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In re Title

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc

July 5, 2016

In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause for 2015-2016 #132
v.
Kathleen Curry and Frank McNulty, Respondents Donna R. Johnson, Petitioner and Suzanne Staiert, Frederick Yarger, and Sharon Eubanks. Title Board In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause for 2015-2016 #133 Donna R. Johnson, Petitioner
v.
Kathleen Curry and Frank McNulty, Respondents and Suzanne Staiert, Frederick Yarger, and Sharon Eubanks. Title Board

         Original Proceeding Pursuant to § 1-40-107(2), C.R.S. (2015) Appeal from the Ballot Title Setting Board

          Attorneys for Petitioner: Recht Kornfeld, P.C. Mark G. Grueskin Denver, Colorado.

          Attorneys for Respondents: Ireland Stapleton Pryor & Pascoe, P.C. Kelley B. Duke Benjamin J. Larson Denver, Colorado.

Attorneys for Ballot Title Board: Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General Matthew D. Grove, Assistant Solicitor General Denver, Colorado.

          OPINION

          MÁRQUEZ JUSTICE.

         ¶1 In these original proceedings pursuant to section 1-40-107(2), C.R.S. (2015), Petitioner Donna R. Johnson challenges the actions of the Title Board in setting titles and ballot title and submission clauses (collectively, "titles") for proposed Initiatives "2015–2016 #132 'Colorado Redistricting Commission'" ("Initiative #132") and "2015– 2016 #133 'Colorado Legislative Redistricting Commission'" ("Initiative #133").[1] We conclude that both of the proposed Initiatives encompass multiple subjects in violation of article V, section 1(5.5) of the Colorado Constitution and section 1-40-106.5, C.R.S. (2015). Accordingly, we reverse the actions of the Title Board.

         I. Facts and Procedural History

         ¶2 Kathleen Curry and Frank McNulty ("Proponents") are the designated proponents of proposed Initiatives #132 and #133. These Initiatives are substantially similar in language and form and represent two of several redistricting concepts proposed by the Proponents during the 2016 election cycle. Both Initiatives would amend article V, sections 44 to 48 of the Colorado Constitution (the provisions that address congressional and state legislative redistricting) by restructuring or replacing the Colorado Reapportionment Commission-the state commission presently tasked with establishing, after each federal census, the boundaries for the thirty-five state senate districts and sixty-five state house of representative districts for the Colorado General Assembly. Colo. Const. art. V, §§ 45, 46, 48. The Colorado Reapportionment Commission presently consists of eleven members who are appointed by officials in the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of state government. Colo. Const. art. V, § 48(1)(b). Four members of the commission are appointed by leaders in the senate and house of representatives; three members are appointed by the governor; and four members are appointed by the chief justice of the Colorado Supreme Court. Id. Article V, sections 48(1)(a) and (c) set forth political affiliation and geographical residency requirements for the membership of the commission and establish the timeframes and processes for creating the decennial state legislative redistricting plan.

         ¶3 Both proposed Initiatives begin by adding to article V of the Colorado Constitution a section entitled "Political gerrymandering prohibited, " which declares that the practice of political gerrymandering must end, and that the public's interest in creating fair and competitive districts is best accomplished by an independent commission of balanced appointments that is free from political influence and that relies on nonpartisan staff to divide the state into districts without regard to political pressures or to political considerations.

         ¶4 Next, the proposed Initiatives essentially rewrite article V, section 48 to restructure or replace the Reapportionment Commission. Initiative #133 would restructure the Reapportionment Commission and rename it the Independent Colorado Legislative Redistricting Commission. This restructured commission would remain responsible for setting boundaries for state legislative districts. Initiative #132 would replace the Reapportionment Commission with a new commission called the Independent Colorado Redistricting Commission. This new commission likewise would set boundaries for state legislative districts, but unlike #133, the new commission created by #132 would take on the additional responsibility of setting boundaries for Colorado's congressional districts-a responsibility presently vested with the General Assembly. Colo. Const. art. V, § 44.

