to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals Case Nos.
Attorneys for Petitioner Adam Michael Teague: Douglas K.
Wilson, Public Defender Andrew C. Heher, Deputy Public
Defender Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Petitioner/Respondent The People of the State
of Colorado: Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General Christine
Brady, Senior Assistant Attorney General Denver,
Attorneys for Respondent Bobby Nicky Rogers: Douglas K.
Wilson, Public Defender Meghan M. Morris, Deputy Public
Defender Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Office of the District Attorney,
Eighteenth Judicial District: George H. Brauchler, District
Attorney, Eighteenth Judicial District Richard H. Orman,
Chief Deputy District Attorney Centennial, Colorado
¶1 We granted certiorari in these cases to determine
whether sexual offenders must shoulder the cost of their
victims' forensic medical examinations as criminal
restitution. While the General Assembly has authorized
recovery of "extraordinary direct public . . .
investigative costs, " divisions of our court of appeals
have disagreed as to whether the cost of a victim's SANE
(Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner) examination is in fact
"extraordinary." We now conclude it is.
As both a medical and investigative response to a sexual
offense, a SANE exam necessarily performs dual roles. It
functions not only as a valuable tool for collecting
sexual-assault evidence but also as a patient-centered
medical procedure that is sensitive to victims' treatment
needs, conducted by medical personnel, and limited to the
scope of victims' informed consent. We conclude the
hybrid nature of these exams renders them, and their
resulting costs, extraordinary, and the state may recover
those costs as restitution. We thus affirm the judgment of
the court of appeals in People v. Teague, No.
10CA2358 (Colo.App. Nov. 27, 2013) (not published pursuant to
C.A.R. 35(f)), and reverse the judgment of the court of
appeals in People v. Rogers, 2014 COA 110, P.3d .
Accordingly, we also reinstate the district court's
restitution award in Rogers.
Facts and Procedural History
This opinion consolidates two unrelated sexual assault cases.
In El Paso County District Court Case No. 09CR1165, the
People alleged that Adam Michael Teague sexually assaulted
the victim while she was asleep. During a police interview,
Teague denied any sexual contact with the victim, yet the
morning following that denial, a SANE exam of the victim
revealed possible sexual activity. The People then charged
Teague with sexual assault, and he later pled guilty to a
misdemeanor offense resulting in probation.
In Arapahoe County District Court Case No. 09CR2049, the
People alleged that Bobby Nicky Rogers offered the victim a
ride in his car, drove her behind a building, and forced her,
at knifepoint, to perform oral sex on him. The victim
reported the assault, received a SANE exam, and later
identified Rogers as her assailant. He later pled guilty to
attempted sexual assault in return for a stipulated four-year
term of sex offender intensive supervised probation.
The People in both cases sought to recover the costs of the
SANE exams as restitution under sections 18-1.3-601 to -603,
C.R.S. (2016). Teague and Rogers objected, and the trial
court in each case awarded the People the requested cost of
the exam, totaling $702.27 to be paid to the Colorado Springs
Police Department in Teague's case and $500.00 to be paid
to the Aurora Police Department in Rogers's.
Teague and Rogers appealed, each of them arguing that the
expense of a SANE exam is not an "extraordinary direct
public . . . investigative cost" as described in
section 18-1.3-602(3)(b) and recoverable under section
18-1.3-603. In an unpublished opinion, the division hearing
Teague's appeal affirmed the restitution award.
Teague, slip op. at 8. Beginning from a dictionary
definition of "extraordinary, " the division
concluded that the cost of a SANE exam satisfies the statute.
Id. at 4-6. It reasoned that (1) the exams require
medical professionals, not law enforcement personnel, to
collect evidence, and (2) other statutes had defined
extraordinary costs to include otherwise common expenses.
Id. The division in Rogers's case reached the
opposite result. Rogers, ¶ 18. Operating from