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Espinoza v. City of Trinidad

United States District Court, D. Colorado

March 2, 2016

RICHARD ESPINOZA, RAQUEL GARCIA, ERIC GALLEGOS, JOSEPH ROMERO, MARILYN TYLER, VICKIE VARGAS, and MELISSA VIALPANDO, Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF TRINIDAD, COLORADO MEGAN GILLIS, an Officer of the Trinidad Police Department of the City of Trinidad, in her individual capacity, PHIL MARTIN, a Detective Sergeant of the Trinidad Police Department of the city of Trinidad, in his individual capacity; ARSENIO VIGIL, a Detective Sergeant of the Trinidad Police Department of the city of Trinidad, in his individual capacity; LAUREN RIDDLE, an Officer of the Trinidad Police Department of the city of Trinidad, in her individual capacity; Defendants.

STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER

Craig B. Snaffer, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiffs, Richard Espinoza, et al., and Defendants, the City of Trinidad et al., by and through their respective undersigned counsel, have stipulated to the terms of this Order. Upon a showing of good cause in support of the entry of a protective order to protect the discovery and dissemination of confidential information or information that will improperly annoy, embarrass, or oppress any Party, witness, or person providing discovery in this case, IT IS ORDERED:

RECITALS & THRESHOLD GOOD CAUSE SHOWING

1. Plaintiffs have sued Defendants for alleged violations of their Constitutional rights. Defendants deny all liability on Plaintiffs’ claims.

2. Given the nature of the case, there is good cause to believe that disclosures and discovery may involve the disclosure of confidential information. Some examples of the type of records that a party may seek to designate as confidential are the City’s policy regarding confidential informants and portions of City personnel records.[1] A blanket protective order, therefore, is appropriate in this case, and a document-by-document showing is not required. See Gillard v. Boulder Valley Sch. Dist. Re-2, 196 F.R.D. 382, 386 (D. Colo. 2000).

3. Based on these recitals and the terms of disclosure that follow, the Parties have agreed to this Stipulated Protective Order to facilitate the efficient production of information that the producing Party may claim in good faith is entitled to confidential treatment, while at the same time protecting the Parties’ interests in the confidential treatment of that information and the full and fair disclosure of discoverable information in this action.

DEFINITIONS AND TERMS

1. This Protective Order shall apply to certain documents, materials, and information not made available to the public and designated by one of the attorneys for the Parties in the manner provided in paragraph 3 below as containing Confidential Information.

2. As used in this Protective Order, "document" is defined as provided in Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(a). A draft or non-identical copy is a separate document within the meaning of this term.

3. Information designated "Confidential" or “Subject to Protective Order” shall be information that is deemed by a Party, after a good-faith review by legal counsel, to be confidential in that it implicates common law and/or statutory privacy interests. Confidential information shall not be disclosed or used for any purpose except the preparation and trial of this case.

4. Any Party to this action, after a good-faith review and determination that a document or other material contains confidential information, may designate that document or material as “Confidential” after entry of this Order by conspicuously stamping or labeling the document or material with the word “Confidential” or “Subject to Protective Order” or so indicating in the substance of the document, such as in discovery responses. Documents or materials produced by either Party shall not be treated as confidential pursuant to this Order unless they are stamped or labeled in such a fashion except as provided in this Order. The inadvertent failure to designate material as “Confidential” does not preclude a Party from subsequently making such a designation in good faith and, in that case, the material is treated as confidential only after being properly designated.

a. Parties to this action may in good faith designate deposition testimony as “Confidential” by advising opposing counsel of record, in writing, within 30 days after receipt of a copy of the transcript, or such other time period as may be mutually agreed upon by the Parties, of the pages and lines of the deposition which the Party believes in good faith are confidential. Alternatively, any Party may, on the record at the deposition, designate deposition testimony as Confidential by advising all persons present that the Party believes that the portion of the deposition in question falls under the scope of this Order.
b. In the case of mutually agreed upon joint witness interviews (should any be agreed to), by a statement of counsel during the interview in the presence of other counsel attending, if any, and following the interview, by a letter to such counsel, if any, that such interview or any portion thereof is “Confidential”.
c. In the case of any other production of discovery materials not otherwise specifically identified above, including, but not limited to computer storage devices, a written statement made by counsel of the designating Party to counsel for the other Parties to this action, that such ...

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