In re the Marriage of Kelleen Sullivan Finn, Petitioner-Appellee, and Stephen A. Finn, Respondent-Appellant.
and County of Denver District Court No. 15DR30434 Honorable
R. Thomas Moorhead, Judge
FOR STAY DENIED.
Holland & Hart LLP, Marcy G. Glenn, Denver, Colorado;
Lass Moses & Ramp LLC, Steven C. Lass, Marie Avery Moses,
Jeremy H. Ramp, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee.
Litvak Mehrtens and Carlton, P.C., Diane Carlton, Ronald D.
Litvak, Paula Smith, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant.
1 In this post-dissolution of marriage proceeding, Stephen A.
Finn (husband) requests a stay of the trial court's
orders requiring him to pay Kelleen Sullivan Finn (wife)
certain sums of money and return her artwork and other
personal property. We deny the motion.
2 Husband and wife married on June 8, 2011, and entered into
a marital agreement. Wife filed for dissolution in 2015.
3 In March 2016, the trial court issued a lengthy, detailed
written order that directed husband to make certain payments
to wife within twenty days. In addition to the husband's
obligation to pay wife $20, 000 per month in maintenance for
the number of months the two were married, these payments
included: (1) the prorated sum of $451, 923 for a partial
year of marriage, as established in the marital agreement;
(2) $37, 878 for the pre-petition joint living expenses paid
by wife that should have been paid by husband under the
marital agreement; (3) $36, 000 for wife's post-petition
living expenses; and (4) obligations under the health
insurance policy requested by wife and maintained by husband.
In addition, wife received a vehicle and all of her artwork
and art supplies, with the exception of eight paintings
identified by the court as husband's property.
4 Husband filed a motion for post-trial relief pursuant to
C.R.C.P. 59 and 60. The trial court denied the motion, with
the exception of correcting a clerical error. Husband then
appealed. He also filed a motion with the trial court to stay
the court's orders pursuant to C.R.C.P. 62(b) and (d),
and requested approval of his supersedeas bond, both of which
the court denied without explanation.
5 Husband now seeks a stay from this court pursuant to C.A.R.
8. Specifically, he seeks to stay the trial court's order
requiring him (1) to pay wife $451, 923 as required by
article 4.2 of the marital agreement; (2) to return
wife's artwork; (3) to return all items of wife's
personal property, except wedding gifts, and those items wife
agreed were husband's separate property; (4) to pay $37,
878 in pre-petition expenses; and (5) to pay $531, 429.81 of
wife's attorney fees.
6 The total amount of the judgment that husband seeks to stay
is $1, 021, 230.81. When multiplied by 125%, as required by
C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-23(3)(a), the supersedeas bond amount
necessary for a stay is $1, 276, 538.51. Husband presented a
redacted copy of a cashier's check in that amount and
represented that his counsel will deposit the check with the
court if his motion for stay is granted.
7 Upon consideration of both parties' pleadings
concerning the motion for stay, we ordered the parties to
file supplemental briefs addressing: (1) whether the factors
articulated in Romero v. City of Fountain, 307 P.3d
120, 122 (Colo.App. 2011), apply to motions seeking to stay a
judgment and, in particular, a judgment that contains a
nonmonetary component; (2) the precise scope of the stay
sought; and (3) the apparent failure in the motion
for stay to assign any monetary value to the artwork and
items of personal property.
8 Husband contends that the Romero factors do not
apply to monetary judgments. Rather, he argues that he should
receive a stay automatically upon posting a bond in our
court. Wife, on the other hand, contends that Romero
applies to the two nonmonetary orders and that
Romero should apply to monetary judgments as well.
Husband contends that the objects subject to the nonmonetary
order must be valued, whereas wife contends that they are
invaluable and thus cannot be valued.
9 We conclude that only three of the four Romero
factors apply in this case. However, for the reasons stated
below, we further conclude that husband has failed to