United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND IMPROPER VENUE
CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO United States District Judge.
matter is before the Court upon Defendant Kevin, Inc.'s
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and
Improper Venue. (Doc. # 11.) For the reasons detailed herein,
the Motion is granted.
Spyderco, Inc. is a knife manufacturer incorporated in
Colorado with its principal place of business in Golden,
Colorado. (Doc. # 1 at ¶¶ 1, 11 .) Plaintiff holds
a number of federally registered and common law trademarks.
(Doc. # 1 at 8-11 .) Defendant Kevin, Inc. is a Maine
corporation with its principal place of business in Kittery,
Maine. (Doc. # 11 at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
sold and continues to sell two variants of counterfeit
Spyderco knives through a brick and mortar retail store
located in Kittery, Maine. (Doc. # 1 at ¶ 28.)
Metallurgic testing confirmed that the knives are not
authentic Spyderco products (Doc. # 1-11), yet both knives
bear Plaintiff's trademarks. (Doc. # 1 at ¶ 31.)
Plaintiff initiated this suit on December 14, 2016, bringing
claims for trademark infringement and counterfeiting under
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 11 1 7 & 1125, a
claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation
of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 6-1-101, and a number of common law causes of action.
(Doc. # 1 at 17-21.)
January 5, 2017, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. (Doc. # 11.) On
January 26, 2017, Plaintiff filed its response (Doc. # 17),
to which Defendant replied on February 10, 2017 (Doc. # 26).
Defendant has not designed any products for Colorado,
advertised within Colorado, or marketed the allegedly
infringing products through a sales agent in Colorado. (Doc.
# 11-1 at ¶¶ 10, 12, 14.) However, Plaintiff
alleges that (i) Defendant's intentional trademark
infringement and intentional and willful counterfeiting of
Plaintiff's products and (ii) Defendant's
long-standing relationship with Plaintiff constitute
sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state for the
purposes of personal jurisdiction.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: RULE 12(b)(2) MOTION TO DISMISS
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a court's
personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Rambo v. American
S. Ins. Co., 839 F.2d 1415, 1417 (10th Cir. 1988)
(citation omitted). In responding to a Rule 12(b)(2) motion
filed prior to an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need
only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction to
defeat the motion. OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co.
of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1091 (10th Cir. 1998). The
prima facie showing may be made by submitting affidavits or
other written materials with facts that would support
jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. A defendant can
counter that showing by demonstrating “that the
presence of some other considerations would render
jurisdiction unreasonable.” Id. (quoting
Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985)).
made in the complaint must be taken as true so long as they
remain undisputed by the defendant's affidavits. Wenz
v. Memery Crystal, 55 F.3d 1503, 1505 (10th Cir. 1995).
Conflicting facts in the parties' affidavits “must
be resolved in the plaintiff's favor, and the
plaintiff's prima facie showing is sufficient
notwithstanding the contrary presentation by the moving
party.” Wenz, 55 F.3d at 1505 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally,
Plaintiff has “the duty to support jurisdictional
allegations in a complaint by competent proof of the
supporting facts if the jurisdictional allegations are
challenged by an appropriate pleading.” Pytlik v.
Prof'l Res., Ltd., 887 F.2d 1371, 1376 (10th Cir.
THE COURT'S ABILITY TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER
Legal Standard: “Minimum Contacts”
analysis of personal jurisdiction begins with a two-step
inquiry. First, a court must determine “whether any
applicable statute authorizes the service of process on [the]
Defendant. Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts,
Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1070 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation
omitted). Second, a court must “examine whether the
exercise of such statutory jurisdiction comports with
constitutional due process demands.” Id.
respect to the first question, the federal Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 111 7 & 1125, does not provide for
nationwide service of process. CrossFit, Inc. v.
Jenkins, 69 F.Supp.3d 1088, 1094 (D. Colo. 2014).
Consequently, Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k)(1)(A) requires that this
Court apply Colorado law. Colorado's long-arm statute, in
turn, confers the maximum jurisdiction permissible consistent
with the Due Process Clause. Archangel Diamond Corp. v.
Lukoil, 123 P.3d 1187, 1193 (Colo. 2005). Thus, in this
case, the first, statutory inquiry effectively collapses into
the second, constitutional analysis.
Supreme Court has held that, to exercise jurisdiction in
harmony with due process, defendants must have “minimum
contacts” with the forum state, such that having to
defend a lawsuit there would not “offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945) (internal quotation marks omitted). Jurisdiction over
corporations may be either general or specific.
Rambo, 839 F.2d at 1418. Jurisdiction over a
defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the
defendant's contacts with the forum state is
“specific jurisdiction.” Id. In
contrast, when the suit does not arise from or relate to the
defendant's contacts with the forum and jurisdiction is
based on the defendant's presence or accumulated contacts
with the forum, the court exercises “general
jurisdiction.” Id. In this case, Plaintiff has
not sufficiently pled that Defendant has the continuous or
systematic contacts with Colorado that would permit an
exercise of general jurisdiction. See Burger King,
471 U.S. at 473 n. 15; Helicopt ...