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Pinnacol Assurance v. Hoff

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc

June 27, 2016

Pinnacol Assurance, Petitioner
Norma Patricia Hoff; Hernan Hernandez; Alliance Construction & Restoration, Inc.; MDR Roofing, Inc.; and Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado. Respondents

         Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals Case No. 13CA1798

          Attorneys for Petitioner: Pinnacol Assurance Harvey D. Flewelling Denver, Colorado

          Attorneys for Respondent Norma Patricia Hoff: Scott A. Meiklejohn, LLC Scott A. Meiklejohn Denver, Colorado Worstell & Associates David Worstell Thomas J. Connell Denver, Colorado

          Attorneys for Amici Curiae American Insurance Association and Property Casualty Insurers Association of America: White and Steele, PC John Lebsack Denver, Colorado

          No appearance by or on behalf of Hernan Hernandez; Alliance Construction & Restoration, Inc.; MDR Roofing, Inc.; and Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado.

          HOOD JUSTICE

         ¶1 In this workers' compensation insurance case, we consider whether an insurer had a legal obligation to notify a non-insured holder of a certificate of insurance when the insurance policy evidenced by the certificate was cancelled. Based on the certificate at issue here and the relevant statute, we conclude that the insurer had no such obligation. We therefore reverse the court of appeals' judgment to the contrary.

         I. Facts

         ¶2 Norma Hoff owns a house that she rents out through a property management agency. When the roof of the house sustained hail damage, Hoff and her husband contracted with Alliance Construction & Restoration, Inc. ("Alliance") to repair it. Without Hoff's knowledge, Alliance subcontracted the roofing job to MDR Roofing, Inc. ("MDR"). MDR employed Hernan Hernandez as a roofer.

         ¶3 While working on Hoff's roof, Hernandez fell from a ladder and suffered serious injuries. He sought medical and temporary total disability benefits for these work-related injuries, but MDR's insurer, Pinnacol Assurance ("Pinnacol"), denied the claim because MDR's insurance coverage had lapsed. Neither Hoff nor Alliance had workers' compensation insurance. Hernandez then brought an action under the Workers' Compensation Act ("WCA" or "the Act"), §§ 8-40-101 to 8-47-209, 8-55-101 to -105, C.R.S. (2015), seeking benefits against MDR, Alliance, Hoff, and Pinnacol. ¶4 The facts relevant to this claim are best summarized chronologically.

         ¶5 In July 2010, MDR applied for workers' compensation insurance from Pinnacol through Pinnacol's agent, Bradley Insurance Agency ("Bradley"). Shortly thereafter, Pinnacol issued a policy to MDR.

         ¶6 In October 2010, before starting the roofing job on Hoff's property, Alliance obtained from Bradley a certificate of insurance[1] which verified that MDR had a workers' compensation insurance policy in effect from July 9, 2010, to July 1, 2011.

         ¶7 On February 10, 2011, Pinnacol informed MDR by certified letter that MDR's insurance policy would be cancelled if Pinnacol did not receive payment of a past-due premium by March 2, 2011. Pinnacol also mailed a copy of this letter to Bradley. Alliance was not notified of the pending cancellation.

         ¶8 MDR did not pay the past-due premium, and the policy was therefore cancelled effective March 3, 2011. Pinnacol sent letters to MDR and Bradley advising them of the cancellation, but it did not send a letter to Alliance.

         ¶9 One week later, on March 10, 2011, Hernandez's injuries occurred.

         ¶10 On March 11, 2011, MDR's owner went to Bradley's office and asked to reinstate the policy. Bradley personnel informed MDR's owner that the policy could be reinstated only if the owner paid the outstanding premium, paid a reinstatement fee, and signed a "no-loss" letter, which is a statement by an insured certifying that no injuries have occurred since the insured's policy was cancelled. MDR's owner made the necessary payments and, although he knew Hernandez had been injured since the policy's cancellation, signed and submitted the no-loss letter. He did not inform Bradley of Hernandez's accident. That same day, upon receiving the payments and no-loss letter, Pinnacol reinstated MDR's policy retroactively to the March 3 cancellation date.

         ¶11 On March 16, 2011, MDR's owner returned to Bradley's office to report Hernandez's March 10 injuries. Bradley contacted Pinnacol to advise it of the claim. Pinnacol contested the claim on coverage grounds and later cancelled the policy.

         II. Procedural History

         ¶12 After conducting a hearing on Hernandez's workers' compensation claim, an administrative law judge ("ALJ") determined that Pinnacol's March 3 cancellation of MDR's insurance policy was proper. The ALJ further determined that MDR's owner's failure to disclose Hernandez's injuries when he signed the no-loss letter was a material misrepresentation that rendered void the March 11 reinstatement of the policy. As a result, MDR had no workers' compensation coverage on March 10-the day of Hernandez's injuries-and Pinnacol could not be held liable on the claim.

