United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR A
180-DAY ENDS OF JUSTICE CONTINUANCE PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161 AND FOR THE SETTING OF A TRIAL DATE
WILLIAM J MARTÍNEZ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Unopposed
Motion for a 180-Day Ends of Justice Continuance Pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3161 and for the Setting of a Trial Date
(the “Motion”). (ECF No. 82). The Defendant's
Motion requests a 180-day ends of justice continuance of the
deadlines as set forth in the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3161-3174, and for a continuance of the trial
date and deadline to file motions. For the following reasons,
the Motion is GRANTED.
Speedy Trial Act is “designed to protect a
defendant's constitutional right to a speedy indictment
and trial, and to serve the public interest in ensuring
prompt criminal proceedings.” United States v.
Hill, 197 F.3d 436, 440 (10th Cir. 1999). It requires
that a criminal defendant's trial commence within 70 days
after his indictment or initial appearance, whichever is
later. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1); United
States v. Lugo, 170 F.3d 996, 1001 (10th Cir. 1999).
Certain periods of delay are excluded and do not count toward
the 70-day limit. See 18 U.S.C. §
3161(h)(1)-(8). Specifically, “the Act excludes any
period of delay ‘resulting from a continuance granted
by any judge . . . on the basis of its findings that the ends
of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best
interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy
trial.'” Hill, 197 F.3d at 440-441
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A)).
Speedy Trial Act provides, in pertinent part:
The following periods of delay shall be excluded . . . in
computing the time within which the trial of any such offense
. . . .
(7)(A) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance
granted by any judge . . . at the request of the defendant or
his counsel or at the request of the attorney for the
Government, if the judge granted such continuance on the
basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by
taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public
and the defendant in a speedy trial.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
order for a continuance to qualify as an excludable
“ends of justice” continuance under §
3161(h)(7)(A), certain prerequisites must be satisfied.
Hill, 197 F.3d at 441. First, the Court must
consider the following factors listed in §
(i) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the
proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such
proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice;
(ii) Whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the
number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the
existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is
unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial
proceedings or for the trial itself within the time limits
established by [the Act];
(iii) Whether, in a case in which arrest precedes indictment,
delay in the filing of the indictment is caused because the
arrest occurs at a time such that it is unreasonable to
expect return and filing of the indictment within the period
specified in section 3161(b), or because the facts upon which
the grand jury must base its determination are unusual or
(iv) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in a
case which, taken as a whole, is not so unusual or so complex
as to fall within clause (ii), would deny the defendant
reasonable time to obtain counsel, would unreasonably deny
the defendant or the Government continuity of counsel, or
would deny counsel for the defendant or the attorney for the
Government the reasonable ...