and County of Denver District Court No. 13CV32572. Honorable
Robert L. McGahey, Jr., Judge.
H. Coffman, Attorney General, Jay B. Simonson, First
Assistant Attorney General, John Feeney-Coyle, Assistant
Attorney General, Sarah Page Jackson, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Wunder, Pro se.
In this civil action under part 1 of the Colorado Consumer
Protection Act (CCPA), sections 6-1-101 to -115, C.R.S. 2015,
Colorado's Attorney General (AG) alleged that defendant,
Stephen Wunder, engaged in multiple deceptive trade
practices. The district court granted the AG's motion for
summary judgment, concluding that Wunder violated the CCPA.
Then, the AG filed an unverified motion for injunctive
relief, civil penalties, and restitution. Based on the
documents filed by the parties and without holding an
evidentiary hearing, the trial court assessed statutory
penalties of $515,000 and entered a money judgment against
Wunder for restitution in excess of $6 million.
Wunder appeals and we affirm in part and reverse in part. We
affirm the court's summary judgment determination that
Wunder violated the CCPA. Because it is vague and overbroad,
we reverse a portion of the permanent injunction and remand
for reformulation. Because the court assessed civil penalties
and restitution without holding an evidentiary hearing, we
reverse those judgments and remand for further proceedings.
Relevant Facts and Procedural History
Stephen Wunder operated a Colorado-based vacation and travel
club known as Sea to Ski, LLC. Sea to Ski promised customers
significant savings on travel through purportedly exclusive
After receiving consumer complaints about Sea to Ski, the AG
investigated Sea to Ski's business practices. The AG
concluded that Sea to Ski's practices were misleading and
sued Wunder and related parties under the CCPA. The AG sought
preliminary and permanent injunctions as well as civil
penalties and restitution.
After an evidentiary hearing on the AG's motion for
preliminary injunction, the court denied relief. The AG later
moved for summary judgment on whether Wunder had violated the
CCPA, and the trial court granted that motion.
The AG then moved for permanent injunctive relief, civil
penalties, and restitution. Without holding a hearing on that
motion, the court ordered most of the relief requested by the
AG, including injunctive relief, civil penalties, and
restitution in excess of $6 million.
Wunder moved to " vacate, stay, or clarify, modify, and
amend the court's permanent injunction," arguing
that (1) the court's order incorporated by reference
material outside of the injunction itself, in violation of
C.R.C.P. 65(d); and (2) the injunction was vague and overly
broad, in violation of C.R.C.P. 65(d) and Wunder's
Fourteenth Amendment rights of due process and equal
protection. The district court agreed with Wunder's first
contention and corrected that error. It denied Wunder's
motion in all other respects.
The District Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction to
Adjudicate Whether Wunder Violated the CCPA
Wunder contends that the money judgments and injunction are
void because the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over CCPA violations committed against those Sea
to Ski members who were nonresidents of
Colorado. We reject this argument.
Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question
of law we review de novo. Tulips Invs., LLC v. State ex
rel. Suthers, 340 P.3d 1126, 2015 CO 1, ¶ 11.
Colorado district courts are vested with broad subject matter
jurisdiction, determined solely by the state constitution and
Colorado statutes. Colo. Const. art. VI, § 9; Tulips
Invs., ¶ 20. The CCPA expressly authorizes the AG
to bring actions " in the appropriate district court of
this state." § 6-1-110(1), C.R.S. 2015.
Wunder cites no authority to support his argument that the
district court lacked jurisdiction over CCPA violations
committed against nonresidents. The CCPA itself does not
limit the court's jurisdiction based on the residency of
the victims of deceptive trade practices and, indeed, makes
no distinction between consumers who reside within or outside
of Colorado. Thus, the court had subject matter jurisdiction
to adjudicate whether Wunder violated the CCPA, irrespective
of whether consumers in other states were harmed by those
The Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment
Wunder asserts that the district court erred when it granted
summary judgment against him. We reject this argument because
the AG and the district court fully complied with the
procedures required by C.R.C.P. 56 and the AG proved that it
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
We review summary judgments de novo. Brodeur v. Am. Home
Assurance Co., 169 P.3d 139, 146 (Colo. 2007). Summary
judgment is a drastic remedy appropriate only when the
pleadings and supporting documents show that no genuine issue
of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Id. The moving party
has the burden of establishing the lack of a triable factual
issue, and all doubts as to the existence of such an issue
must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party.
Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1340
(Colo. 1988). Once the moving party has met this burden, the
burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that there
is a triable issue of fact. Cont'l Air Lines, Inc. v.
Keenan, 731 P.2d 708, 712-13 (Colo. 1987).
The CCPA forbids numerous deceptive trade practices,
including: knowingly making a false representation as to the
benefits of a service, making false or misleading statements
concerning the price of services, making guarantees of goods
or services without clearly and conspicuously disclosing the
nature and extent of the guarantee and any limitations on the
guarantee, and failing to disclose material information about
the services in order to induce the customer to enter into a
transaction. § 6-1-105(1)(e), (l), (r), (u), C.R.S.
In its summary judgment motion, the AG contended that Wunder
misrepresented Sea to Ski's " exclusive" access
to discounted vacation accommodations, misrepresented the
price of those accommodations, guaranteed full refunds
without disclosing the onerous conditions of the guarantees,
and failed to disclose material information about supposedly
free prize and bonus offers used to solicit customers. The AG
supported its summary judgment motion with twenty-six
o deposition testimony from Wunder and the other defendants;
o the preliminary injunction hearing transcript;
o the text of the " buyback guarantees" offered to
o affidavits of Sea to Ski members who claimed to have been