         ¶13 The ALJ also concluded that, in addition to MDR, who was Hernandez's direct employer, Hoff and Alliance were Hernandez's statutory employers under sections 8-41-402 and 8-41-401 of the WCA, respectively. Finding that none of these three parties had a workers' compensation insurance policy in effect on March 10, 2011, the ALJ held them jointly liable for Hernandez's benefits.

         ¶14 On appeal to the Industrial Claim Appeals Office ("ICAO" or "the Panel"), Hoff argued that, under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, Pinnacol should be barred from denying coverage because the certificate of insurance required Pinnacol to notify Alliance that MDR's policy was being cancelled, she and Alliance relied on the certificate as proof that MDR had insurance, and Pinnacol failed to notify Alliance of the policy's cancellation. The Panel rejected this argument and affirmed the ALJ's order

         ¶15 Hoff then appealed the Panel's order to the court of appeals, [2] again asserting a claim of promissory estoppel In Hoff v Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 2014 COA 137M, ___P.3d ___, a division of the court of appeals reversed, with each of the division's three judges writing separately Although the division unanimously rejected the Panel's promissory estoppel analysis, [3] id at ¶¶ 28–30; id at ¶ 46 (Casebolt, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part); id at ¶ 69 (Berger, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part), it disagreed as to how the estoppel claim should be resolved.

         ¶16 The majority (Judges Dailey and Berger) held that the certificate required Pinnacol to notify Alliance if MDR's insurance policy was cancelled and that any contrary disclaimer language[4] in the certificate was void; accordingly, this notice obligation satisfied the "promise" element of Hoff's promissory estoppel claim as a matter of law. See id. at ¶¶ 2, 31–43 (majority opinion); id. at ¶ 70 (Berger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Casebolt dissented from this holding, instead finding that the certificate was ambiguous and that "the kind and nature of the promises and disclaimers contained in the certificate present[ed] factual issues that the ALJ should first decide" on remand. See id. at ¶ 51 (Casebolt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

         ¶17 The majority (Judges Dailey and Casebolt) also held, however, that the question of whether the other elements of promissory estoppel were satisfied was a factual issue best resolved by the ALJ in the first instance and that remand was therefore necessary. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 44 (majority opinion); id. at ¶ 46 (Casebolt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Berger dissented from this holding. In his view, the facts relevant to all elements of Hoff's promissory estoppel claim were undisputed, and the court therefore should have resolved the claim as a matter of law. Id. at ¶¶ 68–69 (Berger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Applying the law to the facts, Judge Berger would have held that Pinnacol was estopped from denying coverage for Hernandez's benefits. See id. at ¶¶ 69–76.

         ¶18 We granted Pinnacol's petition for certiorari.[5]

         III. Analysis

         ¶19 We begin our analysis by addressing the appropriate standard of review and rejecting Pinnacol's contention that we should defer to the ICAO's interpretation of the WCA. We then turn to Hoff's promissory estoppel claim and, after summarizing the applicable law, examine whether the court of appeals properly determined that the initial, promise element of Hoff's claim was established as a matter of law.

         ¶20 In doing so, we first consider the court of appeals' determination that the certificate of insurance promised that the insurer, Pinnacol, would notify the certificate holder, Alliance, of policy cancellation. We conclude that the unambiguous language of the certificate contains no such promise.

         ¶21 Next, we consider the court of appeals' holding that public policy expressed in sections 8-41-402 and 8-41-404 of the WCA required it to construe the certificate as promising notice to Alliance. We conclude that nothing in the WCA supports imposing such a promise either.

         ¶22 Pinnacol was therefore under no obligation to notify Alliance of policy cancellation. Because Pinnacol did not promise to provide such notice, Hoff's promissory estoppel claim fails for lack of a necessary element. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

         A. Standard of Review

         ¶23 Pinnacol argues the court of appeals erred in not deferring to the ICAO's interpretation of the WCA. Because the ICAO has not rendered a decision addressing the precise issues before us here, we disagree that deference is owed.

