December 15, 2016
The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee,
Corey Anthony Lopez, Defendant-Appellant.
County District Court No. 12CR1974 Honorable Christie A.
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Kevin E. McReynolds,
Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for
Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Audrey E.
Bianco, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for
1 Defendant, Corey Anthony Lopez, appeals the trial
court's judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts
finding him guilty of one count each of first degree murder -
after deliberation; attempted first degree murder - after
deliberation; reckless endangerment; and third degree
assault. We affirm.
2 In 2012, defendant's girlfriend, R.B., was at a bar
drinking with her mother, brother, and a friend. At some
point, defendant joined them.
3 Later in the evening, the group left the bar and continued
drinking at R.B.'s friend's home. After some
additional drinking, defendant told R.B. that he wanted to go
home because he had to get up early for work the next day.
However, R.B. told defendant she did not want to leave, and
the two began arguing. Eventually, R.B. left her friend's
house, got into her brother's car, and asked him to take
her home. As defendant attempted to convince R.B. to come
home with him, R.B.'s friend intervened, asking defendant
to stop bothering R.B. At that point, defendant began arguing
with R.B.'s friend and, as the argument escalated,
defendant became so angry that he punched out his car window.
R.B. then exited her brother's vehicle and left the scene
4 The police responded to a noise complaint at R.B.'s
friend's house soon thereafter. After the police left,
R.B.'s mother and brother headed home, and defendant
5 When the group arrived at the home, R.B. was asleep on the
couch. At approximately 5 a.m., defendant and R.B. traveled
to defendant's apartment. Later that afternoon, defendant
called 911 to report that R.B. was not breathing. When the
police and paramedics arrived, R.B. was dead.
6 In interviews with the police, defendant claimed that he
and R.B. had had consensual "make-up" sex, and, at
some point, he was behind R.B. with his arms draped over and
around her shoulders. He said that after they were done, he
cuddled with R.B. and went to sleep. In explaining why R.B.
was fully clothed when the police and paramedics arrived, he
said that he and R.B. had both worn their underwear during
sex and that he did not want anyone to see R.B. in her
7 As the police waited on R.B.'s autopsy reports, they
were contacted by defendant's ex-girlfriend, S.E. S.E.
told the police that based on her experience dating
defendant, she believed defendant may have strangled R.B. Her
belief was based on an incident in 2008 when, according to
S.E., defendant nearly strangled her to death during an
argument, only to be saved by a friend who had forced her way
into S.E. and defendant's bedroom.
8 The autopsy report later showed that R.B. had died of
9 The district attorney subsequently charged defendant with
first degree murder - after deliberation as to R.B. and
attempted first degree murder - after deliberation as to S.E.
At the end of trial, at defendant's request, the court
also instructed the jury on the lesser nonincluded offenses
of reckless endangerment and third degree assault as to S.E.
The jury convicted defendant of (1) first degree murder -
after deliberation as to R.B.; (2) attempted first degree
murder - after deliberation as to S.E.; and (3) the lesser
10 Defendant first contends that the trial court erred when
it allowed R.B.'s mother and brother, who were witnesses
for the prosecution, to be present during testimony at
defendant's preliminary hearing and trial. We are not
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
11 Decisions related to the sequestration of witnesses are
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See People v.
Cohn, 160 P.3d 336, 346 (Colo.App. 2007).
12 Absent limited exceptions not relevant here, CRE 615
provides that upon the request of a party, the trial court
shall order the exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom
"so that they cannot hear the testimony of other
witnesses." "The purpose of a sequestration order
is to 'prevent a witness from conforming his [or her]
testimony to that of other witnesses and to discourage
fabrication and collusion.'" People v.
Villalobos, 159 P.3d 624, 629 (Colo.App. 2006)
(alteration in original) (citations omitted).
13 However, article II, section 16a of the Colorado
Constitution provides that "surviving immediate family
members . . . shall have the right to be heard when relevant,
informed, and present at all critical stages of the criminal
justice process." The legislature has codified this
right in part 3 of title 24, article 4.1 (the Victims'
Rights Act), and section 24-4.1-302.5(1)(b), C.R.S. 2016,
states that victims have "[t]he right to be informed of
and present for all critical stages of the criminal justice
process as specified in section 24-4.1-302(2)." See
also People v. Coney, 98 P.3d 930, 935 (Colo.App. 2004).
