Opinion Announced May 18, 2017, WITHDRAWN
Jefferson County District Court No. 13CR2831 Honorable Margie
L. Enquist, Judge
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Joseph G. Michaels,
Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for
Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Lisa
Weisz, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for
1 Gregory James Wilson is required to register as a sex
offender. After he was released from custody, he did not do
so. He was then charged with - and convicted of - failure to
register as a sex offender. Wilson now appeals that
conviction. We affirm.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
2 Wilson contends that the evidence was insufficient to show
that he knowingly failed to register as a sex offender. We
3 We review de novo whether the evidence is sufficient to
support a conviction. Dempsey v. People, 117 P.3d
800, 807 (Colo. 2005). In doing so, we evaluate the evidence
as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution
to determine whether it is substantial and sufficient to
support a conclusion that the defendant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v. Johnson, 2016 COA 15,
¶ 16. All reasonable inferences are drawn in the
prosecution's favor. Id.
4 A defendant is guilty of failing to register as a sex
offender when, as relevant here, he does not register with
his local law enforcement agency within five business days
after being released from incarceration. §
18-3-412.5(1)(a), C.R.S. 2016; see also §
16-22-108(1)(a)(II), C.R.S. 2016.
5 Although the statute does not include any specific mental
state, a division of this court has concluded that "the
failure to register as a sex offender is not a strict
liability offense but includes the mental state of
'knowingly.'" People v. Lopez, 140 P.3d
106, 113 (Colo.App. 2005). Knowledge requires only that the
defendant knew the factual circumstances that made his
conduct illegal, not the "technical understanding of the
relevant statutes." People v. Allman, 2012 COA
212, ¶ 36.
6 Despite the fact that the prosecution argued at trial that
Wilson acted knowingly, the People now argue that failure to
register is a strict liability offense and that People v.
Lopez, 140 P.3d 106, was wrongly decided. Because we
conclude that sufficient evidence supports the trial
court's finding that Wilson acted knowingly, we decline
to revisit Lopez.
7 Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the