Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Robledo-Valdez v. Dick

United States District Court, D. Colorado

March 31, 2017

CRAIG S. ROBLEDO-VALDEZ, Plaintiff,
v.
ROBERT DICK, et al.; JEFF LONG; MR. PETERSON; MR. BILDERAYA; HENRY HIGGINS; JANE DOE, Officer; JOHN DOE, Lieutenant; OFFICER CURRY; JOHN DOE, Officer; JOHN DOE, Sergeant; STEPHANIE STEPHENSON; DAN KATZENBERG; and JOHN DOE, Officer #2, Defendants.

          OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING IN PART AND REJECTING IN PART RECOMMENDATION AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS

          Marcia S. Krieger Chief United States District Judge.

         THIS MATTER comes before the Court pursuant to the Plaintiff's Objection (# 38) to the Magistrate Judge's February 27, 2017 Recommendation (# 38) that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (# 29) be granted in part and denied in part.

         JURISDICTION

         The Court exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

         FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

         The Plaintiff, Mr. Robledo, who appears pro se, [1] is an inmate at the Sterling Correctional Facility (“SCF”). The Defendants are employees of the Colorado Department of Corrections (“CDOC”).

         Mr. Robledo's claims arise primarily from three separate incidents when other inmates at SCF assaulted him in mid-2014. Mr. Robledo alleges that the first assault occurred on March 30, 2014. At dinnertime, two inmates attacked him. He defended himself and then submitted to prison officers. He alleges that although he was not the aggressor and remained calm, the officers charged him with a disciplinary violation for fighting. He contested that violation, but the Hearing Officer found that he was the aggressor during the fight and sentenced him to spend twenty days in disciplinary segregation. While in segregation, Mr. Robeldo alleges that he spoke to Mr. Dick, a case manager, and Mr. Long, a prison investigator, because prisoners told him that he “would have to fight again” upon his release from segregation. Mr. Robeldo also “informed staff” that he would be attacked again if he was returned to the unit where he was previously assigned.

         At or about this same time, Mr. Dick provided Mr. Robledo's parole action sheet to another inmates. That sheet revealed that Mr. Robledo had been convicted of a sex offense against a child, a fact that, the Court assumes, Mr. Robledo was not previously known in the prison. Mr. Robledo alleges - albeit in a conclusory fashion - that Mr. Dick acted purposefully, with the intention that the inmate who received the sheet disseminate further the facts about Mr. Robledo's convictions. Mr. Robledo alleges that disclosure of these facts made him a target for violence from other prisoners.

         Notwithstanding Mr. Robledo's warnings, Mr. Dick and Mr. Long decided to return Mr. Robledo to his prior unit. On April 23, 2014, two prisoners attacked him. The assault lasted for only six seconds because prison staff was approaching. The assailants warned that “they would strike again” and “put [him] in a coffin.”

         Mr. Robledo alleges that the third assault occurred a few months later. His friends told him that inmates were planning to hospitalize him. He asked prison staff for protection but those staff members stated that he was faking his fears of future attacks in an attempt to be assigned to a new prison. On June 11, 2014, the same prisoners who assaulted him on April 23 attacked him again, stabbing him repeatedly with an eight-inch shank and beating him with a padlock inside a sock. The attack lasted for four minutes until prison officers intervened.

         No additional assaults occurred before Mr. Robledo was placed on parole and released from SCF on August 13, 2014. However, he alleges that Mr. Dick discriminated against him prior to his release by failing to file an application that would have allowed him to be paroled to Texas (where he is from and his family resides). Mr. Robledo alleges that Mr. Dick did so out of animus against Mr. Robledo's race (Hispanic), sexuality (bisexual), and his status as a sex offender. Mr. Robledo further alleges that Mr. Katzenberg discriminated against him based on his sex offense and race by refusing to help him obtain housing and transportation immediately after his release.

         PROCEDURAL HISTORY

         On January 25, 2016, Mr. Robledo filed his Complaint (# 1), asserting a broad range of claims against a wide array of Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mr. Robledo's lengthy Amended Complaint (# 13) asserted eleven claims for relief under § 1983, but the Court summarily dismissed what he labeled[2] as his third, fifth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh claims (# 15).

         The Defendants jointly filed a motion to dismiss (# 29) Mr. Robledo's first, fourth, sixth, seventh, and eighth claims[3] on the grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity and qualified immunity. The Court referred the Motion to Dismiss to the Magistrate Judge. The Magistrate Judge issued a Recommendation (# 38) that the motion be granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge recommended: (i) Mr. Robledo's claims for damages against the Defendants in their official capacities be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; (ii) Mr. Robledo's Sixth Amendment claims alleged in Claim Six and Claim Seven be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim; (iii) Mr. Robledo's Eighth Amendment claim, alleged in Claim Four as to the April 23, 2014 assault, be dismissed in that Mr. Robledo failed to allege facts showing that the Defendants disregarded an obvious risk of harm before that incident; (iv) the Eighth Amendment claim alleged in Claim Six be dismissed for failure to state a claim, in that Mr. Robledo failed to plead facts showing that Mr. Dick was subjectively aware of a risk of harm to Mr. Robledo when he provided Mr. Robledo's parole sheet to the other inmate; (v) the Equal Protection claims alleged in Claim Seven and Claim Eight, due to insufficient pleading. The Recommendation declined to dismiss: (i) Mr. Robledo's Eighth Amendment claims in Claim One against Ms. Stephenson, Officer Curry, Officer Jane Doe, and Officer John Doe #2 for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief in their individual and official capacities; (ii) the Eighth Amendment claims in Claim One against Ms. Stephenson, Officer Curry, Officer Jane Doe, and Officer John Doe #2 for monetary relief in their individual capacities; (iii) the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims alleged in Claim Two against Lieutenant John Doe; (iv) the Eighth Amendment claims alleged in Claim Four as to the June 11, 2014 assault against Mr. Long, Mr. Peterson, Mr. Bilderaya, Mr. Higgins, Ms. Stephenson, Officer Curry, and Mr. Dick; (v) the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims alleged in Claim Six against Mr. Dick; and (vi) the Eighth Amendment claim alleged in Claim Eight against Mr. Katzenberg.

         Mr. Robledo timely filed an Objection to the Recommendation (# 40). He objects to the dismissal of the Sixth Amendment Claims alleged in Claim Six and Claim Seven, the Eighth Amendment claim alleged in Claim Four as to the April 23, 2014 assault, the Eighth Amendment claim alleged in Claim Six, and the Fourteenth Amendment claims alleged in Claim Seven and Claim Eight. His specific objections will be addressed in turn.

         STANDARD OF REVIEW

         Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the Court reviews the objected-to portions of the Recommendation de novo.

         In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the Complaint as true and views those allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Stidham v. Peace Officer Standards & Training, 265 F.3d 1144, 1149 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999)). The Court limits its consideration to the four corners of the Complaint, any documents attached thereto, and any external documents that are referenced in the Complaint and whose accuracy is not in dispute. Oxendine v. Kaplan, 241 F.3d 1272, 1275 (10th Cir. 2001); Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 2002); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Howsam, 261 F.3d 956, 961 (10th Cir. 2001).

         A claim is subject to dismissal unless it is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To make such an assessment, the Court first discards those averments in the Complaint that are merely legal conclusions or “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. at 678-79. The Court takes the remaining, well-pleaded factual contentions, treats them as true, and ascertains whether those facts (coupled, of course, with the law establishing the requisite elements of the claim) support a claim that is “plausible” as compared to merely being “conceivable” or “possible”. What is required to reach the level of “plausibility” varies from context to context, ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.