United States District Court, D. Colorado
AIG PROPERTY CASUALTY COMPANY, as subrogee of John and Chris Kelley, Plaintiff,
WATTS REGULATOR CO., and WATTS WATER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendants.
Kristen L. Mix United States Magistrate Judge
matter is before the Court on Defendant Watts Water
Technologies, Inc.'s (“Watts Water”) Motion
to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
[#15] (the “Motion”). On August 25,
2016, Plaintiff filed a Response [#16] in opposition to the
Motion. On September 15, 2016, Defendant filed a Reply [#18].
The Court has reviewed the case file and the applicable law,
and is sufficiently advised in the premises. For the reasons
set forth below, the Motion [#15] is GRANTED.
outset, the Court must address Plaintiff's request to
conduct limited discovery with respect to this Court's
jurisdiction over Defendant. See Response [#16] at
6-7. Plaintiff states that it needs discovery to determine
“the relationship between Watts Water and its
subsidiaries and the control Watts Water has over its
subsidiaries . . . .” Id.
Court denies Plaintiff's request for limited
jurisdictional discovery for the following three reasons.
First, Plaintiff failed to comply with Local Rule 7.1(d),
which states that “[a] motion shall not be included in
a response or reply to the original motion. A motion shall be
filed as a separate document.” D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(d).
Plaintiff's request may be denied on this basis alone.
Plaintiff does not provide the Court with any indication of
the type of information it needs. Instead, Plaintiff provides
the following description of the types of discovery
needed to establish jurisdiction:
Such discovery would be limited as follows: 1) around 10
requests for production of documents; 2) around 10
interrogatories; 3) the depositions of Timothy MacPhee, a
Watts Water F.R.C.P. 30(b)(6) deposition, and select
signatories of the Form 10-K, including Robert J. Pagano, Jr.
Response at 7. These nebulous references to
discovery tools are insufficient to convince the Court that
any specific discovery is necessary before determination of
the Motion [#15].
the Court notes that the Motion [#15] was filed on July 14,
2016. Despite ample opportunity, Plaintiff has not made any
further request for limited discovery since that time.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's request for limited discovery is
action arises out of water damage incurred by John and Chris
Kelley (the “homeowners”) to their vacation
property located in Steamboat Springs, Colorado. Am.
Compl. [#10] at 2. While the homeowners were away, a
toilet connector failed in the second floor bathroom,
allegedly resulting in damages to the property totaling $593,
366.85. Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff AIG Property Casualty
Company (“AIG”), as subrogee of John and Chris
Kelley, filed suit against Defendants Watts Regulator and
Watts Water, alleging that the toilet connector was
manufactured, assembled, labeled, marketed, distributed,
and/or sold by Defendants. Id. Specifically,
Plaintiff brings three claims against Defendants: (1) strict
liability, (2) negligence, and (3) breach of implied
warranty. See generally Am. Compl. [#10].
14, 2016, Defendant Watts Water filed the present Motion
[#15]. Defendant argues that the Court should dismiss the
claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant
to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2), because it is merely “the
investment vehicle for the Watts family of products”
and has been improperly grouped with Defendant Watts
Regulator, which is the manufacturer within the Watts family
of companies. Motion [#15] at 5. Defendant
Watts Water, which is a Delaware corporation, asserts that it
lacks sufficient contacts with the State of Colorado for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over it. Id.
Court analyzes Defendant's argument that the Court lacks
personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2).
“The district court is given discretion in determining
the procedure to employ in considering a motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction . . . . Facts regarding
jurisdictional questions may be determined by reference to
affidavits, by a pretrial evidentiary hearing, or at trial
when the jurisdictional issue is dependent upon a decision on
the merits.” Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Oaklawn
Apartments, 959 F.2d 170, 174 (10th Cir. 1992) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). A plaintiff bears the
burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over a
defendant. Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n of the
U.S., 744 F.2d 731, 733 (10th Cir. 1984). Before trial,
a plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of
jurisdiction. Id. “The plaintiff may make this
prima facie showing by demonstrating, via affidavits and
other written materials, facts that if true would support
jurisdiction over the defendant.” OMI Holdings,
Inc. V. Royal Ins. Co., 149 F.3d 1086, 1091 (10th Cir.
1998). The Court accepts the well-pled allegations (namely
the plausible, nonconclusory, and nonspeculative facts) of
the operative pleading as true “to the extent they are
uncontroverted by the defendant's affidavits. If the
parties present conflicting affidavits, all factual disputes
must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor, and the
plaintiff's prima facie showing is sufficient
notwithstanding the contrary presentation by the moving
party.” Wenz v. Memery Crystal, 55 F.3d 1503,
1505 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citations
exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant must satisfy the requirements of the forum
state's long-arm statute as well as constitutional due
process requirements. Doe v. Nat'l Med. Servs.,
974 F.2d 143, 145 (10th Cir. 1992). “Colorado's
long-arm statute is coextensive with constitutional
limitations imposed by the due process clause.” Day
v. Snowmass Stables, Inc., 810 F.Supp. 289, 291 (D.
Colo. 1993). Therefore, if jurisdiction is consistent with
the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, Colorado's
long-arm statute authorizes jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant. Under the due process clause, personal
jurisdiction may not be asserted over a party unless that
party has sufficient “minimum contact” with the
state, so that the imposition of jurisdiction would not
violate “traditional notions or fair play ...