United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER GRANTING ENDS OF JUSTICE CONTINUANCE
A. BRIMMER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before me on Defendant Juan Amaya's Unopposed
Motion for Continuance of Motions Deadline, Pretrial
Conference, Trial and Unopposed Motion to Exclude Time Within
Which the Trial for the Offenses Charged in the Indictment
Must Commence Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i)
and (iv) [Docket No. 53], wherein defendant Juan Amaya
requests that the Court exclude an additional 60 days from
the Speedy Trial period. Mr. Amaya indicates that he has
contacted counsel for the United States and the other
defendants and they do not oppose the motion. Id. at
motions were due on August 25, 2017; the trial is set for
October 16, 2017.
defendant's motion is based on his attorney's
relatively late entry of appearance in the case and the large
amount of discovery involved. See Docket No. 53 at
superseding indictment charges the defendants with various
counts related to the distribution and/or possession with the
intent to distribute methamphetamine and cocaine and/or the
possession of firearms.
defendant's motion implicates the Speedy Trial Act of
1974, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174.
Specifically, the motion implicates 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h),
which provides in relevant part:
The following periods of delay shall be excluded . . . in
computing the time within which the trial of any such offense
. . . .
(7)(A) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance
granted by any judge . . . at the request of the defendant or
his counsel or at the request of the attorney for the
Government, if the judge granted such continuance on the
basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by
taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public
and the defendant in a speedy trial.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
Speedy Trial Act serves two distinct interests: first, to
protect a defendant's right to a speedy indictment and
trial, and second, to serve the public interest in ensuring
prompt criminal prosecutions. United States v.
Williams, 511 F.3d 1044, 1047 (10th Cir. 2007). The Act
requires that a defendant's trial commence within 70 days
after his indictment or initial appearance, whichever is
later. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1); Zedner
v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 497 (2006). Certain
periods of delay are excluded and do not count toward the
70-day limit. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)-(8).
Specifically, “the Act excludes any period of delay
‘resulting from a continuance granted by any judge . .
. on the basis of its findings that the ends of justice
served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of
the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.'”
United States v. Hill, 197 F.3d
436, 440-41 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting former 18 U.S.C. §
order for a continuance to qualify as an excludable
“ends-of-justice” continuance under §
3161(h)(7)(A), certain prerequisites must be satisfied.
Id. at 441.
I must consider the following factors listed in §
(i) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the
proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such
proceeding impossible, or ...