As relevant here, section 24-4.1-302(2), C.R.S. 2016, defines
"critical stages" to include preliminary hearings
and the defendant's trial.
14 Although "CRE 615 does not provide authority for
departing from the constitution and statute, "
Coney, 98 P.3d at 935, section 24-4.1-303(6)(a),
C.R.S. 2016, states that "[a] victim . . . may be
present at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding
regarding any crime against such victim unless the
court or the district attorney determines that
exclusion of the victim is necessary to protect the
defendant's right to a fair trial." (Emphasis
15 Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of
discretion by the trial court in allowing R.B.'s mother
and brother to be present during testimony at defendant's
preliminary hearing and trial.
16 Initially, we note that R.B.'s mother and brother are
both included in the statutory definition of a
"victim" under the Victims' Rights Act. §
24-4.1-302(5). And because the Victims' Rights Act
represents a decision on a matter of public policy - here,
that R.B.'s mother and brother have a right to be present
during the trial of her accused killer - the statute controls
over CRE 615. See People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424,
436 (Colo. 1993) ("In drawing the distinction between
substance and procedure, we have held that in general, rules
adopted to permit the courts to function and function
efficiently are procedural whereas matters of public policy
are substantive and are therefore appropriate subjects for
legislation."); see also People v. McKenna, 196
Colo. 367, 372-73, 585 P.2d 275, 278-79 (1978) (on
substantive matters, a statute controls over a rule
promulgated by the court); Coney, 98 P.3d at 935.
17 Nonetheless, as defendant points out, section
24-4.1-303(6)(a) provides a trial court with authority to
exclude a deceased victim's family members if it
"determines that exclusion . . . is necessary to protect
the defendant's right to a fair trial." However,
while defendant is correct that the court had authority to
exclude R.B.'s mother and brother, the trial court
determined that such exclusion was not necessary in
this case. And based on the reasons given by defense counsel
for the need to exclude the witnesses, we discern no abuse of
discretion by the trial court in reaching that decision.
18 At the preliminary hearing, defense counsel contended that
R.B.'s mother and brother should have been excluded from
the courtroom because they were not collateral witnesses and
because "we'll probably learn through the course of
th[e] hearing through the D.A. investigator . . . that there
ha[d] been a lot of rumors and information being exchanged
between various witnesses." The prosecutor responded
that she did not "know what [defense counsel] [wa]s
referencing in that last portion" and asked that
R.B.'s mother and brother be allowed to remain in the
courtroom for the preliminary hearing. Because the family
members were not scheduled to testify at the hearing, and in
light of "the mandate contained in the Constitution
permitting the family to remain in the courtroom, " the
court, relying on Coney, allowed R.B.'s family
19 The court and the parties revisited the issue at trial.
Citing Coney for the proposition that victims have a
right to be present during trial, the court asked defense
counsel, "And I guess what I don't know from the
defense is, what is your specific objection if they are here?
I'm assuming there are police reports. But did you have a
specific objection or is there an order that we can do?"
The following colloquy then occurred:
[Defense counsel:] Your Honor, I just - Your Honor, I am just
concerned about witnesses, any witnesses watching testimony
of other witnesses and discussing that testimony with other
. . .
[Court:] And so you're just concerned that they might
talk to each other about the witnesses or what are you
concerned about specifically?
[Defense counsel:] Yes. I am concerned about talking about
testimony that they've observed and seen with other
witnesses who may testify.
[Court:] And I can admonish them. But what is the
[Prosecutor:] They've been instructed to that part of the
sequestration order, that that would apply to them and
they're not to discuss either their own testimony or
anything that they would hear.
20 In ruling on defense counsel's request, the court
stated that in "balancing . . . the victim's
constitutional right and the defendant's constitutional
right to due process, " it would allow R.B.'s mother
and brother to watch the trial. However, the court gave both
the following admonishment:
Whatever you hear in the courtroom, you cannot tell anyone
else, and that's an order of the Court which is subject
to contempt. And so you can't go home at night and tell
others, especially those other people that might testify.
