and County of Denver District Court No. 14CV33637 Honorable
R. Michael Mullins, Judge
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH
Charles Welton P.C., Charles Welton, Denver, Colorado, for
Markusson Green & Jarvis, John T. Mauro, H. Keith Jarvis,
Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees
1 In this action seeking recovery for personal injuries
sustained at a fitness club, plaintiff, Wendy Jane Stone,
appeals the summary judgment entered in favor of defendants,
Life Time Fitness, Inc.; Life Time Fitness Foundation; and
LTF Club Operations Company, Inc. (collectively, Life Time),
on Stone's negligence and Premises Liability Act (PLA)
claims based on injuries sustained when she tripped on a hair
dryer cord after washing her hands. The principal issue
presented on appeal is whether the district court correctly
ruled that Stone's claims are contractually barred based
on assumption of risk and liability release language
contained in a member usage agreement (Agreement) she signed
when she became a member of Life Time.
2 We disagree with the district court's conclusion that
the exculpatory provisions of the Agreement are valid as
applied to Stone's PLA claim. Consequently, we reverse
the judgment as to that claim and remand the case for further
proceedings. We affirm the district court's judgment on
the negligence claim.
3 Stone was a member of a Life Time fitness club located in
Centennial. According to the complaint, she sustained
injuries in the women's locker room after finishing a
workout. Stone alleged that she had washed her hands at a
locker room sink and then "turned to leave when she
tripped on the blow dryer cord that was, unbeknownst to her,
hanging to the floor beneath the sink and vanity counter
top." She caught her foot in the cord and fell to the
ground, fracturing her right ankle.
4 Stone alleged that allowing the blow dryer cord to hang
below the sink counter constituted a trip hazard and a
dangerous condition and that, by allowing the condition to
exist, Life Time failed to exercise reasonable care. She
asserted a general negligence claim and also a claim under
Colorado's PLA, section 13-21-115, C.R.S. 2016.
5 Life Time moved for summary judgment, relying on assumption
of risk and liability release language contained in the
Agreement Stone signed when she joined Life Time. Life Time
argued that the Agreement was valid and enforceable, that it
expressly covered the type and circumstances of her injuries,
and that it barred Stone's claims as a matter of law. A
copy of the Agreement appears in the Appendix to this
6 After full briefing, the district court granted Life
Time's motion, concluding that the Agreement was
"valid and enforceable" and that Stone had released
Life Time from all the claims asserted in the complaint.
7 She contends that the district court, therefore, erred in
entering summary judgment and dismissing her action.
Summary Judgment Standards
8 Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and
supporting documents establish that there is no genuine issue
of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Gagne v. Gagne, 2014
COA 127, ¶ 24; see C.R.C.P. 56(c). We review de
novo an order granting a motion for summary judgment.
Gagne, ¶ 24; see Ranch O, LLC v. Colo.
Cattlemen's Agric. Land Tr., 2015 COA 20, ¶ 12.
9 In her complaint, Stone alleged common law negligence and
PLA claims, and she pursues both claims on appeal. The trial
court's summary judgment ruled in favor of Life Time
without distinguishing between Stone's negligence and PLA
claims. It simply concluded that the exculpatory clauses in
the Agreement were "valid and enforceable" and
released Life Time from all claims asserted against it.
10 We turn to the negligence claim first because we may
affirm a correct judgment for reasons different from those
relied on by the trial court. English v. Griffith,
99 P.3d 90, 92 (Colo.App. 2004).
11 The parties agree that the PLA applies to this case. In