United States District Court, D. Colorado
Nina Y. Wang United States Magistrate Judge
Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang This matter comes before the court on three motions:
(1) Unopposed Motion For Leave To Restrict Exhibits B, C, D and E to Trans Ova Genetics, L.C.’s Daubert Motion to Exclude and Limit the Testimony and Report of XY, LLC’s Damage Expert Todd Schoettelkotte (“Schoettelkotte Motion to Restrict”) [#324], filed on October 30, 2015 by Defendant Trans Ova Genetics L.C. (“Trans Ova”);
(2) Amended Unopposed Motion For Leave To Restrict Exhibits A, B, D, and E to Trans Ova Genetics, L.C.’s Daubert Motion to Exclude Portions of the Expert Reports and to Limit Testimony of XY, LLC’s Expert Dr. James C.S. Wood (“Wood Motion to Restrict”) [#327], filed on October 30, 2015 by Trans Ova; and
(3) Unopposed Motion for Leave to Restrict Exhibits A - C to Motion of XY, LLC and Inguran, LLC to Exclude Expert Testimony (“XY Motion to Restrict”) [#328] filed on October 30, 2015 by Plaintiff XY, LLC (“XY”) and Counterclaim Defendant Inguran (“Inguran”).
These three motions were referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(a), the Order of Reference dated April 10, 2013 [#12], and the memoranda dated November 2, 2015 [#331, #332, #333]. Having considered the various motions, as well as the documents associated with them, the court hereby GRANTS IN PART, and DENIES IN PART as follows.
This case arises from a dispute between the Parties concerning a License Agreement originally entered into between XY and Trans Ova that allowed Trans Ova to use certain XY patents. [#301 at 3]. After Inguran acquired XY, it determined that Trans Ova had allegedly breached the License Agreement, and therefore, terminated the License Agreement on November 20, 2007. [Id. at 4]. XY alleges that Trans Ova breached the License Agreement in various ways, including the underpayment of royalties, violation of the improvements clause that governed improvements made to XY’s licensed intellectual property rights, unauthorized purchase of certain associated equipment, engaging in third-party development activities, breach of confidentiality, and exceeding the number of permitted sales. [Id. at 6]. In addition, XY alleges that TransOva has continued to infringe XY’s previously licensed patents. [Id. at 7-8]. XY asserts that these alleged breaches have resulted in damages well in excess of $3, 000, 000. [Id. at 9].
Trans Ova denies these charges, and asserts that the patents are unenforceable due to patent misuse, are invalid, and have not been infringed. [Id. at 19-20]. Trans Ova also contends that XY’s contract claims are barred by the statute of limitations, [#301 at 22], and asserts its own claims against XY and Inguran. Along with its counterclaims of unenforceability, invalidity, and non-infringement, Trans Ova raised a claim for monopolization and attempted monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which was subject to summary judgment in favor of XY and Inguran, [#284, #315]
Pursuant to the Practice Standards for Civil and Criminal Practice before the Honorable William J. Martinez, motions under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence are due not later than 70 days prior to the Final Trial Preparation Conference. See WJM Revised Practice Standards, § III.F.4. Judge Martinez set the Final Trial Preparation Conference for January 8, 2016, and accordingly, the Parties’ Rule 702 motions were due on October 30, 2015. These instant motions to restrict relate to such motions.
I. Standard of Review
With respect to discovery materials filed in proceedings before this court, the Supreme Court acknowledged a common-law right of access to judicial records in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). This right is premised upon the recognition that public monitoring of the courts fosters important values such as respect for the legal system. See In re Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002). Judges have a responsibility to avoid secrecy in court proceedings because “secret court proceedings are anathema to a free society.” M.M. v. Zavaras, 939 F.Supp. 799, 801 (D. Colo. 1996). There is a presumption that documents essential to the judicial process are to be available to the public, but access to them may be restricted when the public's right of access is outweighed by interests which favor nondisclosure. See United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 811 (10th Cir. 1997).
Accordingly, documents filed with this District are presumptively available to the public, and the burden is on the party seeking restriction to justify such relief. D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2(a). A showing of compelling reasons for restriction of public access is necessary, as it is critical that the public be able to review the factual basis of this court's decisions and evaluate the court’s rationale so that it may be confident that the court is functioning as a neutral arbiter. Cf. McVeigh, 119 F.3d at 814. Local Rule 7.2(c) is quite clear that a party seeking to restrict access must make a multi-part showing. It must: (1) identify the specific document for which restriction is sought; (2) identify the interest to be protected and the reasons why that interest outweighs the presumption of public access; (3) identify a clear injury that would result if access is not restricted; and (4) explain why alternatives to restricted access-such as redaction, summarization, stipulation, or partial restriction-are not adequate. D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2(b)(1)- (4). As a result, a party seeking to restrict access may not simply point to confidentiality designations with respect to materials produced in discovery and/or state that it “believes” certain materials are competitively ...