County District Court No. 09CR4453 Honorable William B. Bain,
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Lisa K. Michaels,
Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for
Kimberly Penix, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado,
1 Aaron Michael Blackwell appeals the district court's
order revoking his deferred judgment for theft from an
at-risk victim after he pleaded guilty to driving after
revocation prohibited (DARP) in a later, unrelated deferred
judgment agreement. Blackwell contends that his plea in the
DARP case is not sufficient to prove that he violated a state
criminal law - a condition of his deferred judgment in this
case. Because we conclude that Blackwell's later plea to
DARP - a state criminal offense - constitutes a conviction
within the meaning of the revocation hearing statute, §
16-11-206(3), C.R.S. 2016, we affirm the district court's
2 Blackwell pleaded guilty to theft from an at-risk victim,
and the district court deferred the judgment against him with
the condition that he "violate no federal, state, or
local criminal law."
3 In a later case, Blackwell pleaded guilty to DARP, a class
one misdemeanor. The district court also deferred the
judgment against Blackwell in the DARP case.
4 The prosecution then filed a motion to revoke
Blackwell's deferred judgment in the theft case based on
Blackwell being convicted of DARP.
5 After a revocation hearing, the district court found that
Blackwell's guilty plea in the DARP case showed that he
had committed DARP in violation of the terms of his deferred
judgment in the theft case. The court subsequently revoked
Blackwell's deferred judgment.
Applicable Law and Standard of Review
6 The revocation hearing statute provides that the
prosecution normally has the burden to establish by a
preponderance of evidence that a defendant violated a
condition of a deferred judgment. See §
16-11-206(3). But, if the violation of the deferred judgment
is a criminal offense, the violation "must be
established beyond a reasonable doubt unless the [defendant]
has been convicted thereof in a criminal proceeding."
7 We must determine whether a defendant who pleads guilty to
a state criminal offense in the course of entering into a
later deferred judgment agreement has been
"convicted" within the meaning of the revocation
hearing statute. To make this determination, we are guided by
common rules of statutory interpretation.
8 When interpreting a statute, our primary task is to
determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature.
Esquibel v. Bd. of Educ. Centennial Sch. Dist. R-1,
2016 COA 9, ¶ 7 (citing McKinley v. City of Glenwood
Springs, 2015 COA 126, ¶ 5). To discern legislative
intent, we look first to the statutory language, giving words
and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings. Id.
And, in construing the word "conviction, " the key
factor to be considered is the legislative intent behind the
use of the word in the statute involved. Hafelfi ...