         ¶5 Through amendments to sections 44 through 48 of article V, both proposed Initiatives would make substantial changes to the Colorado Reapportionment Commission and its processes. For example, both Initiatives modify the criteria to be used in drawing districts; subject the commission to open meetings and open records laws; require a two-thirds vote of commissioners to approve any action of the commission; change the process for drafting and approving redistricting plans and the process for supreme court review of such plans; and allow the reconfigured commission to adopt rules to govern its administration and operation, among other details.

         ¶6 Both proposed Initiatives would also modify the membership of the commission by increasing the total number of members to twelve; prohibiting registered lobbyists, as well as members of or candidates for the U.S. Congress or the General Assembly, from serving as members of the commission; and modifying the political affiliation and geographical residency requirements for the membership of the commission. In addition, and relevant here, both Initiatives would require the Colorado Supreme Court Nominating Commission (the "Supreme Court Nominating Commission" or "Nominating Commission") to "establish and announce a process for appointment" of the four members of the commission who are either registered with a minor political party or unaffiliated with any political party. The proposed Initiatives would require the Nominating Commission to solicit, receive, and review applications for these positions; to generate a list of ten recommended applicants representing, to the extent possible, Colorado's racial, ethnic, and geographic diversity; and to forward this list of recommended applicants to the eight previously appointed members of the commission. The proposed Initiatives would require the eight appointed members, by unanimous vote, to appoint the remaining four members of the commission from the list of finalists generated by the Nominating Commission. If the commissioners fail in their responsibility to make these appointments, the proposed Initiatives would require the director of the General Assembly's nonpartisan research staff to randomly select names from the Nominating Commission's list in a public drawing until the commission is filled with members who collectively meet the geographic residency requirements.

         ¶7 On April 8, 2016, Proponents submitted a final version of Initiatives #132 and #133 to the Secretary of State. On April 20, 2016, the Title Board conducted hearings for each initiative and set titles in accordance with section 1-40-106(1), C.R.S. (2015). On April 27, 2016, Petitioner filed motions for rehearing, arguing that the Initiatives contain multiple subjects in violation of article V, section 1(5.5) of the Colorado Constitution. After a rehearing on April 28, 2016, the Title Board denied both motions. Following the rehearing, the title set for Initiative #133 states:

An amendment to the Colorado constitution concerning state legislative redistricting and, in connection therewith, restructuring the state commission that sets boundaries for state senatorial and representative districts to require at least 4 of the 12 commissioners be affiliated with a minor political party or unaffiliated with any political party; prohibiting commissioners from being registered lobbyists or members or candidates for the U.S. Congress or the Colorado legislature; requiring the agreement of at least 8 of 12 commissioners to approve any action of the commission; adding competitiveness as the final criteria to be used in drawing state legislative districts; establishing a procedure to set legislative district boundaries if the commission is unable to adopt a plan; and requiring that the commission's work be done in public meetings.

         ¶8 The title set for Initiative #132 is similar to the title set for #133, except for an initial reference to "redistricting" (in lieu of "state legislative redistricting"); a reference to "replacing" (in lieu of "restructuring") the reapportionment commission; and language reflecting the newly created commission's task to establish congressional districts in addition to state legislative districts:

An amendment to the Colorado constitution concerning redistricting in Colorado, and, in connection therewith, replacing the Colorado reapportionment commission with a Colorado redistricting commission; directing that the commission redistrict congressional districts and state legislative districts; requiring the appointment of 12 commissioners, of whom at least 4 must be either a member of a minor political party or unaffiliated with any political party; prohibiting commissioners from being registered lobbyists or members or candidates for either Congress or the state legislature; requiring the agreement of at least 8 of 12 commissioners to approve any action of the commission; adopting existing criteria for congressional districts and adding competitiveness to the criteria for state legislative and congressional districts; requiring that only the nonpartisan staff of the commission may submit plans to the commission; and requiring that the commission's work be done in public meetings.