And I would ask you not to talk at all to anyone about the
testimony you hear during these two weeks, because that could
go through a chain and then somebody that may testify could
hear it from a third party that you've told. So I'm
going to ask that you do not discuss anything you heard in
the courtroom with anyone else until this trial is over.
And under that scenario, I will allow you then to sit through
21 The court then asked both witnesses if they understood its
order, and both replied that they did.
22 In this case, defense counsel was unable - at either the
preliminary hearing or defendant's trial - to articulate
any specific grounds raising concerns that the witnesses
would conform their testimony. And although appellate counsel
offers portions of the mother's and brother's
testimony that are similar to other witnesses' testimony,
the trial court had not heard any trial testimony at
the time it made its ruling.
23 Lastly, we note that to the extent the mother's or
brother's trial testimony was different from the account
they gave in their reports to police, defendant had access to
those reports and was free to impeach the witnesses on that
24 In sum, in light of (1) defense counsel's failure to
identify any specific grounds raising concerns about
conforming testimony; (2) the court's admonishment, which
we presume the witnesses understood and followed, see,
e.g., People v. Rhea, 2014 COA 60, ¶ 68;
and (3) defendant's opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial
court in allowing R.B.'s mother and brother to be present
during testimony at defendant's preliminary hearing and
25 Defendant next contends that the trial court committed
reversible error when it used a basketball analogy to explain
to the jury the law of intoxication. We are not persuaded.
26 During voir dire, defense counsel questioned jurors about
an intoxication defense, at which point several jurors
expressed their opinion that a defendant, even if
intoxicated, is nonetheless responsible for his or her
actions. For instance, defense counsel asked a juror,
"What about a situation where somebody is . . . charged
with actually killing somebody with intent and after
deliberation, causing the death of another person and that
they claim I'm not responsible because I didn't mean
to do it because I was so drunk." The juror responded,
Well . . . there are different types of murder:
[f]irst-degree murder, you know, manslaughter, things like
that, so it might lessen the ultimate charge or what
they're charged with. But I do believe they're
responsible for their actions. If it's the drinking that
causes them to commit the murder, then they're
responsible for the drinking to begin with.
27 After a number of similar questions and answers, the trial
court interjected and told the jurors that "[w]e're
not trying to ask, do you like the law or do you hate the law
or, in this situation, what do you think about that law or
that law? It's just really, whatever it is, can you
follow the law?" After more of the same questioning, the
trial court provided the jury with the following analogy:
The law of intoxication. If we are at a [basketball] game.
Say you're shooting - you're running down the court
trying to make a basket and you jump up and you made a shot.
You intended, at that point, to make a basket, right?
All right. And so, if you have the intent to make the basket
and you jump up and do it. By doing that, you're showing
you have that intent.
If you are intoxicated, as a jury, as you believe that the
person is running down in the basketball game is so
intoxicated, you have to decide if they're so intoxicated
about they - whatever the evidence you hear, that they can no
longer have that intent to shoot the basket because
they're so intoxicated. So it's just one of the
elements that the prosecution has to prove.
And I don't - I don't want to go through all the
legal parts of it. And as I said, we don't know what the
evidence is going to be. We don't even know if it's
going to be brought up. I don't know. But generally, it
just goes to the intent. It's one of the elements the
prosecution will have to show.
28 Defendant contends that "[t]he court told the jurors
they would need to, in essence, determine whether that player
had 'that intent to shoot the basket, ' or
not due to intoxication." In doing so, defendant
continues, the court "left out entirely the question of
whether the player had intended to make the basket
or not." Defendant asserts that in failing to make this
distinction, the court informed the jury that it should be
concerned with whether defendant "acted
intentionally, not whether he intended to cause
29 As an initial matter, the jury did not necessarily parse
the court's comments in the same manner as, and draw the
same conclusions that, defendant does on appeal. Furthermore,
as the Attorney General points out, the court, in its initial
analogy, said, "You intended, at that point, to make a
basket, right?" In light of this initial comment, it is
possible that the jury interpreted the court's analogy to
mean that intoxication, under appropriate circumstances,
could have negated the hypothetical shooter's intent to
"make" the basket.
