This case is subject to revision upon final publication.
Jefferson County District Court No. 02CR1048. Honorable Margie Enquist, Judge.
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Emmy A. Langley, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
The Reisch Law Firm, LLC, R. Scott Reisch, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
[¶1] Defendant, Jason Scott Anderson, appeals the district court's order denying his motion to terminate his probation pursuant to section 18-1.3-1008(2), C.R.S. 2014. That statute permits a court to discharge the indeterminate probation sentence of a sex offender convicted of a class four felony after the offender has served ten years of probation. Anderson presents the following question: where a sex offender is sentenced to probation after revocation of a deferred judgment, should the period of supervision under the unsuccessful deferred judgment count toward calculating the offender's total time served on probation? We answer that question " no" because the plain language of the statute precludes such a result. We thus affirm the district court's order.
[¶2] In 2002, Anderson pleaded guilty to one count of sexual assault on a child, a class four felony, and one count of unlawful sexual contact, a class one misdemeanor. See § § 18-3-404(1)(a), -405(1), C.R.S. 2014. The prosecution dismissed three other counts. As part of the plea agreement, Anderson entered into a stipulation for a deferred judgment and sentence on the felony count, which continued the case for four years.
[¶3] In this stipulation, Anderson agreed to participate in a diversion program, to be supervised by the probation department, and to successfully complete sex offense specific treatment. He also agreed to " successfully comply with all terms and conditions of sentence" on the misdemeanor unlawful sexual contact count. On that misdemeanor count, the court sentenced Anderson to two years in jail but suspended one year on the condition that he successfully complete four years of probation and the deferred judgment term on the felony count. With respect to the other year of the jail term, the court authorized work release.
[¶4] Three years later, the probation department filed a revocation complaint. According to the department, Anderson had been unsuccessfully terminated from his sex offender treatment program for violating his treatment contract and was in arrears on payments toward the costs of his supervision. At the revocation hearing, Anderson admitted the violations alleged in the complaint, and the district court revoked both his deferred judgment and probation.
[¶5] At a March 2006 hearing, the court sentenced Anderson to probation for ten years to life on the felony count. As conditions of probation, he was required to participate in a sex offender intensive supervision probation (SOISP) program and to serve two years in community corrections. On the misdemeanor count, the court resentenced Anderson to two years of probation concurrent to his felony sentence.
[¶6] In August 2013, Anderson moved to terminate his probation and for a review hearing, pursuant to section 18-1.3-1008(2). He argued that he had " been on probation for the past eleven years." While Anderson acknowledged that his deferred judgment had been revoked, he still claimed that " for the past [eleven] years, [he] has maintained full compliance with probation and has positively progressed in his treatment." Attached to the motion was a letter from his treatment provider attesting that Anderson had " successfully completed treatment" as of March 2013. But Anderson also advised the court that the probation department " stated that [it] cannot ...