United States District Court, D. Colorado
ORDER OVERRULING PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION, AND
ADOPTING THE JANUARY 11, 2017 RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED
STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
William J. Martinez, United States District Judge
Elizabeth Wojdacz (“Plaintiff”) brings this
“complex civil action for civil RICO remedy, Civil
Rights violations and  non compliance of EMTALA
statutes” pro se against multiple Defendants,
including: Aurora City Police Department and officers (the
“Aurora Defendants”), Arapahoe County
Sheriff's Office and officers (the “Arapahoe
Defendants”), and Denver Police Department and officers
(the “Denver Defendants”). (ECF No. 88 at 3-17.)
This matter is before the Court on the January 11, 2017
Recommendation by U.S. Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix
(“Recommendation, ” ECF No. 143) that
Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 65 (“Motion, ” ECF No.
77) be denied. Plaintiff filed an objection to the
Recommendation. (“Objection, ” ECF No.
145.) Responses were filed by the Arapahoe
Defendants and Denver Defendants. (ECF Nos. 146, 147.) For
the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's Objection is
overruled, the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation is
adopted, and Plaintiff's Motion is denied.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
magistrate judge issues a recommendation on a dispositive
matter, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3) requires
that the district judge “determine de novo any part of
the magistrate judge's [recommendation] that has been
properly objected to.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
72(b)(3). An objection to a recommendation is
properly made if it is both timely and specific. United
States v. One Parcel of Real Property Known as 2121 East 30th
St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996.) An objection
is sufficiently specific if it “enables the district
judge to focus attention on those issues-factual and
legal-that are at the heart of the parties'
dispute.” Id. In conducting its review,
“[t]he district court judge may accept, reject, or
modify the recommendation; receive further evidence; or
return the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3). Here, Plaintiff
filed a timely objection to Judge Mix's Recommendation.
Id. Therefore, this Court reviews the issues before
it de novo.
Civ. P. 65 governs preliminary injunctions and temporary
restraining orders. A party requesting injunctive relief must
clearly establish that four equitable factors weigh in his or
her favor: (1) the party will suffer irreparable injury
unless the injunction issues; (2) the threatened injury
outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause
the opposing party; (3) the injunction, if issued, would not
be adverse to the public interest; and (4) there is a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Schrier
v. Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2005).
Because injunctive relief “is an extraordinary remedy,
the right to relief must be clear and unequivocal.”
Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250,
1256 (10th Cir. 2003).
addition, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se; thus, the
Court must liberally construe her pleadings. Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Trackwell v.
United States Gov't, 472 F.3d 1242, 1243 (10th Cir.
2007). The Court, however, cannot act as advocate for
Plaintiff, who must still comply with the fundamental
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991);
see also Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, Kan., 318 F.3d
1183, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003).
parties object to the recitation of facts set forth by Judge
Mix in the January 11, 2017 Recommendation. (ECF No. 143 at
3-7.) Accordingly, the Court adopts and incorporates Sections
I and II of that Recommendation as if set forth herein.
Briefly, Plaintiff alleges that she “is being targeted
by law enforcement as retaliation for seeking a murder
investigation and coroner's inquest into the death of her
son.” (ECF No. 140 at 4.) Plaintiff further alleges
that efforts to intimidate her by law enforcement have been
continual and “seemingly have no end.” (ECF No.
140 at 4-5.)
seeks a temporary restraining order to prevent “all
Police defendants” from engaging in “witness
retaliation, threats, intimidation, harassment,
following-stalking-including placing under surveillance, or
by causing intentional bodily or financial harm to
[Plaintiff] or her property[.]” (ECF No. 77 at 4; ECF
No. 140 at 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff requests that the
restraining order state “that police may not harass
threaten or abuse Plaintiff at her church or others at her
church, while she goes about her daily business including
panhandling as well as that they be restrained from using
others to harass threaten or intimidate Plaintiff including
area panhandlers and non defendant police.” (ECF No. 77
Mix recommended that Plaintiff's Motion be denied as to
all Defendants. (ECF No. 143 at 3.) Judge Mix made several
findings to reach that recommendation.
Judge Mix found that the injunctive relief requested by
Plaintiff “would require Defendants to act and/or
otherwise alter the status quo in relation to their dealings
with Plaintiff. Thus, the injunctive relief sought by
Plaintiff ‘constitutes a specifically disfavored
injunction' that ‘must be more closely
scrutinized.'” (ECF No. 143 at 5 (quoting
Schrier, 427 F.3d at 1261).)
the alleged incidents involving Aurora Defendants, Judge Mix
found Plaintiff's allegations “not specific enough
for the Court to conclude that Plaintiff will suffer
irreparable harm” and that allegations of retaliation
by Aurora Defendants “lack detail” and do not
demonstrate that their “activities will lead to
irreparable injury.” (ECF No. 143 at 9.)
the alleged incidents involving Arapahoe Defendants, Judge
Mix found the “allegations regarding past harm lack
sufficient detail, [Plaintiff] fails to specify the precise
harm that an injunction will prevent” and “she
has not demonstrated ...