to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals Case No.
Attorneys for Petitioner: Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney
General William G. Kozeliski, Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent: Meyer Law Office, P.C. Hans Meyer
¶1 Osvaldo Corrales-Castro pled guilty to a criminal
impersonation charge and he received a one-year deferred
judgment. When Corrales-Castro successfully completed the
deferred judgment in 2010, his plea was withdrawn and the
charge was dismissed with prejudice pursuant to section
18-1.3-102(2), C.R.S. (2016), which provides that, upon
"full compliance with [the conditions of a deferred
judgment], " the guilty plea previously entered
"shall be withdrawn and the charge upon which the
judgment and sentence of the court was deferred shall be
dismissed with prejudice."
In 2013, Corrales-Castro filed a motion to withdraw his
guilty plea pursuant to Crim. P. 32(d), which authorizes
"[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty . . . before
sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is
suspended." The district court denied the motion. The
court of appeals reversed, holding that Crim. P. 32(d)
authorizes the withdrawal of a plea that had already been
withdrawn. People v. Corrales-Castro, 2015 COA 34M,
¶ 2, __ P.3d__, ___ .
We granted the People's petition for certiorari and now
reverse. We hold that the plain language of Crim.
P. 32(d) requires that a "plea" exist in order for
it to be "withdraw[n]." Therefore, there is nothing
in the Rule that would authorize a district court to withdraw
an already-withdrawn plea. Because Corrales-Castro's plea
had already been withdrawn and the case dismissed with
prejudice pursuant to section 18-1.3-102(2), there was no
plea to be withdrawn pursuant to Rule 32(d). Accordingly, we
reverse the court of appeals.
On May 12, 2009, Corrales-Castro pled guilty to criminal
impersonation, and he received a one-year deferred judgment.
Corrales-Castro successfully complied with the terms of the
deferred judgment, and in May 2010 the court withdrew his
guilty plea and the charge was dismissed with prejudice
pursuant to section 18-1.3-102(2).
In May 2013, Corrales-Castro filed a motion to withdraw his
guilty plea under Crim. P. 32(d), asserting that the plea was
based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The district
court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider
Corrales-Castro's motion. The court of appeals reversed.
Corrales-Castro, ¶ 2. The court held that Crim.
P. 32(d) allows a defendant to seek withdrawal of a plea that
has previously been withdrawn pursuant to section
18-1.3-102(2) when the plea has collateral consequences under
federal immigration law. Id. at ¶¶ 26-27.
We granted certiorari and now reverse.
We review de novo the court of appeals' interpretation of
Crim. P. 32(d). People v. Sandoval-Candelaria, 2014
CO 21, ¶ 11, 321 P.3d 487, 489.
¶7 Crim. P. 32(d) provides that "[a] motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere may be
made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of
sentence is suspended." (Emphasis added.) Under the
plain language of Rule 32(d), there must be a
"plea" to "withdraw." Here, there is no
such plea to withdraw, because the plea was previously
withdrawn pursuant to section 18-1.3-102(2). Because nothing
in Rule 32(d) ...