘resulting from a continuance granted by any judge . .
. on the basis of its findings that the ends of justice
served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of
the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.'”
United States v. Hill, 197 F.3d
436, 440-41 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting former 18 U.S.C. §
order for a continuance to qualify as an excludable
“ends-of-justice” continuance under §
3161(h)(7)(A), certain prerequisites must be satisfied.
Id. at 441. First, I must consider the following
factors listed in § 3161(h)(7)(B):
(i) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the
proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such
proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice;
(ii) Whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the
number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the
existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is
unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial
proceedings or for the ...