         ¶9 Petitioner invokes this court's jurisdiction under section 1-40-107(2), C.R.S. (2015). She contends that the Title Board erred in setting the titles because the Initiatives contain multiple subjects in violation of article V, section 1(5.5) of the Colorado Constitution. Specifically, Petitioner argues that both proposed Initiatives contain at least three subjects: (1) changing the existing Colorado Reapportionment Commission processes for establishing state legislative districts; (2) changing the mission and role of the Supreme Court Nominating Commission by requiring it to select the finalists for the four "swing vote" (i.e., minor party or unaffiliated) members of the reconfigured redistricting commission; and (3) curtailing the political involvement of lobbyists by prohibiting them from serving on the commission. Petitioner further contends that Initiative #132 contains a fourth subject: transferring the power to draw Colorado's congressional districts from the General Assembly to the newly created Redistricting Commission and establishing new criteria and procedures for the congressional redistricting process.

         II. Standard of Review

         ¶10 In reviewing Title Board decisions, "we employ all legitimate presumptions in favor of the propriety of the Board's actions." In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2011–2012 #3, 2012 CO 25, ¶ 6, 274 P.3d 562, 565 (quoting In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2009–2010 #45, 234 P.3d 642, 645 (Colo. 2010)). Thus we will overturn the Title Board's finding that an initiative contains a single subject only in a clear case. Id.

         ¶11 In our limited review of the Title Board's actions, we do not address the merits of the proposed initiatives or suggest how they might be applied if enacted. Id. at ¶ 8. However, we must examine their wording to determine whether the initiatives and their titles comport with the single subject and clear title requirements. In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause, & Summary for 2005–2006 #75, 138 P.3d 267, 271 (Colo. 2006). In conducting this limited inquiry, we employ the general rules of statutory construction and give words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning. In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2007–2008 #17, 172 P.3d 871, 874 (Colo. 2007).

         III. Analysis

         A. The Single Subject Requirement

         ¶12 Petitioner contends that the Title Board erred in setting titles for Initiatives #132 and #133 because both proposed Initiatives violate the single subject requirement found in article V, section 1(5.5) of the Colorado Constitution, which provides:

No measure shall be proposed by petition containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title; but if any subject shall be embraced in any measure which shall not be expressed in the title, such measure shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed. If a measure contains more than one subject, such that a ballot title cannot be fixed that clearly expresses a single subject, no title shall be set and the measure shall not be submitted to the people for adoption or rejection at the polls.

See also § 1-40-106.5, C.R.S. (2015) (addressing the constitutional single subject requirement).

         ¶13 The single subject requirement serves two functions. First, the single subject requirement "is intended to ensure that each proposal depends upon its own merits for passage." In re Proposed Initiative on Public Rights in Waters II, 898 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Colo. 1995); see also § 1-40-106.5(1)(e)(I), C.R.S. (2015) (single subject requirement "forbid[s] the treatment of incongruous subjects in the same measure, especially the practice of putting together in one measure subjects having no necessary or proper connection, for the purpose of enlisting in support of the measure the advocates of each measure, and thus securing the enactment of measures that could not be carried upon their merits"). Like the constitutional single subject requirement for bills passed by the General Assembly, the single subject requirement for ballot initiatives prevents proponents from engaging in "log rolling" tactics, that is, combining multiple subjects into a single initiative in the hope of attracting support from various factions that may have different or even conflicting interests. In re Title, Ballot Title, & Submission Clause for 2013–2014 #76, 2014 CO 52, ¶ 32, 333 P.3d 76, 85; In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause, & Summary for 1997–1998 #84, 961 P.2d 456, 458 (Colo. 1998).

         ¶14 Second, the single subject requirement is intended "to prevent surprise and fraud from being practiced upon voters" caused by the inadvertent passage of a surreptitious provision "coiled up in the folds" of a complex initiative. § 1-40-106.5(1)(e)(II); In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for Proposed Initiative 2001–2002 #43, 46 P.3d 438, 442 (Colo. 2002).