30 But even if the trial court's analogy constituted
error, reversal would not be required under the plain error
standard of review. See People v. Carter, 2015 COA
24M, ¶ 13 (assuming without deciding that the trial
court's reasonable doubt analogy was erroneous, but
concluding that such an error did not require reversal under
the plain error standard).
31 To establish plain error, defendant must show that the
putative error was both obvious and so substantial that it
undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial itself,
casting serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of
conviction. People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743, 750
(Colo. 2005). We conclude that defendant has failed to
establish that the court's error, if any, was
32 First, as defendant acknowledges, at the close of
evidence, the trial court correctly instructed the jury that
(1) "[t]he evidence presented . . . has raised the
question of self-induced intoxication with respect to the
offense of Murder in the First Degree, and Criminal
Attempt[ed] Murder in the First Degree"; (2) it could
"consider whether or not evidence of self-induced
intoxication negates the existence of the elements of
'after deliberation and with intent'"; (3)
"[t]he prosecution has the burden of proving all the
elements of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable
doubt"; and (4) if it found "the defendant was
intoxicated to such a degree that he did not act with the
required mental state, you should find him not guilty of that
offense." We presume the jury understood and followed
the trial court's instructions, and nothing in the record
rebuts that presumption. See Carter, ¶¶
58-59 (assuming the trial court's use of a puzzle analogy
to explain reasonable doubt was erroneous, the division
concluded that reversal was not required under the plain
error standard because the court correctly instructed the
jury on the definition of reasonable doubt); see also
People v. Baca, 2015 COA 153, ¶¶ 13-14 (same);
People v. Boyd, 2015 COA 109, ¶¶ 12-13
("[A]ny risk of prejudice here was mitigated by the
court's written jury instructions, which correctly
articulated the burden of proof and the presumption of
innocence and which we presume the jury understood and
correctly applied.") (cert. granted Mar. 21,
2016); People v. Estes, 2012 COA 41, ¶ 12
33 Second, the trial court began its analogy by referencing
the shooter "mak[ing] a basket, " and it ended its
analogy by telling the jury that intoxication "generally
. . . goes to the intent, " which is "one of the
elements the prosecution will have to show." Thus, as we
set forth above, it is possible that the jury interpreted the
court's analogy to mean that defendant's intoxication
could have negated his specific intent to cause R.B.'s
34 Lastly, as the Attorney General notes, during closing
arguments, the parties focused on the court's correct
self-induced intoxication instruction, rather than on the
allegedly erroneous basketball analogy.
35 For all of these reasons, any error in the trial
court's analogy would not be so substantial that it would
undermine our confidence in the reliability of the judgment
of conviction. See Miller, 113 P.3d at 750.
36 Defendant last contends that the trial court erred in
precluding his counsel from asking a prosecution witness,
Amanda DeLeon, whether S.E. had smoked marijuana on the day
of the attempted murder. We are not persuaded.
37 Before trial, defendant filed a motion in limine asking
the court to bar the prosecution from introducing evidence of
his drug use. At a hearing on the motion, the prosecution
stated that it did not intend to introduce such evidence.
However, it noted that it planned to offer for admission
photos of defendant's apartment, and that a number of
those photos "contain[ed] numerous bongs."
38 While the parties and the court discussed how to resolve
this problem, defense counsel stated that she might seek to
question prosecution witnesses about their alleged drug use,
contending that such evidence was relevant to the
witnesses' credibility. When the court asked how that
information was relevant to credibility, counsel responded
that the witnesses' alleged drug use at the time of the
events about which they would testify could have altered the
witnesses' ability to perceive and recall the events.
Referring to R.B.'s murder, the court agreed, saying,
"I understand for the night of the incident, that would
be relevant for everybody that was there if anybody is going
to testify about what happened."
39 The prosecution called the attempted murder victim, S.E.,
on the fifth and sixth days of trial. On direct examination,
she said that defendant had strangled her and did not stop
doing so until her friend, DeLeon, forced her way into S.E.
and defendant's bedroom and pulled defendant off of her.