         ¶24 Judicial review of the Panel's disposition of a workers' compensation claim is governed by the WCA. See Fulton v. King Soopers, 823 P.2d 709, 712–13 (Colo. 1992). Section 8-43-307 allows dissatisfied parties to appeal a Panel order to the court of appeals, see § 8-43-307(1), and several subsequent sections circumscribe the nature and scope of that court's review, see §§ 8-43-308 to -310. Section 8-43-313, in turn, allows a still-dissatisfied party to seek review of the court of appeals' decision in this court. If we grant review, our inquiry is limited "to a summary review of questions of law." § 8-43-313. In evaluating a Panel order under these provisions, appellate courts defer to the agency's factual findings but review its conclusions of law de novo. See City of Brighton v. Rodriguez, 2014 CO 7, ¶¶ 11–12, 318 P.3d 496, 501; Kieckhafer v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2012 COA 124, ¶¶ 8, 12, 284 P.3d 202, 205–06.

         ¶25 So, the presumptive standard of review is de novo for the questions of law central to this case-i.e., the proper construction of the certificate, the insurance policy, and certain provisions of the WCA. See Specialty Rests. Corp. v. Nelson, 231 P.3d 393, 397 (Colo. 2010) ("Statutory construction is a question of law . . . ."); Meier v. Denver U.S. Nat'l Bank, 431 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Colo. 1967) ("The construction of a written instrument [is] a question of law . . . .").

         ¶26 But, as Pinnacol points out, this typically unfettered review is sometimes restricted when it comes to interpreting provisions of the WCA. Although appellate courts ultimately are not bound by the Panel's legal interpretations, see Rodriguez, ¶ 12, 318 P.3d at 501, or by its earlier decisions, Kieckhafer, ¶ 8, 284 P.3d at 205, courts nonetheless traditionally give deference to the Panel's reasonable interpretations of WCA provisions, see Specialty Rests., 231 P.3d at 397; Kieckhafer, ¶ 8, 284 P.3d at 205.

         ¶27 Pinnacol seizes on this deference principle, claiming that the court of appeals' prior decision in Broderick Investment Co. v. Strand Nordstrom Stailey Parker, Inc., 794 P.2d 264, 266 (Colo.App. 1990), set forth a rule that certificates of insurance create no rights for a certificate holder and that, although Broderick did not involve workers' compensation, the ICAO has long applied this rule in the workers' compensation context. As support, Pinnacol cites four prior ICAO decisions, in addition to the Panel's decision here, and asserts these decisions "implicitly interpret the Act as not creating any contractual duty for the benefit of a certificate holder where, as here, the certificate is specifically limited to an informational document only which is subject to the terms of the policy." Accordingly, Pinnacol argues the ICAO has interpreted the WCA as not requiring notice to certificate holders, and the court of appeals erred in failing to accord deference to this interpretation.

         ¶28 None of these ICAO decisions, however, interpreted the statutory provisions on which the court of appeals relied in this case. The ICAO did not examine whether public policy underlying sections 8-41-402 and 8-41-404 of the WCA required insurers to notify certificate holders about policy cancellations and rendered void any disclaimers that would prevent certificates from serving their intended purpose under the Act.

         ¶29 In fact, three of the four prior decisions, as well as the decision below, merely applied Broderick as controlling precedent without tying that case or its purported rule to any WCA provision at all. See Hernandez v. MDR Roofing, Inc., W.C. No. 4-850-627-03, 2013 WL 858028, at *4 (Colo. ICAO Feb. 27, 2013); Lopez-Najera v. Black Roofing, Inc., W.C. No. 4-565-863, 2004 WL 2107582, at *3 (Colo. ICAO Sept. 13, 2004); Gomez v. Gonzales, W.C. Nos. 4-447-171 & 4-449-330, 2004 WL 348737, at *8 (Colo. ICAO Feb. 18, 2004); Wilson v. H & S Constr., W.C. No. 4-472-849, 2002 WL 2018806, at *3 (Colo. ICAO Aug. 30, 2002). And the other prior decision squared Broderick with a statutory provision extraneous to the court of appeals' analysis here. See Suttles v. Sherman, W.C. No. 4-308-510, 1997 WL 730627, at *4–6 (Colo. ICAO Oct. 31, 1997) (citing § 8-45-112, C.R.S. (1997)). It neither interpreted sections 8-41-402 and 8-41-404 nor considered what those provisions require of insurers vis-à-vis certificate holders. Id.

         ¶30 Thus, Pinnacol's argument suffers from the false premise that the ICAO has rendered an interpretation of the WCA provisions central to the case at hand. In other words, there is no interpretation to which we or the court of appeals could defer. We therefore apply traditional de novo review.

         B. Promissory Estoppel Does Not Apply Because There Was No Promise

         ¶31 We now turn to Hoff's claim that Pinnacol is estopped from denying coverage for Hernandez's workers' compensation benefits. In order to place the issues on which we granted certiorari in context, we first briefly summarize the law of promissory estoppel. We then consider whether there is a promise here, based on the certificate of insurance or the WCA. We conclude there is not.

         1. Promissory ...

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