         ¶15 To satisfy the single subject requirement, "the subject matter of an initiative must be necessarily and properly connected rather than disconnected or incongruous." In re 2011–2012 #3, ¶ 9, 274 P.3d at 565 (internal quotation marks omitted). A proposed initiative presents only one subject if it tends to effect or carry out one general objective or purpose; minor provisions necessary to effectuate the single objective or purpose of the initiative may be properly included. See In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause, & Summary for 1999–2000 #256, 12 P.3d 246, 253 (Colo. 2000).

         ¶16 Conversely, "[a]n initiative violates the single subject requirement where it relates to more than one subject and has at least two distinct and separate purposes." In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2013–2014 #90, 2014 CO 63, ¶ 11, 328 P.3d 155, 159. If an initiative advances separate and distinct purposes, the fact that they both relate to the same general concept or subject is insufficient to satisfy the single subject requirement. In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause, & Summary for 1997–1998 #64, 960 P.2d 1192, 1196 (Colo. 1998); see also In re 2001–2002 #43, 46 P.3d at 442 ("[A] proponent's attempt to characterize his initiative under some overarching theme will not save an initiative containing separate and unconnected purposes."). "Grouping the provisions of a proposed initiative under a broad concept that potentially misleads voters will not satisfy the single subject requirement." In re Proposed Initiative 1996–4, 916 P.2d 528, 532 (Colo. 1996).

         B. The Titles Violate the Single Subject Requirement

         ¶17 Proponents assert that all of the provisions of the two Initiatives relate to the single subject of "redistricting in Colorado" and thus satisfy the constitutional single subject requirement. They contend that the central purpose of the Initiatives is to end the practice of political gerrymandering in the redistricting process, and that the Initiatives seek to achieve this purpose through the proposed changes to the Reapportionment Commission.

         ¶18 We recently held that a host of significant changes to the manner in which recall elections are triggered and conducted constituted a single subject. In re 2013–2014 #76, ¶¶ 17–25, 333 P.3d at 81–83 (describing changes to signature thresholds, ballot content, manner of filling vacancies, the applicability of campaign finance laws, and petition circulation requirements for recall elections as constituting a single subject). In this case, Initiatives #132 and #133 propose comparable changes to the current Reapportionment Commission and its processes for establishing state legislative districts. To the extent Initiatives #132 and #133 modify the criteria to be used in drawing legislative districts, subject the restructured commission to open meetings and open records laws, require a two-thirds vote of commissioners to approve any action of the commission, change the process for drafting and approving redistricting plans and the process for supreme court review of such plans, and allow the reconfigured commission to adopt rules to govern its administration and operation-such changes to the state legislative redistricting process collectively constitute a single subject. See id. at ¶ 25, 333 P.3d at 83.

         ¶19 However, Initiatives #132 and #133 also propose a significant change to the mission and role of the existing Supreme Court Nominating Commission; moreover, Initiative #132 also proposes a fundamental reallocation of the power to draw the districts for Colorado's seats in the U.S. Congress, removing that constitutional legislative power from the General Assembly and transferring it to the proposed new Independent Colorado Redistricting Commission. We agree with Petitioner that these aspects of the Initiatives constitute impermissible additional subjects.

         1. Changes to the Constitutional Objective of the Supreme Court Nominating Commission

         ¶20 In 1966, Colorado voters enacted the state's judicial merit selection system as part of article VI of the Colorado Constitution, which addresses the Judicial Department. Article VI, section 24 describes the Supreme Court Nominating Commission and the process by which members are appointed. Colo. Const. art. VI, §§ 24(2), (4). Article VI, section 20 tasks the Nominating Commission with creating a list of three nominees for vacancies on the supreme court and court of appeals. Id. § 20(1). This provision requires the Nominating Commission to certify and submit the list to the Governor within thirty days after a vacancy occurs. The constitutional role of the Supreme Court Nominating Commission is limited to this specific function for the judicial and executive branches; under current law, it has no role whatsoever in the process of either state legislative redistricting or congressional redistricting.

