County District Court No. 12CR3553 Honorable Mark D. Warner,
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Rebecca A. Adams,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for
Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Meghan M.
Morris, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for
1 Defendant, Kristopher Ray Jones, appeals his conviction for
failure to register as a sex offender under section
18-3-412.5(1)(g), C.R.S. 2016. He contends that the evidence
at trial was insufficient to prove that he failed to register
"upon changing an address" under subsection (1)(g).
He also contends that the prosecution elected, but failed, to
prove that he had a duty to register in Adams County during
the relevant time period. Because we agree with his first
contention, we vacate the judgment of conviction and need not
address his second contention.
2 Jones was required to register as a sex offender based on a
1994 conviction. In 2011, he registered as a sex offender
with the Aurora Police Department (Aurora P.D.) in Colorado.
3 In August 2012, Jones was released from prison onto parole
in an unrelated case, and he was given a voucher to stay at a
particular motel in Aurora (and in Adams County). On August
12, 2012, Jones updated his sex offender registration with
the Aurora P.D., listing the motel's address as his new
4 On August 20, 2012, when the voucher expired, Jones left
the motel and did not return. His whereabouts during the
months after he left the motel are not clear. What is clear
is that he did not report a change of address with the Aurora
P.D., and he did not register as a sex offender with any
other local law enforcement agency in Adams County or in any
other jurisdiction in Colorado until 2013. The People charged
him in this case with failure to register as a sex offender
between August 26, 2012, and November 28, 2012, covering a
three-month period soon after he moved out of the motel
(hereinafter, "the relevant time period").
5 There is no evidence that Jones had a fixed residence
during any portion of the relevant time period. However,
there is some circumstantial evidence of Jones's
whereabouts early on during that period. Between August 27,
2012, and September 4, 2012, Jones telephoned an automated
check-in system numerous times as a requirement of his
parole. He reported that he was calling from a variety of
different locations in Adams County and Denver County, mostly
from truck stops or pay phones: . On August
27, he reported as calling from a pay phone at 56th
and I-25 in Denver. . On August 28, he
reported as calling from a truck stop at I-225 and Quebec
Street in Commerce City.
. On August 30, he reported as calling from
another truck stop at I-225 and Quebec in Commerce City. In
another call he reported as calling from a truck stop near
I-270 and Quebec in Commerce City.
. On September 1, he reported as calling
from a gas station on South Broadway in Denver.
. On September 2, he reported as calling
from a pay phone at a 7-11 store at 70th and Greenwood in
Thornton. In another call he reported as calling from 64th
Avenue and Holly Street in Commerce City.
. On September 3, he reported as calling
from a pay phone at 36th Avenue and Federal Boulevard in
. On September 4, he reported as calling
from Willow Court in Thornton. In another call, he reported
as calling from a pay phone near I-270 and Quebec in Commerce
evidence indicates that Jones did not call into the automated
check-in system after September 4, 2012. ¶ 6 Jones also
met with his parole officer at least once after he left the
motel. The parole officer asked Jones where he was residing
or sleeping, but Jones did not say. Because of that, the
parole officer categorized Jones as "AWOL,
7 The prosecution charged Jones with failure to register as a
sex offender (second offense), alleging that he "failed
to register with the local law enforcement agency in each
jurisdiction in which he resided upon changing an
address" in violation of section 18-3-412.5(1)(g).
(Emphasis added.) The prosecution filed the complaint and
information in Adams County, alleging that the offense was
"committed, or triable, in the county of Adams."
8 At the close of evidence at the bench trial, Jones moved
for a judgment of acquittal. He argued, among other things,
that (1) the prosecution presented no evidence of where he
resided during the relevant time period, including whether he
had resided in Adams County; and (2) ceasing to reside at an
address and thereafter lacking a fixed residence does not
fall within the meaning of "changing an address"
under section 18-3-412.5(1)(g).
9 The trial court denied the motion. It concluded, among
other things, that Jones was in Colorado during the relevant
time period, and that although it is unclear whether he had a
fixed residence or lacked a fixed residence after he moved
out of the motel, the phrase "changing an address"
under section 18-3-412.5(1)(g) is broad enough to cover ...