Although defense counsel impeached S.E.'s credibility
during cross-examination, she did not ask S.E. whether she
had been under the influence of marijuana on the day of the
40 The prosecution then called DeLeon. During the
prosecutor's direct examination, DeLeon said that she did
not remember a number of the details of the incident as she
had previously represented them in an interview with the
police. For instance, DeLeon initially told the police that
she heard S.E. screaming for help and, in response, she (or
another individual who was present at the time) forced her
way into the bedroom and pulled defendant off of S.E. During
her direct examination, however, she said that she only
remembered defendant sitting on S.E. to stop S.E. from
scratching and hitting him; she did not remember (1) the
couple arguing in the bedroom; (2) S.E. calling for help; or
(3) forcing her way into the bedroom. The prosecutor ended
her questioning by asking DeLeon if she had been smoking
marijuana on the day of the attempted murder, and DeLeon
responded that she had.
41 During cross-examination of DeLeon, defense counsel asked
whether DeLeon had been smoking marijuana with S.E. on the
day in question. The prosecutor objected, contending that it
was an improper question because "[y]ou can ask this
witness about her ability to perceive, but you can't ask
her to comment on another witness' ability to perceive .
. . [s]he can't comment on that because that's not
for this witness." Defense counsel responded that she
was "not asking her to make a comment on [S.E.'s]
ability to perceive. I'm asking her to say whether or not
she was smoking marijuana or not, and the jury can determine
whether it's relevant to her credibility or not."
The trial court asked defense counsel a follow-up question:
"[I]f you're not asking whether or not it affected
her ability to perceive, why is it relevant?" Counsel
replied that "that's a determination for the jury to
make, Judge. It's not a determination for Ms. DeLeon to
determine whether it affects other people. . . . How could
she determine if it affected [S.E.'s] ability. The fact
that she was using drugs goes to her credibility."
42 Ultimately, the trial court sustained the objection. It
[i]f defense had asked . . . the victim, [S.E.], whether she
was smoking marijuana at the time this occurred, I think that
would be relevant because then they can talk about whether
her perceptions were different or whatever. It's only
relevant if you can say that by smoking marijuana, it's
affected her like she said been smoking all day or been
smoking for three days, or whatever. But right now, what is
the jury going to be left with?
The jury will be left with your scenario that she had issues
with smoking marijuana. They won't know how much or her
perception because there's nobody here to testify what
that was like. It's just going to hang out there. And
that's why we did the motion in limine ahead of time
because if you want [to] bring it up, if you want to do this,
you can't do it through impeachment, but you can bring it
up in your case-in-chief.
. . .
I just don't find that that's going to be relevant at
this point. And I think it just goes to her character without
Standard of Review
43 Trial courts are vested with broad discretion regarding
the admissibility of evidence, see, e.g., People
v. Manyik, 2016 COA 42, ¶ 83, and the extent and
type of cross-examination they will allow, People v.
Silva, 987 P.2d 909, 918 (Colo.App. 1999). Accordingly,
we will not disturb a trial court's decision regarding
such matters absent an abuse of discretion. Manyik,
¶ 83. To establish an abuse of discretion, a defendant
must show that the trial court's decision was manifestly
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or was based on a
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law. Id.
at ¶ 65.
44 Defendant preserved the contention he now raises on
appeal, so we apply the harmless error standard to determine
if reversal is required. See Merritt v. People, 842
P.2d 162, 166-67 (Colo. 1992).
45 "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by" the United States or Colorado
Constitutions, statute, or other rule. CRE 402; see also
Yusem v. People, 210 P.3d 458, 463 (Colo. 2009). And
evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence." CRE 401.
46 "[W]hether the witness was, at the time of the events
as to which he testifies, under the influence of some drug
that could have affected his perception of those events bears
directly on credibility." People v. Dunham,
2016 COA 73, ¶ 27. This type of evidence is generally
relevant, then, because "reasonable inquiry regarding
matters probative of the credibility of [a] witness is always
relevant on cross-examination." People v.
Mandez, 997 P.2d 1254, 1267 (Colo.App. 1999).