         ¶21 Petitioner argues that by requiring the Nominating Commission to select finalists for the four minor party or unaffiliated members of the reconfigured Reapportionment Commission, the proposed Initiatives fundamentally alter the constitutional role and mission of the Nominating Commission. Petitioner contends that because "redistricting in Colorado" does not encompass "changes to the objective of an independent judicial nominating commission, " the Initiatives hide a second subject from unwary voters, allowing surprise and fraud to be practiced upon them, see § 1-40-106.5(1)(e)(II).

         ¶22 Proponents counter that the Initiatives' implementing provisions, including the proposed new role of the Nominating Commission, are directly connected to the central purpose of depoliticizing redistricting and are therefore not separate subjects.

         ¶23 At first blush, the proposed involvement of the Supreme Court Nominating Commission in recommending finalists for these seats appears to be simply part and parcel of the host of changes to the proposed reconfigured Reapportionment Commission. However, this aspect of the proposed Initiatives reaches beyond changes to the Reapportionment Commission to fundamentally alter the role and objective of an unrelated constitutional commission.

         ¶24 In In re 1997–1998 #64, this court held that a provision in a proposed initiative that altered the composition and powers of the Commission on Judicial Discipline violated the single subject requirement because it was not properly and necessarily related to the initiative's purpose, which was to alter the qualifications of judicial officers. 960 P.2d at 1197, 1199. We observed that the Commission on Judicial Discipline is an independent constitutional body with power derived from "a separate and independent constitutional basis" than the judicial branch. Id. at 1199. We reasoned that altering the powers of this separate commission furthered a distinct purpose, and therefore violated the single subject requirement. Id. at 1199–1200.

         ¶25 Likewise, Initiatives #132 and #133 would fundamentally change the role and mission of the Nominating Commission, a separate and independent commission that currently has no role whatsoever in the legislative process of redistricting. We have observed that "[r]edistricting is an incredibly complex and difficult process that is fraught with political ramifications and high emotions." Hall v. Moreno, 2012 CO 14, ¶ 1, 270 P.3d 961, 963; accord Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1012 n.9 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that redistricting is "inherently political"). By contrast, Colorado voters created the judicial nominating commissions in article VI, section 24 to foster an independent judiciary by separating and insulating the courts from politics. See Formal Op. Att'y. Gen. No. 04–03 (April 12, 2004). By adding to the Nominating Commission's otherwise apolitical role of recommending judicial appointments the new and inherently political task of recommending members for the reconfigured Reapportionment Commission, the proposed Initiatives would do more than restructure the Reapportionment Commission-they would fundamentally change the role and mission of the independent Supreme Court Nominating Commission.

         ¶26 Initiatives #132 and #133 run the risk of surprising voters with a "surreptitious" change not anticipated by the seemingly neutral requirement that the Nominating Commission recommend candidates for appointment to the Redistricting Commission. See § 1-40-106.5(1)(e)(II). We have disapproved of second subjects "coiled up in the folds of a complex proposal, " e.g., In re 2013–2014 #76, ¶ 32, 333 P.3d at 85, and we conclude that the proposed changes to the Nominating Commission are just that. Although the Petitioner does not challenge the language of the titles set by the Title Board, we note that voters would have no notice of this fundamental shift because the titles make no reference whatsoever to the Nominating Commission's changed role.[2]

         2. Transfer of Congressional Redistricting Power from the General Assembly to the New Redistricting Commission

         ¶27 Petitioner also contends that proposed Initiative #132 violates the single subject requirement by removing the power to redistrict Colorado's congressional districts from the General Assembly and transferring it to a newly created Redistricting Commission. We agree.

         ¶28 In In re 1997–1998 #64, we also addressed a provision of the proposed initiative to alter the qualifications of judicial officers that would have repealed article VI, section 26 of the Colorado Constitution-the provision that grants the City and County of Denver home rule control over its own county court judges. 960 P.2d at 1198. We reasoned that although this provision indirectly affected the qualifications of Denver County court judges in the sense that it changed the governmental entity that controls those qualifications, the proposed repeal of this provision nevertheless served the separate purpose of "reallocating governmental authority and control" over Denver County court judgeships. Id. We concluded that this reallocation of power did not share a unifying or common objective with the provisions of the proposed initiative changing the qualifications of judicial officers, and therefore held that this provision violated the single subject requirement. Id.

         ¶29 Initiative #132 bears a similar flaw: Although shifting the responsibility of congressional redistricting to the Reapportionment Commission affects its duties, the objective of this aspect of the proposed Initiative is to reallocate constitutional authority and control over congressional redistricting. Such a reallocation of constitutional power is a separate and discrete objective, and its inclusion in Initiative #132 therefore violates the single subject requirement.

         ¶30 The authority of the General Assembly to define congressional districts derives from article I, section 4 of the United States Constitution. Since statehood, the Colorado Constitution also has expressly placed with the General Assembly the responsibility to divide the state into congressional districts. See Colo. Const. art. V, § 44.[3] Initiative #132's proposal to remove this constitutional authority for congressional redistricting from the General Assembly and transfer it to the newly created Redistricting Commission thus affects separate redistricting processes derived from different sources of constitutional authority.

         ¶31 Proponents argue that the "practical reality" is that congressional and legislative redistricting involve similar issues and goals, regardless of underlying authority, and thus both are properly included in the broader subject of "redistricting in Colorado." We disagree. The fact that these two processes are addressed by separate constitutional schemes is meaningful and relevant to the single subject analysis. See In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause, & Summary With Regard to a Proposed Petition for an Amendment to Constitution of State Adding Section 2 to Article VII (Petition Procedures), 900 P.2d 104, 109 (Colo. 1995) (holding that an initiative combining procedural and substantive changes to recall, referendum, and initiative petitions involved multiple subjects in part because the "Colorado Constitution treats these different citizen initiated measures in separate sections").

         ¶32 Contrary to Proponents' assertion that legislative and congressional redistricting are closely related and involve comparable criteria, the Colorado Constitution addresses these processes separately and provides different levels of guidance for each. State legislative redistricting is described in detail in article V, sections 46 to 48. See Colo. Const art V, § 46 (directing that the state be divided into senatorial and representative districts based on population); id § 47 (setting forth guidelines for creating district boundaries); and id § 48 (creating the Reapportionment Commission and tasking it with developing a plan for state legislative districts) These provisions list "a hierarchy of criteria" for measuring the adequacy of a state legislative redistricting plan, namely, equalizing population among the senate districts and among the house districts; restricting unnecessary division of counties; making each district as compact as possible; limiting the aggregate linear distance of the boundaries; and preserving communities of interest In re Colo. Gen Assembly, 332 P.3d 108, 110–11 (Colo 2011)

         ¶33 "In stark contrast to its elaborate provision for state senate and representative districts, the state constitution provides almost no guidance for or limitation on the general assembly's division of the state into congressional districts, other than requiring it do so" Hall, ¶ 104, 270 P.3d at 982 (Coats, J, concurring) (citations omitted). Thus, state legislative redistricting and congressional redistricting are distinct processes derived from distinct sources of constitutional authority and governed by different standards.[4]

         ¶34 Importantly, Initiative #132 creates a danger of log rolling because the Initiative may attract a "yes" vote from voters who are unhappy with the current process for state legislative redistricting and would support restructuring the Reapportionment Commission but who might oppose removing the power to draw congressional districts from the General Assembly, or vice versa. See In re 2013–2014 #76, ¶ 8, 333 P.3d at 79. Although Proponents contend that giving the Redistricting Commission the added responsibility of congressional redistricting is properly related to the overarching subject of "redistricting in Colorado, " we disagree.