47 However, under CRE 403, even relevant evidence "may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
48 Consistent with CRE 403, "a trial court has wide
latitude, insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned,
to place reasonable limits on cross-examination based on
concerns about, for example, harassment, prejudice, confusion
of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation
which is repetitive or only marginally relevant."
Merritt, 842 P.2d at 166. But a trial court should
not excessively limit a defendant's cross-examination of
a witness regarding the witness's credibility.
49 As an initial matter, we agree with defendant that
evidence of S.E.'s alleged marijuana use on the day of
the attempted murder was relevant. See Dunham,
¶ 27. We do not agree, however, that the trial court
abused its discretion in precluding defense counsel from
asking one witness, DeLeon, whether another witness,
S.E., was under the influence of marijuana on the day in
50 Although the court did not precisely identify CRE 403 in
ruling on the prosecutor's objection, the reasons it
articulated for precluding defense counsel's question
suggests that the court viewed the probative value of
DeLeon's expected answer as being outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice and misleading the jury. And that
conclusion - which we agree with - was based on the
procedural posture in which the question was asked.
51 Evidence of a witness's drug use is relevant
because it bears on a witness's perception and
memory of an event about which the witness is testifying.
See Dunham, ¶ 27; see also People v.
Roberts, 37 Colo.App. 490, 491, 553 P.2d 93, 94 (1976)
(noting that it is improper to question a witness about his
or her drug addiction "merely for purposes of attacking
the credibility of the witness").
52 In this case, defense counsel had a prior opportunity to
ask S.E. whether or not she had been under the influence of
marijuana on the day in question. She did not do so. Instead,
she asked a different witness, DeLeon, that question. And
although DeLeon could have given a simple yes or no answer,
as the trial court noted, and defense counsel acknowledged,
DeLeon could not have spoken to the impact of the alleged
marijuana consumption on S.E.'s perceptions or memory.
Thus, based on the procedural posture in which defense
counsel's question was asked, DeLeon's answer would
have had little, if any, probative value.
53 In contrast, DeLeon's expected answer carried with it
the danger for unfair prejudice and misleading the jury. As
the trial court concluded, absent any testimony connecting
S.E.'s putative marijuana consumption to her perception
of, or ability to remember, the events in question, the
"jury w[ould] be left with [counsel's] scenario that
she had issues with smoking marijuana. . . . It's just
going to hang out there." In other words, without an
explanation of the effects of the marijuana on that
particular day, there was a danger that the jury would infer
that (1) S.E. was a drug user; and (2) because she was a drug
user, her testimony was generally less credible. And such an
inference would have been improper because evidence of a
witness's "purported drug addiction" is
inadmissible "merely for purposes of attacking the
credibility of the witness." Roberts, 37
Colo.App. at 491, 553 P.2d at 94.
54 The propriety of the court's CRE 403 ruling is
reinforced by its statement to counsel that "if you want
to do this, you can't do it through impeachment, but you
can bring it up in your case-in-chief." This statement
acknowledges that the probative value of the evidence of drug
use would have been higher if the question had been asked of
S.E., who would then have had an opportunity to explain the
effect of any such drug use on her perception of, and ability
to remember, the attempted murder.
55 In sum, based on the procedural posture in which it was
asked, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court
in precluding defense counsel from questioning DeLeon about
S.E.'s alleged marijuana use.
56 The judgment is affirmed.
TERRY and JUDGE BERGER concur.
 In light of the record, even if we
assume that we should apply the various balancing tests
applied by other courts, we would reach the same result.
See, e.g., In re Mikhel, 453 F.3d 1137,
1139 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) ("[Under the Federal
Crime Victim's Rights Act, ] [a] district court may
exclude a victim-witness from the courtroom if the court
finds by 'clear and convincing evidence . . . that
testimony by the victim would be materially altered if
the victim heard other testimony at that
proceeding.'") (emphasis added) (citation omitted);
Gabriel v. State, 925 P.2d 234, 236 (Wyo. 1996) (in
considering whether to allow an exception to the rule
requiring courts to grant a defendant's motion to
sequester witnesses, "the standard is whether good
cause is shown that the exemption should not be
granted") (emphasis added).
 In any event, as defendant
acknowledges, similar testimony may simply have resulted from
the witnesses perceiving the events in the same way.