         ¶35 We conclude that the removal of constitutional power over congressional redistricting from the General Assembly and the reallocation of that power to the Redistricting Commission constitutes an impermissible separate subject in violation of article V, section 1(5.5) of the Colorado Constitution. Such a reallocation of constitutional power is a separate and discrete objective, and its inclusion in Initiative #132 therefore violates the single subject requirement. See In re 2001–2002 #43, 46 P.3d at 442 (noting that a proponent's attempt to characterize an initiative under some overarching theme will not save an initiative that contains separate and unconnected purposes); In re Proposed Initiative 1996–4, 916 P.2d 528, 532 (Colo. 1996) ("Grouping the provisions of a proposed initiative under a broad concept that potentially misleads voters will not satisfy the single subject requirement.").

         IV. Conclusion

         ¶36 By combining the restructuring of the Reapportionment Commission with changes to the constitutional role of the Supreme Court Nominating Commission, Initiatives #132 and #133 violate the single subject requirement and could unfairly mislead voters. Further, Initiative #132's removal of the power to draw congressional districts from the General Assembly and the reallocation of that constitutional power to the new Redistricting Commission constitutes an additional subject. Accordingly, we reverse the actions of the Title Board and remand these matters to the Board with directions to strike the title, ballot title and submission clauses, and to return the Initiatives to their Proponents.

          JUSTICE BOATRIGHT dissents, and JUSTICE COATS and JUSTICE EID join in the dissent.

         APPENDIX A-Initiative #132 and Titles

         Be it Enacted by the People of the State of Colorado:

         SECTION 1. In the constitution of the state of Colorado, add section 43.5 to article V as follows:

         Congressional and Legislative Appointments

         Section 43.5. Political Gerrymandering Prohibited.

         The people of the state of Colorado find and declare that fair representation requires that the practice of political gerrymandering, whereby congressional, state senate and state representative districts are purposefully drawn to favor one political party or incumbent politician over another, or to accomplish political goals, must end. The public's interest in prohibiting political gerrymandering and in creating fair and competitive plans for congressional, state senatorial and state representative districts is best accomplished by a new and independent commission of balanced appointments that is free from political influence and relies on nonpartisan legislative staff to divide the state into these districts without regard to political pressures or political considerations.

         SECTION 2. In the constitution of the state of Colorado, amend section 44 of article V as follows:

         Section 44. Independent Colorado redistricting commission. Representatives in congress. The general assembly shall divide the state into as many congressional districts as there are representatives in congress apportioned to this state by the congress of the United States for the election of one representative to congress from each district. When a new apportionment shall be made by congress, the general assembly shall divide the state into congressional districts accordingly.

         (1) After each federal census of the United States, the independent Colorado redistricting commission shall meet, in open meetings and subject to open meetings and public disclosure laws, to adopt competitive plans for congressional districts, state senate districts, and state representative districts as identified by section 45 of this article V. The commission must hold meetings throughout the state and conduct all of its activities in public and in places where members of the public are invited to attend. The commission or its staff shall not draw or adopt any plan for the purpose of favoring a political party, incumbent member of the general assembly, member of congress or other person.

         (2) The commission shall consist of twelve members who have the following qualifications:

         (a) Four members who are unaffiliated, not having been registered with any political party for a period of at least two calendar years prior to the member's appointment, or are registered with a minor political party, having been registered with that party for a period of at least two calendar years prior to the member's appointment.

         (b)Four members registered with one of the state's two largest political parties.

         (c)Four members registered with any political party, or who are unaffiliated, so long as no political party has a majority of members on the commission.

         (3)No member of the commission may be a registered lobbyist, incumbent member of the general assembly or congress, or a current candidate for one of these offices. All commission members must be qualified electors of the state of Colorado.

         (4) At least one member of the commission shall be appointed from each congressional district, so long as Colorado is not apportioned more than twelve congressional districts. No more than three members may come from any single congressional district. At least one member shall reside west of the continental divide and at least one member ...


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